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Prelude - Abstract 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
There is a considerable practical and theoretical interest in real-timed 
concurrent systems. Previous attempts at building. theories of such systems 
have imposed time post hoc onto an extant model: we will attempt to start from 
scratch. -1 
The fundamental things of interest to us will be occurrences of events. Each 
of these occurrences will have an associated duration. Hence, each occurrence 
of an event will have a start and afinish. Causality will be modelled by giving 
a partial order to these starts and finishes, while timing will be modelled by 
associating each of them with a real number. 'I'lle causal part of the model will 
thus be like Winskpl's event structures, (especially once we add conflict), while 
the timed part will associate an interval of the reals with each occurrence of an 
event; the model is therefore tenned the interval event structure model. 
Various categories are defined whose objects are interval event structures 
and whose morphisms indicate when one interval event structure can sinallate 
another. Operafions such as nondeterniinistic and parallel composition of inter- 
val event structures are defined as limits in these categories. 
A seinantics is given to the model by considering when bets placed on an 
interval event structure about its subsequent behaviour may and must win. 
The interval event structure model suggest a natural finied process algebra, 
interval process algebra. 'Ibis algebra is developed and given both denotational, 
axiomatic and operational semantics. The denotational and axiomatic semantics 
are proved equivalent. Some consideration is given to the relationship between 
various 'truly concurrent' operational techniques, our own included. 
Finally, notions of event refinement and abstraction for interval event struc- 
tures are proposed. 
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Introduction: 
Motivations and Justifications 
Light thickens, and the crow 
Makes wing to th'rocky wood. 
Good things of day begin to droop and drowse, 
While night's black agents to their prey do rouse. 
Thou marvell'st at my words; but hold thee still. 
Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill 
So prithee go with me. 
Shakespeare 
This thesis is about a model of concurrency incorporating thne and causality. Concurrency 
theories with these concerns are not new, but there are various ways to build such a theory, 
and the one adopted here is, to the best of my knowledge, unique. 
We shall be concerned with putting time on an equal footing with causality, rather than 
merely adding it to an extant model. This is because the order on time is just as important as 
the (causal) order on happenings, and we wish to investigate the interaction of these two 
orders. In. particular, we want to discover new insights about concurrency and nondetermin- 
ism through our siudy of time. 
The thesis is composed of chapters separated by interludes; this is the first chapter; it is 
introductory, being concerned with the general problem area addressed in this thesis. This 
chapter is also meant to give some necessary background, so that the ideas motivating the 
model announced above can be understood. It is divided into five main sections. In the first, 
the general problem area addressed is explained, and its history elucidated. We shall be con- 
cerned with concurrency theories and, in particular, with the r6le of time and causality in 
concurrency theories. The second section provides a taxonomy of currently-popular untimed 
concurrency theories, and a survey of methods. This section is rather long, as there is much 
work to examine. The third section does a similar job for timed concurrency theories, and 
describes why timing is useful. 
(-, / 
. 
The fourth section is more philosophical; it describes the ontological position taken here 
on time, concurrency and causality. In the final section, some decisions are made about the 
kind of theory that will be developed in later chapters, and the origin of these decisions is 
explained. In the interlude which separates this chapter for the next my acknowledgements 
are made and the structure of the rest of the thesis is explained. 
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0.0 A short intellectual history of concurrency 
Here we will give a brief and highly personal outline of some developments in concurrency 
theory: concurrency theory started, in computer science at least, as an attempt to provide a 
formal technique for reasoning about distributed computer systems. The earliest work recog- 
nised today, such as [Petri 1962] and [Kahn 1974], concentrated on describing the flow of 
infon-nation arouiid a distributed system and, hence, the relationship between happenings in 
the system. This 'dataflow' approach turned out to be very rich, - witness the bulk of the 
Petri net literature and the subtle problems associated with Kahn processes [Brock & Acker- 
inan 19831. 
The ultimate aim of this research could be seen as the description of the behaviour of dis- 
tributed systems; all behavioural features should be correctly described, no spurious features 
should be introduced, and it should be possible to reason about behaviours. A central strand 
in this work is the treatment of causality; in a distributed system it is important to know 
what causes what, since this tells us what must be accessible to what, and hence gives 
infon-nation about acceptable implementations. Clearly not all happenings are causally relat- 
ed, so we can represent causality as a poset; elements of the poset are happenings, and a :5b 
just when a causes b. 
These 'dataflow' theories can be seen as generalisations of autoniata theory. A single 
automata- engages in its happenings sequentially, but several distributed connected 
automata possesSý the potential of concurrent, cooperative behaviour. 
A major advance in this line of work was made by Winskel, who was the first to explain 
that happenings (which h6 calls 'events') and their causality could be understood almost 
independently of the state changes that exhibit them. In ffinskel 1980] the event structure 
model was presented; this model, while closely related to Petri nets, has brought different 
issues into focus, and has propitiated the comparison of concurrency theories, (ofýwhich more 
later). 
The phrase 'true concurrency' has been coined for the work of people like Petri and 
Winskel. To understand this phrase, we need to understand nondeternzinism. Concierrency is 
intuitively about unrelated things happening, - they might. happen in different places, or 
simultaneously, but the key point about two things being concurrent is that they are causally 
unrelated. Concurrency, then, is a property of happenings. Con/Uct is also a property of 
happenings: the idea is that a and b are in conflict if they can't both happen. Thus reading this 
thesis prevents you from simultaneously reading Oliver Twist (unless you are rather 
unusual), while Nancy's untimely death prevented something ineffably twee happening to 
her. Conflict is a useful notion when modelling competition for resources, a situation that 
often occurs in distributed systems. If we don't care how conflict is resolved, (- I might 
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either have some chocolate for breakfast, or some Christmas pudding, but not, of course, 
both, and I don't mind which, ) or we don't know, then nondeterminism results. The system 
can do a, or it can do b, but not both, and there is no a priori means of telling which. Systems 
with conflict, then, can display different behaviour on different executions; they have more 
than one possible history. 
Another strand in concurrency theory sprang from the attempt not just to describe dis- 
tributed systems, but to write correct programs for them. Generalised automata theories 
were suitable for reasoning about systems with distributed state, but they were rather mono- 
lithic. Programmers needed abstraction mechanisms in order to be able to describe structural 
as well as behavioural features. The theory of process algebras sought to provide these mech- 
anisms; here the central notion was of autonomous processes, communicating by 
synchronising and passing data. Process algebras were usually compositional; large process- 
es could be constructed from small ones using process combinators representing the 
sequential combination of processes, the parallel combination of processes, the nondetermin- 
istic choice between processes and so on. Moreover, the meaning of a compound process 
could be deduced from the meanings of its -components. Process algebra is algebraic; there 
are laws for reasoning about processes which reflect the nature of the combinators. 
Process algebras meet a certain need, and are beautifully simple to use. However, initially 
at least, they relied on a suspension of disbelief in the user, as they did not have a notion of 
concurrency. The concurrent execution of a and b was modelled by the nondeterministic 
choice between the two sequentialisations, ab and ba. Not only are complex events reduced 
to atomic happenings, but also concurrency is reduced to interleaving. The idea was that 
either a happened first and then b happened, or vice versa, and since a and b were concur- 
rent, the order was not decidable a priori. Thus representing a happening by a single 
(notional) instant in time, and adopting interleaving, leads to a model without a primitive 
notion of concurrency. Hence the origin of the phrase 'true concurrency' for the causality-as- 
a-poset tradition; here concurrency is a primitive notion, not derivable from nondeterminism. 
In the next section some models derived from these two traditions will be discussed and 
compared. Before moving on, we will outline a few minority traditions. 
The design of hardware has always been seen by concurrency theorists as an 
exercise in their discipline. Only recently, however, has concurrency theory been 
able to deal tractably with the complexity and behavioural subtlety of hardware. I 
expect that more mainstream concurrency models will be used for hardware 
design in the future, rather than the somewhat parochial hardware-specific mod- 
els used in the past. This is the most technologically interesting area where 
physical concurrency (see below) must be considered. 
Chapter Nought - Introduction Page 8 
David Murphy Time, causality, and concurrency 
Logicians have provided a convenient means of speciffing distributed systems 
by developing temporal logics. In their more advanced forms, these enable dis- 
tributed states and their causality to be specified and reasoned about. We will 
not treat them in any detail, as they do not seem suited to discussing the level of 
behavioural detail we are interested in; they usually lack convenient operational 
means of strupturing systems and of describing the behavioural subtleties of par- 
tial order models. (Work is underway to alleviate these deficiencies; we may 
have cause to change our opinion in due course. ) 
Page 9 Chapter-Nought - Introductios 
Time, causality, and concurrency David Murphy 
0.1 A taxonomy of untimed concurrency theories 
This section is concerned with models of concurrency. Some popular models will be 
examined to see where they are successful and where they are more limiting. This will be 
done within the framework of a taxonomy; ours is based on that of [Pnueli 1986ii]. (Similar 
work can be found in [Reisig 1989]. ) A classification is attempted because there is a growing 
feeling that 
there are too many concurrency theories, and 
all of them have serious limitations. 
For instance, although the trace semantics of CSP is easy to understand, it is difficult to 
use as a specification tool. Similarly, systems specification can be simple in a modal logic, 
but such logics often cannot describe the behaviours the 'true concurrency' school find 
interesting. By classifying a model we can, perhaps, see which features of it contribute to its 
advantages and disadvantages. 
It would be nice to be able to talk about behaviours without worrying about how those 
behaviours are represented. This jump up to a higher level of abstraction is not possible yet, 
so we will have to be content with trying to discover what questions about behaviours we 
are interested in answering, and with formalising our notions of what a behaviour is, so that 
we can ask and answer those questions efficiently. A classification of models of concurrency 
in terms of how they deal with behaviours might, therefore, be a useful one. 
One distinction to be made is that between finictional and reactive systems. A functional 
system is one whose interaction with the environment is best viewed as a function. Such 
systems take some input, produce some output and then stop. Many sequential programs 
are of this form. On the other hand, a reactive system is one whose interaction with the 
environment is much less directional. Such systems should often, in the ideal case, run for 
ever; examples include operating systems and process control applications. We are 
essentially concerned with the behaviour of reactive systems. (This classification by r6le 
seems more appropriate than the sequential/concurrent classification, which is one by 
implementation. ) 
0.1.1 Physical and Abstract Concurrency 
Another important distinction is that between physical and abstract concurrency. Abstract 
concurrency is the form usually studied in theoretical computer science, as it is the form 
which is displayed by common applications, clocked digital systems, transaction processing 
systems and so on; it can usually be simulated on a sequential (possibly nondeterministic) 
machine with a countable number of states, as it only involves at most a countable number of 
interactions between concurrent components. The title of [Hoare 1985] describes abstract 
concurrency perfectly, - 'communicating sequential processes. ' 
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However, most of physical reality displays a different form of concurrency. This form, 
which we call 'physical concurrency' is that displayed by analogue systems (and digital ones 
if you clock them fast enough, but that is another story), biological systems and so on. It 
involves the wholly asynchronous exchange of real-valued signals between autonomous 
components, so a countable infinity of happenings is inadequate for describing it. 
It is clear that-c6itain features of physical concurrency (such as synchronisation failitre, 
[Barros & Johnson 19831, [Marino 19811) and chaos ([Deane et al. 1989], [Schuster 1984]) 
are not accessible to modelling by discrete calculi. Their description seems to rely crucially 
upon real-valued time. Yet, despite their descriptive power, there are considerable problems 
with the use of continuous calculi in concurrency theory viz: 
" there is no accepted method of presenting an analysis in these calculi. In 
particular, there is little notion of precisely what is necessary in order to prove 
something about a system. Further, continuous calculi are often not axiomatised, 
leading to worries about nonstandard models. If proofs in continuous calculi are to be 
comparable in rigour with those in discrete ones, much work in necessary to ensure 
that it is clear what is being proved about what system. Even careful work such as 
[Mendler 19871ýan suffer from the disadvantage that it is not always clear precisely 
what intuitions are being exploited. 
* continuous calculi have little analytical power. In a discrete calculus such as 
CSP, one can state just what it means for two processes to be the same, one can 
combine procýsses in several ways, and one can prove properties true of processes. 
CSP processes are simple, not very descriptively rich mathematical objects, but they 
are related to many other mathematical objects (domains, cpos, categories, 
topological spaces, synchronisation trees) in ways that give some insight into their 
nature and possible behaviour. Their theory can be said to have analytical power 
because of its various semantics (which relate CSP objects to other objects) and 
because of the transparency of composition. (Objects can be analysed via their 
component parts and the analyses composed just as the parts are composed. ) In 
contrast it cannot be said that it is clear, for instance, what the semantics of general 
circuit theory is, or what a natural calculus of composition for asynchronous circuits is 
like (although some progress has been made in this direction; cf. [Cardelli 1982]). 
0 there are difficulties in accepting the richness of R. The reals are not only 
rich enough to describe certain physically observed pathologies of behaviour, they are 
also rich enough to describe many unphysical ones (such as the function that takes 
the value 0 on the rationals and 1 on the irrationals). This criticism applies in part to 
Q and N as well, since there are uncomputable functions over these domains too. 
The problem is this; continuous calculi are complex enough to describe physical concurren- 
cy, but are too complex to enable those descriptions to be easily manipulated and reasoned 
about. Discrete calculi cannot describe some phenomena of interest, but they do possess 
considerable power, with concomitant insights. 
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Further, many of the properties of concurrent systems that are traditionally of interest 
(such as deadlock, divergence, reachability, satisfaction of specification, refinement and so 
on) are easily and naturally formulated in a discrete framework. Simplistically we might say: 
uncountable objects seem to be goodfor describing behaviour, 
but they are harder to reason with. 
One eventual aim -of concurrency theory, then, is to be able to provide a tractable theory of 
physical concurrency. Physical concurrency, after all, is not only an interesting problem 
because it exists; it also legitimises all work on abstract concurrency (much as Maxwellian 
electrodynamics legitimises conventional circuit theory). 
Although we will not deal extensively with physical concurrency, a concern for the 
necessity of modelling it motivates much of this thesis. These matters are further discussed 
in section 0.3. 
After considering the problem of physical concurrency, and presenting some ideas about 
mathematics that might be useful to describe it, [Petri 1986] says: 
"This histifles the hope that all implemen table signalling structures, discrete as well as 
continuous (digital as well as analogue) may be completely described in terms of 
concurrency, using combinatorial inathenzatics only. " 
I am not this enthusiastic, but I do feel that we are beginning to understand concurrency 
well enough to býe able to apply it to this level. The table overleaf summarises rather glibly 
some of this distinctions made in this subsection: after it we continue describing some fea- 
tures relevant to the classification of models of abstract concurrency. 
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PHYSICAL CONCURRENCY 
REALITY 
Physical Reality (including the Proof of 
correctness of all theories of abstract 
concurrency and-true neural computers) 
ALL CONTINUOUS 
SYSTEMS 
MODELS 
0 partial differential equations of physics 
ADVANTAGES 
great predictive power 
verisin-dlitude 
DISADVANTAGES 
complex, with few deep concepts 
little analytical power 
-f-ime, causality, and concurrency 
ABSTRACT CONCURRENCY 
" TRANSACTION PROCESSING cics 
" SERIALISABLE COMPUTING 
occarm Meye, Ada 
, 14 DIGITAL HARDWARE (hopefully) 
0 PROCESS CALCULI CSP, ACP, CCS 
0 (Discrete) TEMPORAL LOGICS 
ITL, CTL* 
0 TRANSITION SYSTEMS Petri Nets 
and so on 
great analytical power 
quite simple 
not how most of the world works 
A summary of some of the 
differences between physical 
and abstract concurrency 
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0.1.2 The available theories 
David Murphy 
Commonly studied properties of modeW of abstract reactive systems, - concurrency, non- 
determinism, hiding, confusion, fairness, liveness, reachability, safety, guarantee, persis- 
tence, recurrence and so on, - are valuable starting points in analysing behaviours. One 
should obviously be concerned with the expressiveness of a model; does it capture the 
behaviour of interest ? (Cf. [Wolper 1986]. ) Is it sufficiently expressive both constructively 
(writing the processes we want) and prescriptively (writing the specifications we want) ? 
Notice that there is a trade-off between the expressive power of a model and the complexity 
of states within it. 
Some insight into five of these issues can be gained from modal logic by using the modal 
quantifiers 0 and 13, corresponding to eventually and always; the safety of a proposition p cor- 
responds to Op, guarantee to Op, recurrence to 130p, persistence to 011p and fairness to 
00p v 110p; this point is discussed in [Pnueli 1986ii]. These relationships can be visu- 
alised: 
Fairness 
OE3p vOop 
Persistence Recurrence 
oElp p 
Safety 
X 
Guarantee 
El p Op 
(Aside: The classification of various requirements has been undertaken by [Kiviatkoivsk-a 
1989]. She shows that various kinds of properties correspond to various notions of open set 
in topologies generated by the executions of a concurrent system. ) 
There are other issues that should be considered, en passant, when evaluating a model: 
* How tractable is it; can behavioural descriptions be manipulated easily ? Some 
models can describe many behaviours but are hideously intractable. The main 
work on tractability and complexity is American; [MairSOn 1987] offers a taste of 
this field for the CSP hacker, [Clarke 19811 does the same for the temporal 
logician. See also [Harel et al. 19821. 
t- We shall use the term 'model' quite loosely, using it for either a syntax with some (or many) semantics, 
or for a semantic technique. I shall also use the word 'process' for any object intended as a model of (a part 
of) a computational system. 
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* Is the model related to other models ? Various individual relationships are 
explored in [Astesiano 19851, [Best 1986], [Degano et al. 1987i-iii], [van 
Glabbeek & Vdandrager 1987], [Goltz 1988], [Goltz & Reisig 1983], [Manna & 
Wolper 1984], [Plotkin 1982], [Thomas 1987] and [Winskel 1987i, iij. General 
techniques for relating semantics are discussed in section 0.1.6. 
* There is -a spectrum of activities that are thought of as specification, running 
from requirement specification to detailed design. Each model of the behaviour of 
a reactive system may be suitable to a different phase of this process. [Olderog 
1989] and [Pniieli 1986ii] maintain, for instance, that trace formulas are appropri- 
ate for requirements specification (as they are abstract, and so don't force us to 
state too much inappropriate detail), process algebra terms are appropriate for 
systems specification and architectural design, and an implementational model 
like the Petri nets fon-nalism is appropriate for detailed design. 
These points will not be discussed any further, but they should be bom in mind when 
choosing a model for a specific purpose. Valuable comparisons can be made by studying such 
review articles as [de Bakker et al. 1986a], [Broy & Streicher 1987], [Denvir et al. 19831, 
[Emerson & Halpern 19851, [Pnueli 1986i], and [de Roever 1985] Cf. also [de Bakker et al. 
1986b] & [Barringer 1985]. 
The models currently on offer will now be examined. I shall use the term 'syntax' for for- 
malisms that seem mainly syntactic or for which people seem anxious to give a semantics. 
Similarly I use ! semantics' for fon-nalisms that seem to be adequate by themselves and 
where there is some consensus that they do not need explaining further. Tile borderline is a 
trifle blurred; this is indicated by moving those fon-nalisms whose r6le seems particularly 
uncertain towards the middle of the classification, and not extending the line through them. 
The principle references to these models are: CCS, [Milner 19801; SCCS, [Milner 1983]; 
CSP, [Brookes et al. 1984], [Hoare 1985]; ACP, [Bergstra & Klop 1984]; COSY, [Laiter et 
al. 19791, [Lauer & Shields 1983]; occam, [Jones & Goldsmith 1987]; Ada, [ANS11MIL- 
STD 1815A]; Coroutines & similar techniques, [Filman & Friedman 1984]; Monitors, 
[Hoare 1974]; Hardware description languages (survey), [Davie 1986], [Murphy 19871; 
CIRCAL, [Milne 1984]; Petri Nets, [Petri 1977], [Reisig, 1985], [Best & Fernandez 1986]; 
Transition systems, [Sifakis 1982]; Event structures, [Nielsen. et al. 19811; Behavioural pre- 
sentations, [Shields 1988]; Branching time temporal logic, [Ben-Ari et al. 1983]; Linear time 
temporal logic, [Pnueli 1981], [Moszkowski 1986], [Wolper 1986]; Modal logic, [Stirling 
1987]; H. O. L., [Gordon 1985]; Hennessy-Milner Logic, [Hennessy & Milner 1985]; Trace 
languages, [Mazurkiewicz 1986], [Aalbersberg & Rozenberg 19881; Regular (0-languages, 
[Buchi 1962], [Park 1981]; Interval temporal logic, [Manna et al. 1983], [Schwartz et al. 
19831. The references continue overleaf. The discussion of timed models is deferred until sec- 
tion 0.2. 
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The major classes of theory are presented in the following table: - 
Syntax 
Process algebras: CCS, SCCS, CSP, 
ACP, COSY. 
Programming Languages and Features; 
occam, Ada, Monitors, 
Coroutines, etc. 
Hardware description languages: 
CIRCAL etc. 
Semantics 
Set-based; set of traces, failures, ready 
actions, divergences, refusals. 
c. p. o. - or lattice-based; Scott-Strachey 
style. 
Observational Semantics. 
Operational Semantics. 
Partial order Semantics. 
Petri Nets 
Event Structures 
Transition Systems 
Behavioural Presentations 
Logics; Temporal, Modal, and Higher Order Logics, 
HennessY-Milner Logic 
Trace- and regular (o-Languages 
Timed variants of the above; TCSP, 
timed Petri nets, real-time temporal 
logic, etc., interval temporal logic. 
This, then, is the territory to be mapped; we have mainly concerned ourselves with 
compositional models, that is, models where complex processes can be built up from simpler 
ones using some natural notion(s) of composition. The properties of the whole should bear 
some relationship to. the properties of the pails. It is not clear, for instance, if finite state 
automata can be so described. 
References continued: Trace, failure, and divergence set semantics, [Hoare 1985], 
[Brookes & Roscoe 1985]; ready-set semantics, [Olderog & Hoare 1986]; Scott-Strachey 
style semantics, [Stoy 1977]; categorical semantics, [Winskel 1984ii]; metric space 
semantics, [de Bakker & Mayer 1988], [Kok & Rutten 1988]; observational semantics, 
[Hennessy 1988], [Degano et al. 1988]; operational semantics [Plotkin 1981]; Partial order 
. semantics, [Pratt 1986]. My apologies for everything I have left out, and for those 
references that are not as definitive as the reader would like. 
It is important to make the distinction between models that happen to have a certain 
semantics, - CCS, for instance, need not have a branching time semantics, - and ones which 
are purely semantic. 
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0.1.3 Time in untimed models 
In the next few subsections the differences between various models of the behaviour of 
abstract reactive systems will be examined. One obvious dichotomy is the event1state one. 
A state-based model, where events are seen as labels on state changes (as in some transi- 
tion systems) seems most appropriate for shared variable parallelism. Specification methods 
in these models concentrate on the development of a sequence of states. On the other hand, 
an event-based approach assumes that states can be deduced from examining a sequence of 
events leading up to them. This sort of model seems best suited to message-passing paral- 
lelism. Specification methods for event-based models concentrate on constraining a 
sequence of events in some way. (Note that both approaches have deficiencies in the treat- 
ment of silent orc events. *) 
There seems to be little disagreement that an instance of the observation of the behaviour 
of a concurrent system is best represented by a run, a linear sequence of events or states 
ordered by time of observation. A telling difference between models of reactive systems is 
how they group runs into behaviours which characterise the system. There are three main 
approaches based on three views of the appropriate model of time to use: 
(i) linear; all possible behaviours are represented by a set of possible runs, and a 
specification is a predicate which requires that some property is true of all runs. 
Examples include linear temporal logic, trace theories and ready set models. 
(ii) branching; here groups of runs form a computation tree which retains information 
. about whený runs part ways 
(i. e. about when choices are taken). A specification 
language in this domain must be able to express predicates over trees. Typical 
models here include branching time temporal logic and bisimulation equivalence 
[Park- 1981]; bisimulation equivalence, for example, tries to capture the notion 
that two things are equivalent just when the same choices are' available to each 
at each step in their evolution; see chapter three for details. 
(iii) partial order; these models are based on two relations, a causality relation, 
written [- (or : 5) and a conflict relation #. The relation a ý- b is true just when a in 
some sense causes b. This usually means that b cannot happen wholly before a. 
Conflict, such as a#b, means that a and b cannot happen together in any run of 
the system. A behaviour in this approach is a maximal subset of events subject 
to the causality and conflict constraints. Examples include event structures and 
Petri nets. See [Reisig 1988] for some further discussion. 
In order to further clarify things, consider how each approach deals with the following four 
CCS-like programs (overleaf). (Remember - binds more tightly than + ). This example, tak- 
*-A silent event is a 'hidden' or 'internal' event. Sometimes it is just a technical gadget, with no physical 
(i. e. observable) significance at all, but more usually it corresponds to a change of state with no externally 
visible accompanying event. Synchronisation gives rise to silent events in CCS. 
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en from [Pnueli 1986ii], makes clear how the different views of time affect which behaviours 
are defined to be equivalent. In that sense the choice of model of time is a semantic decision. 
Interleaving models cannot distinguish between concurrency (3) and choice (4). Linear mod- 
els allow prefixing to distribute through choice, and thus cannot distinguish between (1) and 
(2), although branching models can. Partial order models are the most discriminating of all. 
(The symbol - is used for a point where a decision about what to do next is made. ) 
a-(b+c) (1) 
a*b+a*c (2) 
allb (3) 
a-b+b-a (4) 
Process Linear model Branching model Partial order model 
a 
a-(b+c) [<ab>, <ac>j ýa 
bC 
Z\ 
a-b+a-c (<ab>, <ac>j aa bCII 
Cb 
a 11 b (<ab>, <ba>) brja 
ab 
Z\ 
ba 
br aII a-b+b-a (<ab>, <ba>) ab 
more discriminating 
> 
more abstract 
Figure 0.1 - The difference between linear, 
branching and partial order models 
A survey of the varieties of temporal structure is given in [van Benthem 1983], [Burgess 
1984], and [Joseph & Gosivaini 1988]. There are, of course, many temporal structures that 
have not been discussed here. The only one that we have ignored which is of major 
importance to contemporary concurrency theory is real-time. This deficiency will be remedied 
in section 0.2. 
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0.1.4 Upon semantics 
One obvious semantic decision a model must make is how to assign meaning to a syntac- 
tic object. Semantics is about eqifivalence; a semantics allows us to determine which 
syntactic objects are really the same. There are three main ways of assigning meaning: - 
(i) denotational: here meaning is given in a structure-oriented way; the meaning of 
a compound- expression is some combination of the meanings of its components, 
the combination being formed in a way that depends on the way the components 
are combined in the syntax. A typical example is Winskel's denotational 
semantics for event structures or Roscoe's divergence semantics for timed CSP, - 
see also [de Bakker & Zucker 1982]. Denotational semantics are often fairly 
inscrutable. A denotational semantics, D, assigns a denotation to every process; 
this is typically an element in a domain (Scott 1982]. A denotational semantics 
can be thought of as a mapping from terms T (over some signature E) to a domain 
D so we could write D: TZ -4 D. 
(ii) operational: this technique relies on saying what a process can do. Thus the 
effect of an operation is given on an abstract machine. A typical example is the 
transition system model for process algebras, popularised in [Plotkin 1982]. 
(iii) observational: here a process is characterised by what can be deduced from 
observations of it. See [Hennessy 19881 and [de Bakker et al. 1986,11. 
Obse 
, 
rvational equivalence can often be related to an operational semantics 
defined in terms of a transition system (so that a given observational equivalence 
is generated by a preorder over transition behaviour). 
We will use approaches (i) and (ii) in chapter four. We will also use: - 
(iv) axiomatic: here a set of laws, E, that a process should obey are set down, 
defining an algebra. A semantics is then given using a term algebra, TY, with the 
equivalence induced by the laws factored out. This approach is very useful in 
transformational approaches to process algebra. A given Yalgebra, A, is then a 
natural model of the equations E if A is initial in the class of all E-algebras that 
satisfy E, C(E). This is equivalent to demanding that A is isomorphic to TyJE. 
The interesting point is that the concept of 'natural' is represented formally by 
initiality. Again, see [Hennessy 1988] for details. 
These techniques correspond rather loosely -with varying notions of 
how a process is 
described; a denotational semantics allows us full access to the workings of the process 
when assigning meaning; operational approaches specify the effect of an operation on an 
abstract machine, while observational techniques merely rely on having something to put in 
parallel with the process. There is clearly a scale of introspection of mechanism, running from 
complete knowledge of the process, to complete ignorance of everything about it except its 
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interaction with some agent. This is not wholly independent from the formalism it is 
describing, but is nearly so; there are many possible approaches to giving a semantics to 
CCS for instance, and each deserves an entry in the final classification. 
I am rather unhappy with the labels 'denotational', 'operational' and so on as 
classifications, but can find no reasonable alternative; I do not want to describe a particular 
sort of semanticý-, 'but, rather, an attitude to how much knowledge it is reasonable to ask for 
when assigning meaning. 
0.1.5 On relating semantic techniques; the full abstraction problem 
It is worthwhile to pause for a moment in our search for classifications and consider the 
relationship between various semantic techniques used in concurrency theory. This is the 
territory of the full abstraction problem. A given operational semantics is said to be fidly 
abstract with respect to a denotational one just when they identify the same terms. An 
operational semantics generates some congruence on terrns - (i. e. t- t' if t and t' have the 
same transitions in a given abstract machine), so it is fully abstract with respect to a 
denotational semanti'cs D iff t- t' <--> D(t) = D(t). 
There have been various approaches to the full abstraction problem; one technique is to 
assign a contracfion to both semantics in a complete metric space and show that these 
contractions are the same using the uniqueness property guaranteed by Banach's contraction 
mapping theoreni; [Kok & Rutten 19881 and [de Bakker & Mayer 1988] advocate this 
approach. Alternatively, one can use the algebraic characterisation given in the last 
paragraph. 
0.1.6 On relating models 
Some progress has been made recently on relating models themselves. There seem to be 
two main strategies: 
(i) Categorical. This is the technique adopted by [Bednarczyk 1987]; models are 
formulated as suitable categories (easy enough for transition systems and nets, 
harder for process algebras), and then the relations4ip between categories is 
explored using the usual category-theoretic mechanisms (essentially adjunc- 
tions). The method has also been used by ffinskel 1984ii], [Winskel 1987]. 
Difficulties lie in knowing how to give a sensible categorical treatment to certain 
operations, like sequential composition, which seem both intuitively clear and 
hard to model categorically. However, the existence of a mathematical tool which 
enables some features of different models to be compared ought to hold interest 
in concurrency theory for some time. 
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(ii) Model Theoretic. Here a grand model is proposed with all the behavioural 
features of any model which we want to relate. Individual models are then 
translated into the terms of the grand model, to see what class of structures they 
can express. This technique has been used by [Shields 1988]. The problem then 
comes in comparing grand models. 
It is worth mentioning that there is nothing in concurrency theory yet that is a model in the 
sense of model theory. Joseph Goguen has done some work on the properties that any con- 
currency theory should satisfy, with the aim of investigating the real model theory of 
concurrency. 
0.1.7 Delving into events 
There is a spectrum of positions that a model can take with regard to the status of event 
refinement. We shall, as usual, caricature this complexity by indicating three possible 
stances: 
(i) Events are always atomic: there is no such thing as event refinement, 
" difficult to define in a satisfying way, and concurrency is the same simultaneity is 
as interleaving. CSP is built from much this view. 
(ii) Events are atomic, but, under certain circumstances event refinements can 
proceed sub rosa as process transformations. Here events can have structure but 
careful attention to context is always needed. Petri nets allow this view 
[Berthelot 19871, as do many state-based approaches. [Aceto & Hennessy 
1988] investigates event refinement for a simple process algebra. 
(iii) Events are intervals. Event refinement and process refinement proceed 
independently and events can have as much structure as desired. This approach 
is implicit in real-time interval temporal logics, and explicit in [Manna et al. 
1983] and [Schivartz et al. 1983]. 
0.1.8 A plausible classification of untimed models 
This rather inchoate classification will now be applied to seven major groups of models. 
Needless to say, this classification is tentative and often conjectural. However, while 
specific classifications may be in doubt, we hope that the classifying principles will give the 
reader some insight. 
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A possible classification 
David Murphy 
Model 
View of 
Time 
Introspection 
of Mechanism 
View of 
Events 
Process algebra with linear time 
semantics e. g. the traces semantics of L D, Op?, Ob? A 
CSP 
Process algebra with branching time 
semantics e. g. the usual semantics for B Op, Ob, D? A 
CCSorCOSY 
Shared variable programming language L? Op? T? 
style parallelism 
11 
Typical hardware description usually L Op 
languages 
Distributed transition systems e. g. PO Op, D? T 
Petri nets 
Partial order models without cycles PO D, Op A 
e. g. Event structures 
Interval temporal logics B, PO? Op, D? I 
Key: L linear time, B= branching time, PO = partial order; 
D denotational, Ob = observational, Op'= operational; 
A atomic, T= transformable, I= interval; 
? particularly dubious classification 
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0.2 Timed concurrency theories 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
We shall discuss three timed concurrency theories, one from each of the major branches of 
concurrency theory. Timed CSP is based on the process algebra CSP, timed Petri nets are 
based on the partial-order Petri net framework, and real-time temporal logic is a temporal 
logic with a semant 'i' cs 
based on a continuous set of possible worlds. These models will be 
discussed briefly, in terms of their usefulness for our purposes. 
Before addressing the models themselves, it is reasonable to ask why real-timed models 
are necessary at all. After all, physical concurrency is a long way from the traditional con- 
cerns of concurrency theory, if one neglects the subtleties of asynchronous hardware. The 
answer is that many distributed systems have performance constraints. Operating systems 
have to respond to users before they decide to go away and have a cup of coffee, many other 
distributed systems, - such as process control or air traffic control systems, - also have 
sophisticated timing constraints which are usually expressed with the assumption that time 
is real-valued. We need to be able to reason about these in the same framework used for 
functional correctness. It is not always, or even usually, possible to speed up a system once 
it is 'correct. ' Dist'ributed systems are subject to subtle behaviours resulting from the com- 
pound behaviour of asynchronous subsystems; adding more processes or speeding up 
existing ones will often change the functionality of a system, not improve its performance. 
We must be able to deal with timing considerations ab initio. The discussion in [Joseph & 
Gosivand'1988] is relevant here. 
There is, then, clearly a need to be able to articulate timing constraints. But won't a finite 
or a countable model of time do ? Are the reals necessary ? Apart from the fact that the reals 
are the obvious structure to deal with time, since timing constraints are usually expressed 
over them, there are two issues; density and continuity. 
A dense model is certainly necessary (i. e. a model where there is always a point in time 
between any two given points); we cannot know what is going to happen before we have 
built the model; neither can we know when things will happen. Hence it is impossible to 
chose the correct granularity for a model that isn't dense: time based on N is therefore 
excluded. 
Continuity is more difficult. It is not known to me whether certain interesting behaviours 
(such as chaos and metastability) are expressible with a dense but not continuous time such 
as one based on Q. Certainly R seems the natural domain for describing such behaviours. (It 
would be interesting to know if work concerning the impossibility of realising certain 
behaviours, such as [Mendler 1987], was reproducible under the assumption of rational 
rather than continuous time. ) These behaviours are perverse, admittedly, but we can't say 
that a system won't display them unless they are expressible in the model. If we can't 
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express synchronisation failure, or metastability, properly, then how can we know that we 
have built a system without it ? Any model which purports to be implementable must account 
for the essential underlying complexity of the behaviour of physically concurrent systems, 
and for this real-valued (or, at least, dense) time is necessary. 
It seems silly to have an elegant, abstract model, when implementations of it will be 
hideous ad hoc, -unverified, and of dubious reliability; we should be able to descend to the 
implementational level. Further, as implementations display behaviour that is easy to 
describe under the assumption that time is real-valued, and as the timing constraints that 
implementations must satisfy can be articulated over R, real-timed models seem to have a 
place in concurrency theory. Before going on to consider the timed theories of concurrency 
currently available, we shall indulge in a more philosophical aside. 
ASIDE - Axiomatising a theory of time 
In the discussion above, we considered why R might the right choice for a model of time 
from the point of view of describing behaviours. Another approach is to adopt the 'pick-and- 
. match' method 
for.. choosing a model of time discussed in [van Benthem 19831 (but going 
back in spirit to Dedekind): we shall state the axioms we think are true of time, and see 
what models that leaves us with. Suppose < is the order of temporal precedence, that u, x, y, 
z are points in time and that A is a property of a point. Then it seems reasonable to demand: - 
transitivity (Vx, y, z. (x <z< y) => (x < y)), 
irreflexivitý (Vx. -, (x <x)), 
linearity (Vx, y. (x = y) v (x < y) v (y < x)), 
succession (Vx, 3y .y<x; Vx, 3y .x< y), 
density (Vx, y. x<y => 3z. x<z < y) and 
continuity VA . (((Vx, y. ((AxA-, Ay) =: > x< y)A3x. AxA3y . ýAy) 
3z. (Vu. (z <u => -, Ali)AVii. (it <z => All))) 
The last axiom can best be though of with the aid of a picture. One might read it 'if A is the 
property of being earlier than some point, then there is a point which that property is talking 
about. ' 
T non-A 
z 
R is certainly a model for time with these axioms, and Q isn't [van Benthenz 1983]. If we add 
separability, then we have defined R up to isomorphism. Thus R will certainly serve our 
purposes. 
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The following models will be of interest: 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
(i) Timed CSP is one of the most extensive timed models; [Davies & Schneider 
19891 contains a summary of the literature, see also [Reed & Roscoe 19871. It is 
a carefully thought-out and coherent model, based on CSP. And therein lies the 
reason it is not. adequate for our purposes: CSP has atomic events; so does timed 
CSP. This . means that a 'system delay constant, ' 8, has to be introduced to stop 
everything happening at once. This is not necessarily an undesirable approach, 
but it does mean that timed CSP doesn't agree with our intuitions. We want to 
be able to understand the effect timing has on our thinking, to discover what 
sensible operators should be like in a timed framework. In timed CSP, the timing 
has to be made to fit around the old CSP operators; there is no room for 
exploration, not enough behavioural richness to discuss the level of detail we are 
interested in. Timed CSP isn't inadequate, - far from it, it is quite useful at a 
certain level of abstraction, - but it doesn't inhabit the area of concurrency theory 
we are interested in. 
The reader m4y be wondering if there is a timed concurrency theory based on 
CCS. The only work I know of in this direction is [Tofts 1988], but this is not a 
proper timed theory, since it seems that we cannot force things to happen when 
we want, only when the process feels so inclined. The lack of a proper treatment 
of liveness (i. e. the theory will not allow one to require that something definitely 
happens at a given time), and problems regarding divergence (whereby divergent 
processes can 'stop time') are a common and regrettable deficiencies. Hennessy 
and Regan are working in this area, and their treatment is liable to be more 
satisfactory. 
(ii) Timed Petri nets. The literature on timing and Petri nets that I have been able 
to consult is quite scanty. There are two main approaches, the time Petri nets of 
[Leveson & Stolztzy 1985), [Merlin & Farber 1976], and [Merlin 1974], and the 
timed Petri nets discussed in [Carlier & Chretienne 1989), [Carlier et al. 1984), 
[Chretienne 1983], and [Ramchandan 1974]. (In each case the first few 
references are applications, and the last the presentation of the model). The 
timed Petri net model is closest to our own, so we shall discuss that. 
Timed Petri nets have times attached to transitions representing (fairly 
obviously), the time at which the transition happened. Timed nets would probably 
be sufficient for our purposes, but we will not use them. As is often the case with 
nets, we will end up with something net-like, but the construction of our model is 
only straightforward outside the world of nets. Event structures are easier to 
work with than nets (having a well developed and clean theory of composition 
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and abstraction, and well-isolated notions of conflict and nondeterminism). 
Moreover, event structures are fairly closely related to nets, so we will merely be 
abandoning net terminology, not the net-theoretic notions of concurrency, 
nondeterminism etc. 
(iii) Real Time Temporal Logic. Work here is pretty much as one would expect 
from the title. -I'lie standard reference is Koymans' thesis, while [Koymans et al. 
1987] is a good introduction. Our objection here is the lack of descriptive power. 
One can imagine a partial order real-time temporal logic, but little work has been 
done in this area, and useful results (such as normal form theorems, or dornain- 
theoretic characterisations of expressive power) seem far off. 
Some tangential mention should also be made of systems designed for the development of 
real-timed programs, and real time specification languages. In the former area the work of 
[Auernheitner & Kenitnerer 1986], [Berry et al. 1983], [Coulas et al. 1987] and [Gautier et 
al. 1986] are noteworthy, while in the latter [Beneviste & Le Guernic 1987], [Bernstein & 
Harder 1981], [Dasarathy 1982], [Ganzatie 1986], [Quenzada & Fernandez 1987], and 
fWupper & Vytopil 1987] should be mentioned. [Joseph 1988] contains some current work. 
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0.3 On the nature of a possible concurrency theory 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
It is possible to see concurrency theory as part of a wider tradition than that offered by 
computer science and discussed in the first section of this chapter. This position sees 
concurrency theory as part of natural philosophy, as an attempt to describe and reason about 
events happening and their temporal and causal relationships. There is no reason a priori to 
suppose that concurrency theory is necessarily about computational systems; any 
computation that events perform by virtue of their happening can be seen as inadvertent: 
computation is an interpretation we place on some series of happenings, not an intrinsic 
property of the happenings themselves. 
It is in this tradition that this thesis originates; we will be interested in trying to describe 
the behaviour of physical entities, where 'behaviour' will mean 'what can be seen to have 
happened. ' Another. crucial matter is that of time; intuitively when things happen is as 
important as what happens, - tomorrows' stock market prices are more interesting than 
yesterday's. Computational ly, a cashpoint that always distributes money within fifteen 
seconds may be more desirable than one that takes arbitrarily long, although certain high 
street banks seem to-disagree. 
Our paradigm will be observational. We shall imagine that everything of interest to us can 
be isolated and observed. Things will happen, and we will observe not just the fact of their 
happening. but also the time that that happening started and the time that it finished; we 
might see the ocqurrence of the event 'my supervisor is running a mile, ' starting at 11: 52arn 
and ending at 11: 59am (on the same day). We shall not participate in the events seen by any 
means; running alongside, or tripping the runner up are both disallowed. This, then, is a very 
classical viewpoint; we stand, all-seeing but aloof, recording when and what things happen. 
Two features of this stance are unusual. Firstly we shall be dealing with real time. This 
accords with our naYve-physics outlook; all physical systems that don't operate on 
microscopic or cosmic scales can be described accurately by assuming the existence of a 
single, fixed, all-seeing observer with a clock measuring time over the reals. (Even when we 
are dealing with relativistic systems the presence of such an observer is not necessarily 
contradictory - other observers may disagree with our observer, but their observations can 
be deduced from those of our observer, and in any case the fact of observation in no way 
influences what is observed for us. ) 
A second, unusual position held here is that of the 'all-seeing' observer. Most theories of 
concurrency allow 'hidden events' to occur without the knowledge of the observer. Here we 
are dealing with what happens, a level of abstraction known as the implementational level in 
computer science, and here there seems to be no point in denying ourselves information that 
is available. At higher, more abstract levels of description we may be concerned with black 
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boxes and what can be deduced about them by interacting with them, but this is a less 
observational and less classical position than we want to adopt. 
The occurrence of events is what we are interested in. We have already mentioned our 
notion of when they happen and how that is measured. How things happen is all that remains 
to discuss. 
The causality-as-a-poset position has already been outlined; Nye will adopt it. This gives 
us the advantage of fairly reasonable notions of causality, concurrency and the possibility of 
representing nondeterminism. Notice that all of these three concepts were current in natural 
philosophy long before concurrency theory began. The first serious attempts to formaIise the 
intuitions that we will exploit was made by Russell. For him, implicitly at least, concurrency 
was a property that was enjoyed by two distinct causal ly-unrelated happenings, a notion 
that we share. For us, if two happenings are concurrent, then they might be in different 
places, or occur simultaneously, or both; it doesn't matter. 
A concern for nondeterminism stretches back at least to the preordination debates of the 
-church fathers, and' like most ancient philosophical problems, it still isn't well understood 
today. There is certainly a place for the notion that the future is fundamentally unknowable, 
and that the physical world will not reveal all its secrets to us at once. This is the stance we 
shall take on the nature of nondeterminism. 
.i (Aside: it is important not to confuse several issues when discussing nondeterminism. 
There is the dichotomy between internal choice (pure nondeterminism) and external choice: a 
model may have both sorts of choice, one, the other, or neither. There is also a distinction 
between models with silent (or r) moves and ones without. Furthermore, the presence of 
silent moves (unobservable state changes) does not necessarily indicate nondeterminism; 
silent moves may come about because of hiding, (choosing to ignore some happenings) or for 
other reasons. Hiding may introduce nondeterminism, but it need not. 
One can think of a spectrum of concurrency theories, running from the most 'classical, ' - 
completely deterministic theories without silent moves or hiding, - to the most 'modem, ' - 
theories with internal (purely nondeterministic) but without external choice, endowed with 
silent moves and hiding. Our own position is midway between these two extremes: we want 
a theory with internal choice, (since we believe in nondeterminism), but without hiding (since 
we never want to deny ourselves knowledge that is available). We will occasionally use 
silent moves for sub rosa technical purposes, but they will not play an important conceptual 
r6le in the formalism. ) 
All of our stances on the foundational concepts of concurrency theory seem intuitively rea- 
sonable from a classical position. 
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0.4 A model proposed 
In the last section, a philosophical position on the nature of a possible concurrency theory 
was adopted and some of the consequences of this position were explored. In this section a 
problem area within concurrency theory is selected and a suitable formalism for reasoning 
about systems in that area is suggested; we shall cover the same ground as the last section, 
this time showing-'how the model came about from the perspective of computer science (and, 
in particular, from that of section 0.1) rather than from the perspective of natural philosophy. 
Our original motivation was the design and description of asynchronous digital systems 
[Murphy 1987]. There we suggested that certain undesirable behaviours of such (physically 
concurrent) systems could only be excluded from our designs if there was a means of 
describing genuinely continuous variables. Unfortunately, models with that capacity tend to 
be hideously intractable, so, in an attempt to get some way to full continuity without loosing 
too much analytic power, it was decided to investigate real-timed models of abstract 
concurrency. This field has the advantage that some problems in it have already been tackled 
[Koynians et al. 1985], [Davies & Schneider 1989], but not, we feel with complete success. 
(A proper criticism"of the literature on real-timed concurrency theories would be much more 
extensive than section 0.2 and, I suspect, even more trying on the reader's patience. ) 
The original problem area, asynchronous digital systems, suggests that a model with a 
notion of genuinely distributed concurrency will be important. So, a non-interleaving model is 
needed; a partiallorder one seems to offer the appropriate discrimination. Clearly, also, it is 
reasonable for us to demand a full knowledge of how systems are constructed; we are 
attempting to describe just such constructions. Thus no a priori limitations on our knowledge 
of the system will be imposed, and the semantics will be what we classed in section 0.1 
'denotational. ' 
Concurrency theories with causality and highly descriptive notions of behaviour, like event 
structures, have been discussed in this chapter. These theories seem to be the ideal forum 
for comparing various constructions, as they are rich enough to express everything that we 
are interested in. Our aim will be to take such a model and add timing, so that it has the 
sanze status as causality (rather than as an afterthought), and to explore the consequences of 
that decision. 
We want to invent a concurrency theory that will highlight the interaction of causality and 
timing, and will allow us to discover additional insight into the nature of concurrency and non- 
determinism. We have some intuitions about valid constructions in a timed model, - things 
can't happen before their causes, things can't synchronise unless their times overlap, and so 
on, - and once we have time these intuitions can be exploited. This will allow us to discuss 
what certain operations (like concurrent composition with synchronisation) should be like in 
any model which can be timed. Even if we are only interested in a model being teniporally 
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well-founded, - in the possibility of being able to assign consistent times to it, - then these 
considerations will be important. 
We have seen that many interesting behaviours can only be described by real-valued 
time. NaYvely, time is perceived as continuous. Furthermore, there seems no compelling rea- 
son to doubt that real-valued time will be adequate for the description of physical 
concurrency. A model with real-valued time based on event structures, then, seems to be 
appropriate for our investigations. 
The only further point worthy of discussion is the duration of happenings. Anything which 
happens seems to take time, - "time is nature's way of stopping everything from happening 
at once, " - occurrences of events have measurable durations. (The practicality of this view is 
evinced by [Manna et al. 1983]. ) We will embrace this simplistic analysis, abandoning the 
notion of instantaneous events popular in process algebras. Although events with duration 
could be treated by considering instantaneous starts and finishes, completely ignoring the 
fact that these starts and finishes belong to events seems unnatural. So, for us, happenings 
will have starts and finishes, with some time delay between them, and these starts and fin- 
, ishes will be formally related via the happenings that they are starts and finishes of. This 
position has the singular advantage of giving us a clean notion of event refinement; process 
refinement is now entirely separate from event refinement, and the two forms of refinement 
can proceed without interaction. Intuitively, process refinement and event refinement are 
orthogonal; once events have durations they can become so formally as well. 
The place of our model, the interval event structure model, in the scheme of things is now 
indicated. Some relationships are conjectural, some based on personal prejudice and some 
are fully worked out. 
Real Time Temporal Logic Koy=ns el al. -> Tempo al Logic 
More Abstract 
Olderog, Pnueli, Stirling,... 
Reed & Roscoe Timed Pr ss Algebra > Process Algebra 
This thesis w Delgano et al.. Goltz, Reisig.... Ins I 
Interval Event Structures <--> Event Structures <> Petri Ndts 
More Wailed 
Key: : ý- Relationship known 
Some Relationships betwee 
------- >- Relationship conjectured 
Real-Timed and 
Conventional models 
In the next chapter our model will be outlined in considerably more detail. 
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The structure of the thesis 
Time, causality, and concurrency David Murphy 
The thesis is composed of chapters separated by interludes; this is the first interlude. The 
first chapter was introductory, being concerned with the general problem area addressed in 
this thesis, and with my specific motivations. The main problem chosen is the development of 
a behaviourally rich, analytically sound, real-timed concurrency theory. Some indication of the 
methods to be used in the rest of the thesis was given; in particular we settled on a real- 
timed model based on event structures. The next five chapters will present the substance of 
this model. The second chapter is concerned with the basic definitions, the third with the 
combinators of the model, the fourth with semantics, the fifth with a process algebra based 
on the model, and the sixth with matters of specification and refinement. The interludes 
between chapters offer more speculative (and often rather more technical material) related to 
that presented in the preceding chapter. - 
W- 
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Each chapter, the first excepted, is separated from its interlude by a bibliography. A 
postlude summarises our conclusions and outlines further work. The thesis is completed by a 
complete bibliography of all works referred to, organised by subject area. 
On the progress of concurrency theory 
I would like t6 crave the reader's indulgence for three more paragraphs before the thesis 
proper. There are many models used in concurrency theory at the moment, and their relation- 
ship is badly understood. It should be a matter of urgency to try to understand what 
theoretical features of a model support its usefulness, and how those features are related. 
The interaction between timing, causality, concurrency and nondeterminism is very subtle, 
and it seems more important to me to concentrate on understanding all of them together than 
each of the. separately. There are no good models at the moment, and no bad ones, just mod- 
els suitable for some tasks and not for others. Most models can be forced or cajoled into 
modelling most phenomena, so, to a certain extent, the choice of a model is a matter of per- 
sonal proclivity, but one should be aware that some models are more convenient for some 
tasks than others. I use an even t-structu re-based model because it enables me to talk about 
the level of detail I am interested in easily and naturally; no doubt I could have used practical- 
ly any of the models of section 0.2, but with some, this work might have been more of a 
struggle. 
I feel very conscious that there are too many models and not enough work done on relating 
them and drawing out common threads, - this makes me rather nervous about presenting yet 
another model. However, in my defence, I would claim that interval event structures are 
closely related to well-understood models, and offer previously esoteric insights quite 
directly. Furthermore, where possible, I have given4-hints in the text about techniques that 
might be used for relating the model presented here to others. I would like to claim that real- 
timed models are no more complicated than untimed ones, just different from them. The more 
we can understand about what concurrency theories make sense, (i. e. the. more points in the 
concurrency theory design space have been investigated), the better we can understand the 
quiddity of concurrency and nondeterminism. 
A note on terminology 
Throughout this thesis the term 'event' will be reserved for some thing that can happen 
more than once, and has an identifiable beginning and end. When we want to refer to distinct 
occurrences of events, we will endow each occurrence with a label. The term 'transition' will 
be used for an atomic happening, usually the beginning or the end of an occurrence of an 
event. The term 'happening' will be used more generally, for something that happens and can 
be observed. Our terminology is further discussed in chapter one, which follows. 
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Definitions: Linear and Branching I 
Interval Event Structures 
Nor second he, that rode sublime, 
Upon the seraph-wings of ectasy 
The secrets of 1h' abyss to spy. 
He pass'd theflaming bounds of place and time: 
The living throne, the sapphire-blaze, 
Where angels tremble, while they gaze, 
Ile saw; but blasted with excess of light, 
Closed his eyes in endless night. 
NIiIton 
In this chapter the basic framework of interval event structures (I. E. S. s) is introduced. As 
the name suggests, these are derived from the event structures of [Winskel 1980], and differ 
from them in that wý shall consider events to be intervals of time rather than atomic, dura- 
tionless actions. We begin by discussing our notions of titne and causality. This leads us to a 
discussion of the nature of I. E. S. s; a branching interval event structure can be thought of as 
like an event structure, but with each occurrence of an event having a pair of real numbers 
associated with it representing the time that that occurrence started and finished. The reals, 
R, have a total Order, <, and the extra structure that this gives us means that I. E. S. s are 
rather more than just event structures labelled with durations. 
Definitions that formalise our notions are presented. We then investigate how to repre- 
sent our underlying order on times, <, and our notion of causality as an order on events. This 
gives us some ideas about how to specify interval event structures. At this stage we also 
discuss the representation of choice. Finally, we indicate what information about an I. E. S. 
can be obtained by observing an execution of it. The philosophical position this model sup- 
ports was discussed in the introduction and will not be further elaborated here. 
1.0 Linear and Branching Time 
There are two common views of time in concurrency theory: linear and branching. In the 
former, all events are comparable; we have a sequence of events happening along a line of 
time, and every instant is either before, after, or at the same time as any other instant. This 
is the conventional view of time outside concurrency theory. In branching time instants can 
be incomparable; time is more like a tree (strictly, a graph) than a line. This expresses the 
ideas of concurrency, as instants on different branches may be concurrent, and choice, as a 
structure modelled thus can also display more than one behaviour. 
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Each path through the tree can be thought of as representing the local clock of an observer 
following the computation that lives on that path. Thus the branching view of time subsumes 
the linear one in that each path is a linear time model. However, any execution of the branch- 
ing system as a whole must also be seen as linear-, a global observer will see the order 
imposed by the branching structure, plus additional order imposed by how concurrent happen- 
ings in different branches interleave; it is by discarding the unwanted orderings of each 
execution that we obtain the branching structure. 
1.0.1 Causality 
Our starting point will be a consideration of events. Flaunting usual ten-ninology, we shall 
say that events are distinguishable happenings. They can happen more than once, once, or 
not at all, but each time they occur they can be observed and identified. Each occurrence of an 
event will be given a label to allow us to disambiguate it from other occurrences of the same 
(or different) events; labelled events are unique. t 
, 
Events will be assumed to be compound objects, in the sense that they start and then 
they finish. Putting on a shoe might be an event, or taking a drink, or pin 13 of IC-7 going 
from 0.5V to 4.5V. We shall suppose that the important things about an event are its start 
and its finish; any other details of its internal structure will be ignored for the moment (they 
will reappear later). 
A distinction will be made between things that just happen from things which must hap- 
pen. Things which must happen must have been caused by something. We shall ignore the 
thorny philosophical problem of the presence or absence of primal causes in general, and 
merely allow that some labelled events can be said to cause others, and, in particular, that 
one special happening can be said to cause everything of interest to us. Hence, we might (in 
ascending degree of plausibility) say that the desire to go out to the betting shop caused me 
to put my shoe on, the eventual service of a drink in a crowded bar caused me to drink it, and 
the departure of a pulse of current from pin 7 of IC-5 caused pin 13 of IC-7 to go high. We can 
see that it makes sense to speak of either the beginning or the ending of an action causing 
the beginning or the ending of another. This notion of causality will be modelled by endowing 
the start and finish points of our labelled events with a strict partial order (i. e. a transitive 
and irreflexive relation), which we shall write as <,, (V for caysal). The interpretation placed 
on an assertion like a, <: bf, where a, is (a name for) the start of the occurrence of some 
eve nt, and bf is similarly the finish of an occurrence of another event is that the beginning of 
the first event caused the finish of the second. Where we want to discuss either the start or 
the end of an occurrence, we write at Ct' for transition - some writers call the beginning or 
the end of an occurrence of an event its 'transitions; ' we will adopt this usage sometimes). 
t- Some writers use the term 'action' for what we term 'event' and reserve the term 'event' for what we call 
'labelled evcnL' 
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The causal partial order <, has three obvious properties. Firstly the ends of all occur- 
rences are related to their beginnings (unless we allow point-like occurrences); Va. a, <c af. 
Secondly, we spoke of a 'special happening' that caused everything. This will be denoted by 
*; the start of * causes everything. It will be convenient for * to last at least as long as every- 
thing of interest: it will act like an 'on light. ' Furthermore, everything causes the end of 
Thirdly <. is a strict partial order; at most one of a, <, at' & a, ' <, a, is true. 
It may be desirable to have events occurring contemporaneously with the start of *; in this 
case the structure starts to do something as soon as it is 'turned on. ' In this case we will 
want to consider the start of an occurrence of an event which is causally the same as the 
start of *. 
For this reason we will introduce causal equivalence, =,:; the interpretation of a, =', a, ' is 
that a, and at' are two different names for the same happening. The equivalence =c must be 
reflexive, symmetric and transitive; it must also be distinct from <c and a congruence of it; 
a, =, at' => (a, 4c at' & at' -4c a, ) and (a, =c at' <, at) =* (at <c a, -) & (at' <C at- =. a. ) => (a, ' <. at). 
We might think of t he expression a, =c at' as stating that a, and at' are necessarily simultane- 
ous. Clearly <, is a partial order on occurrences. 
The required property of * is then 
Va. (-, <. a, v -ý ==, a, ) & (a, <. -f v a, =. -f) 
The r6le of * is indeed seen to be special; it will be assumed (rather theologically) that it is 
always present. We will know when things start, happens to tell us that the system is 
active. Similarly *f tells us that everything is over. 
Instead of the usual a, <, af we shall sometimes (in exceptional circumstances) allow the 
weaker condition a, =, af so that, in fact, Va. (a, <c af v a, =ý af). 
We have seen how to deal with causality, now we must deal with the structure of time 
over which things are caused. In the introduction we discussed the motivations for dealing 
with branching real time (see also Ivan Benthenz 1983] and Uoseph & Gosivami 19851 for 
further discussion), so in the next subsection we shall just deal with the how rather than the 
why of our temporal structure. Then, in the next section, we. shall give a fort-nalism which 
encapsulates some of the ideas of this section. 
An alternative approach to non-atomic events, of some interest, still within the causality- 
as-a-poset framework, is taken in [Boudol & Castellani 19871.1 have recently discovered 
that [Thomason 1984] is of considerable relevance to the next section in particular, and this 
chapter in general; some of the operators we discuss in later sections are also defined by 
Thomason. 
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1.0.2 Branching time 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
Suppose that the set of all occurrences of all events is LE. The causality of events has 
been dealt with by endowing the set of all transition, that is starting and finishing points of 
occurrences of events, Tr ý--def (LEý u LEf), with a partial order <,. Now we want to endow 
these points in addition with a real; this real will represent the. time at which that transition 
happened. This will leave us with a branching time model incorporating both causality and 
timing. (Note that we use the term 'occurrence' nontechnically here. ) 
Br-anching time, then, will be modelled by time variables consisting of pairs; the first 
member of the pair will be a real and the second a tag. These tags are just transitions, that 
is, elements of Tr. So, the set of all branching times, BT, will be Rx Tr for some set of 
transitions of partially ordered labelled events Tr = (LE, u I-Ef). These transitions are, of 
course, ordered by <, and endowed with =,. 
Notice that branching time, BT, can be thought of as parameterised by LE; defining LE 
automatically defines a branching time for LE to 'live on, ' (R x Tr). 
The reals have a total order, <, which will represent temporal precedence. The rest of this 
subsection is devoted to showing how to use both < and <, to define various orders on 
branching time. In future, reals will be written as r or r, ýith some subscript whilst branching times 
will be t or twith sorne subscrip, - 
(We sliall also suppose that, for a C= LE, the branching time 
assigned. to, the start of a is (r, (, ), as), and to the finish, (rf(. ), af). Similarly the branching time 
of some general transition a, will be written (r, (. ), a, ). The notation. 4(,, ) = (rq. ), at) will often be 
convenient, and we will assume that, t, (. ) is shorthand for (rt(, ), a, ) and vice versa. ) 
The first order over BT we shall consider will be written <b; this branching order will com- 
bine salient features of both < and <.,:. We must assign reals to the beginnings and ends of 
labelled events in such a way that the branching order <b respects the order on the reals < 
and the causal order on the tags<, (so that things can't happen before their causes): 
(r,, a, ), tb = (rb, WE BT. ta 'ýýb tb 4-* (r. < rb & a, <, 
In addition to <, BT will be endowed with an equivalence -=b, which respects both = (on 
R) and =. (on the tags Tr): 
a, ), tb = (rb, b, ) E BT. ta =b tb <-* (r. = rý & a, =, 
It will be convenient to wfite t. < tb to mean just r. < rb, and t. = tb to mean r. = rb. 
DEFINITION 1.0 - Orders on Linear and Branching Time 
With <band : --b as a basis, it is easy enough to define other orders on branching time; we 
do this overleaf. 
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V tj, tý, r= BT I, 
( tl tb t2 ) =dcf tl <b t2 
Ia. (t, 4t, ) =,,, tI< t2 
) 
2. tI ýýb t2 = def tl =ýb t2 
2a. tI : ý- t2 = def tl = t2 ) 
3. tI -<-b = dcf tI =b t2 V ti <b t2 
3a. (tj :5 t2 =, df t, = t2 V tl < t2 
) 
4. tl ýýb t2 = def tI =b t2) V t2 <b tl 
4a. ( tj ý: t2 =df t, = t2 V t2 < tj ) 
5. tl ýý'b t2 =dct t) ýýb t2 tl =ýb t2 
5a. (tI : ý' t2 =dcr tI ýý t2 tI =ý t2 ) 
David Murphy 
lf tI '4b t2 and t2 4b tj then t, and t2 are said to be unrelated in the branching model, which 
indicates that there is no causal precedence order defined between them. 
This incomparability indicates that whatever is happening at t, can be concurrent with 
whatever is happening at (or is timed by) U. A predicate, inc, indicates incomparability: in 
branching time two things can be concurrent if they are not ordered one way, nor the other, 
nor are they equal. (Notice that branching time incomparability, inc, can only arise from 
causal incomparability since the. reals are totally ordered. ) 
rb 2) 6. t, inct2 "=df ( t) 'Ib t2 )A( t24b tl )A( tj -L t 
At the moment two times are either ordered one way in the branching order, tj <b t2 or 
ordered the other way t2 <b ti, or they are branching equal, tI :,, --b t2, or they are incomparable, 
ti inc t2. Given that inc does not guarantee simultaneity, incomparability should be thought of 
as asserting that the transitions referred to can be distributed. 
In a linear model = would be defineable from < by ( tj = t2 
) =d, 
ýf 
( tj 4 t2 A( t2 4 tj ). That 
is not the case here. 
'$If- 
A review of our progress may not be out of place here. Firs 
't we considered occurrences of events and their causality. This lead us to a partially ordered set of starts and finishes of 
event occurrences. Then we introduced branching time, incorporating both causality and real- 
timing. An order over branching time, <b, was introduced, which respected both the order 
over the reals < and the causal order <,; other orders over BT and R were then defined 
using <band 
Chapter One - Definitions Page 37 
David Murphy Time, causality, and concurrency 
1.0.3 Examples of causal and temporal structures 
The causal part of our model bears some resemblance to the poset tradition of concurrency 
theories as exemplified by [Boudol & Castellani 1988], [Gischer 1989], [Lamport 1978], 
[Pratt 1986], [Shields 19881 and [Winskel 1986]. There are several examples of posets 
which often appear in the literature to illustrate particular behaviours. In this subsection we 
shall show one w4y of representing such behaviours in our model, by displaying appropriate 
branching times. (Notational aside: we will write t, (, ) for (ti),. ) 
The first example we shall consider has two occurrences of events, with one occurrence 
happening wholly before the other. In this case LE = (a,, a2l and the ordering on branching 
times is t, (1) <b tf(l) <b ts(2) <b tf(2). We also have *., -<b t, (, ) and tf(2) : 5b *f- 
These relationships come about because of the causality of the situation, a, (i) <C af(I) <C 
a, (2)<,, af(2), and the timing r, (, ) < rf(I) < r, (2) < rf(2). 
We can picture it thus; 
i --d ! --- I ts(l) tf(l) ts(2) tf(2) 
a, a2 
Arrow of time 
A poset exhibiting sequentlality 
Here time flows across the page and the transitions of the labelled events a, and a2, - ts(l) & 
tf(j) and t, (2), & tf(2) respectively, - are indicated. In all our examples we will omit treatment of 
the silent event * unless it is didactically useful. 
Now consider a structure with the same events but with different causality. If we just had 
t, (, ) <b tf(i) and ts(2) <b tf(2) then we would not be able to deduce a causal relationship between 
a, and a2: we might have r,, (, ) < rf(l) < r, (2) < rf(2) (the same picture) and tf(i) ine t, (2) (different 
causality). 
If we had no relationship between the branching times of a, and a2, and r, (I) < r, (2) < rf(j) < 
rf(2) then a, and a2 are actually simultaneous but on different branches (i. e. possibly in differ- 
ent places). 
We can picture this as 
a, tf(l) 
Affow of time 
ts(2) a2 tf(2) 
A poset exhibiting incomparable, simultaneoits occurrences 
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One of the standard perverse posets in the literature is the N-poset, whose causality we 
might represent thus; a, (, ) <ý af(i) <, a, (2) <r af(2) and a., (j) <, af(i) <, a, (3) <e af(3) and a, (4) <c af(4) 
<, a, (3)<, af(3). A suitable diagram, representing causality by a thin dashed line might be 
iiid 
.. 
ts(4) a4 tf(4) L(3) a3 tf(3) 
Affow of time 
tso) a, tf( ts(2) a2 tf(2) 
The N-poset 
(The 'N' can be seen by turning the page thrOUgh ninety degrees. ) 
This poset is important because tile absence of it embedded in a given poset is a neces- 
sary condition for a decomposition theorem to hold; cf., for instance, [Boudol & Castellani 
19871 for details. (It is also related to the notion of K-densiiy in Petri nets; cf. [Plfinnecke 
1984]. We shall delay a consideration of Petri nets until chapter 4. Meanwhile, background, 
such as [Reisig 1985]. Inight be useful to tile reader. ) 
The (non-trivial) timing we require of the N-poset in order for the branching order to 
reflect the causal order is rf(j) ": ý T, (2), rf(l) `: ý r, (3) and rf(4) *-- r, (3). Notice that this structure dis- 
plays sequentiality (as between a, and a2), 'Ind incomparability (as between tf(4) and 
t, (2)). 
Some more perverse posets will be definable when the notion of conflict is introduced in 
section 1.4. 
Notice, before leaving events and their causality, that nowhere have we demanded that 
every occurrence of an event has the same causality. In fact, we have not made any demands 
on the behaviour of different occurrences of the same event yet. 
Thus far, we have only informally associated a branching time with the start and finish of 
occurrences of events; we go on to make this more formal in the next section. 
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1.1 Structures in time 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
The last section gave us causality, timing and branching time, the third incorporating fea- 
tures of the first two. This section will deal with the association of points in branching time to 
transitions. In particular, branching interval event structures will be defined; each occurrence 
of an event in such a structure will have two associated points in branching time representing 
the times that occurrence started and finished, and the associated causality. Linear interval 
event structures, Viffi the timing, but without the causality, will be recovered as a special 
case. Of necessity this section contains much repetition; I hope this does not impose too 
much strain on the reader's patience. 
I DEFINITION 1.1 - Events and their beginning and ending times 
Consider a finite, non-empty set of events, E, and an observer. Every event el EE is 
considered to have a duration which is observed, and each event ei can be distinguished from 
any other e2 r= E, e2 ;, -- el. * The observer has a clock which is used to record the time each 
occurrence of an event begins and ends, so that time is notionally globally observed. Thus a 
possibly empty set. of pairs can be associated with each event e recording the beginning and 
ending times of each ýoccurrence of e. (Aside: notice that events- can happen more than once. ) 
The 'special happening' * will not be an event. 
The assumption that time could be globally observed is not as damning as it looks; these 
times are just those assigned by some observer; we make no assumption about global clocks 
which could in any way influence the system itself. Cf. the discussion in [Petri 1986]. 
We shall allow for the possibility that these times are not yet fixed using top, T, the time 
which dominates every other, to indicate this. This will entail an expansion of branching time; 
define BT=df (R u (T)) x Tr. Things that haven't happened yet are in the future, so that 
VreR. r<T. There will not be much need to represent structures with undefined times until 
chapter three, so the reader can safely ignore them until then. 
A labelling function associates with each occurrence of an event a unique label 1. Let the 
set L be the set of all labels. The set of all possible labelled events is LE = (L x E) u (*), of 
which some subset LE g LE (with *E LE) will be of interest. For each a cz LE there is a pair 
(t,, tr) associated with a, such that t, is the branching time a began, and tf the branching time 
it ended (i. e. the times of the transitions of that occurrence of the event). 
*- This isn't as tautological as it looks; there are difficulties in using an uncountable set of events precisely 
because then it is not clear when two events are physically distinct and distinguishable. We wish to restrict 
ourselves to the (Newtonian) situation where we can always distinguish between two different events. 
If we wish to consider a non-Newtonian world, we might wish to think of the causal part of the model as 
specifying physically necessary relationships between occurrences, and the timing part as indicating what 
observations a single observer might make. 
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The real component of these branching times represents when the transition occurred, 
while the tag field represents the causality present. Notice that * is a labelled event. 
The I-to-l functions býýn(a) and end(a) are assumed to return these branching times 
(orjust the real part of them, if causality isn't available, as in a linear model). 
begin, end: LE --) BT 
It will be convenient to suppose that LE is countable (i. e. at worst that L is countable). 
For convenience suppose further that L r) E0 and that *eLxE. LE is always nonempty; 
it has at least * in it. 
Only a countable set of branching times will be in the range of begin and end, since LE is 
countable. This set will be denoted by BT; it is the set of branching times at which a transi- 
tion occurs. 
BT = (ts I hegin(a) = t,, a ra LE) u (tf I end(a) = tf, a cz LE) 
We now state the structure we have diagrammatically. 
Events, E Labelled Events, LE Labels, L 
ee EaE LE c (L x E) uIEL 
I 
begin(a) = t, (, ), end(a) = tf(. ) 
Branching Time with reals R and tags Tr = (LEs u LEf) 
(r, (. ), a, ) E BT cz BT = (R u (T)) x Tr 
(ts(a), tf(a)) E (BT x BT) 
<brespects both <, (over LE, u I-Ef) and < (over R) 
ta <b tb <--> (r. < rb& a, <, b, ) 
And similarly : --brespects both =, (over LE, u I-Ef) and (over R) 
Further <, &< and =c &= are consistent: 
a, <, b, =* r, (. ) < ri(b) and a,, =,, b, =; > r, (, ) = ri(t)) 
DEFINITION 1.2 - Elementary Branching and Linear Interval Event Structures 
An elementary linear interval event structure (L. I. E. S. ) L is a pair (LE, <) consisting of a 
set of labelled events and a strict global precedence order <, the usual one on R, on their 
(linear) times. Linear structures have no causality, so the begin and end functions, which are 
assumed to be available, pick out just the real-valued part of branching times, so that 
begin, end : LE -) Ru (T) (the particular meaning of the overloaded begin and end is always 
obvious from the context). 
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An elementary branching interval event structure, B, is a pair (LE, <b) consisting of a set 
LE of labelled events and a strict partial order <b over BT, together with the projection 
functions bojin, end: LE -4 BT and the equivalencebover branching time. 
The total order < on the reals will also be used freely. When we want to compare just the 
real parts of branching times we use <, writing begin(a) < begin(b) to mean r, (. ) < rr, (b) where 
beg: in(a) = (r, (, ), aO, and hegLn(b) = (r,, (b), b. ). 
For te BT we write tT if t is defined (that is, is not T), and tl otherwise. Because of the 
requirements that starts cause finishes, 
a. <. af 
and that < is compatible with <,, 
r, (. ) < r, (b) 
< is nonstrict on T (i. e. T< T) so that belin(a) = J, a, ) => end(a) = J, af). 
We require that t. <b tf (or, exceptionally, ts -`b tf) so that events must begin before they 
end (this follows from the similar property of <, ). We will write a =- ft, tj for the assertion 
that a is timed by*(t,, 4), and we intend the reader to associate a with the closed time 
interval [r, rf] where the branching times t, = (r, a,, ), tf = (rf, af). When we want to ignore the 
branching structure (or when we don't have it, as in a L. I. E. S. ) we will write a =- [r,,, rf] for 
the assertion that a =- [(r., a. ), (rf, af)]. 
Our slogan thus far might be; 
The beginning and end times of occurrences of events are associated 
with unique branching times, that is, real numbers with tags. 
We intend the assertion t(i) <b t(2) to represent the fact that the event timed (in some 
sense) by t(i) must, perhaps because of causality, happen before that timed by t(2)- Suppose 
that a, -= [tqi), tf(i)] and a2 -= [tq2), tf(2)1; then, if we want a, to start before a2 We Might Write 
tqi) <b t, (2) We shall represent the order upon branching times, <b, as an order on events in 
section 1.2 below. Thus far we have a means for talking about what temporal orders must be 
observed in a system, <b, and one that enables us to talk about ones that can be observed or 
are observed <; it is in this sense that L. I. E. S. s are observations of B. I. E. S. s, - some events 
in a B. I. E. S. may not be ordered with respect to each other'(hence inc), but all events are 
ordered in a L. I. E. S. 
A B. I. E. S. can represent just the orderings we want to specify and leave the others 
unspecified. A B. I. E. S., then, is a model of something, a process say, that can be executed. 
All observed events must happen sometime, (i. e. happenings are linearly ordered by time 
of occurrence) so a L. I. E. S. is a good model of what is actually observed during one of these 
exccutions. 
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A B. I. E. S. can display genuine concurrencY (indicated via the inc predicate) while a 
L. I. E. S. can display merely the overlap of occurrences of events. 
Our requirement that the real order respects the causal order should now be restated. 
Remember that a, is the beginning or the end of some ae LE, and similarly for b,. Then if a, <' 
b, we require that. the branching times given to a, and b, t, (. ) = (rt(. ), a, ) and tt(b) = (ri(b), b, ) 
respectively, must obey r, (. ) < ri(b) so that L(. ) <b to). Note that this means that nothing can 
happen before the thing that caused it. Sin-dlarly if a, =c b, then rt(. ) = ri(b) so that t, (. ) =b tt(b)- 
DEFINITION 1.3 - Inclusion Ordering, Overlap and Simultaneity 
An inclusion ordering on events can be defined; for any a, = [ts(j)) tf(, )]) a2 = 
[ts(2)3 tf(2)] 
define ai c; b a2 
iff ts(2) <b ts(I) & tf(I) "ýb tr(2) (i. e. a, and a2are on the same branch and the times 
of a, are totally contained in those of a2). 
Similarly if t., (I) : 5b 
t, (2) :! ýb tf(i) -<b 
tfC2) then we write 
at a2 (i. e. a, and a2are on the same branch, a, starts first and overlaps only some of a2). 
If the relationship holds on linear (but not necessarily branching) time, then write, a, g a2 
and a, g; j a2 (i. e. a, c- a2 4: * (r, (2) < r,, (, ) & rf(j) < rt(2)) and a, EQ a2 4: * (rs(l) : 5; r, (2) :5 rf(j) :5 rf(2))). If 
a, gb a2 or a, s; Qb a2 or a2 c; b a, or a2 ýýb a, then a, and a2 are kFid to be locally simultalleolts; 
not only do their times overlap, but they are on the same branch, whereas if we have merely 
that [rs(i), rf(i)] r) [r, (2) ý! rf(2)] = 0, (i. e. one of a, cz a2 or a, C=) a2 or a2 c- a, or a2 (=: ) at) then we 
say that a, and 
. 
92 are simultaneous; their times overlap, but they may not be on the same 
branch. (The symbol c is unfortunate since (a, g a, ), but c is reserved for other purposes. ) 
ASIDE - Point-like events 
At the moment we have forbidden point-like events where, for instance, a =- [t, t], since 
we enforced a, < af and hence ts(a) < tf(a). We shall sometimes allow point-like events in 
explaining an idea, but we do not intend them as anything other than a philosophical nicety. 
DEFINITION 1.4 -The Outside Relation 
For any a, =- [t, (1), tf(1)], a2 ý- 
[ts(2), tf(2)], we say ai is outside a2, written a, . 91, a2, 
iff no 
labelled event a can be defined so that a c: bal and a c; ba2. From the definition it follows that 
a, oba2,4=ý a2 pb a,. If a, ph a2 then either a, and a2are on different branches, or if they are on 
the same branch, the intervals of time they occupy do not overlap. Notice that for any pair of 
events at and a2with t, (1) <b 
t, (2) either a, oh a2 or at cba2 or a, 'g; 2b a2. 
To see this note that 
the truth of a, ph a2 requires that -n3t E BT. t. (, ) : 
5b t : 5b tf(l) & ts(2) :! 9b t : 5b tf(2)- (Parenthetically, 
note that some care of the difference between :ý and < is needed in definitions like these, to 
ensure that-C-b, ýmb and oh are in fact disjoint. ) Again, if the outside relation holds in linear but 
not in branching time then we write a, g a2; (ai 2a2) 4* ts(l) : 5b tf(l) <b ts(2) V ts(2) : 5b tfC2) <b ts(l)- 
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EXAMPLE - The Usual One 
A vending machine may be characterised thus; 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
=df, U( coin, choc ), 
LE=def u (coini, choci), iEN r= N eN 
We have abused the potation slightly, writing coini, for the pair (i, coin). Notice that the 
order on the labelling set (here the succ ordering on the integers) is entirely incidental; we do 
not need it, altho ugh it is convenient. All we need is a way of telling which choc event 
matches which coin event and which coin event follows which choc event. 
The behaviour of the vending machine might specified thus: 
Vi. end(coini) "-bh9ý10(choci) & end(choci) <b begin(coini,., ) 
One process which may be viewed as satisfying the observation above (in a sense to be 
made precise later) is the familiar CSP vending machine, VM = VMo: 
VMi: -d, f coini ----> choci --) VMi+l 
We can now, of course, articulate some real-time requirements. Assuming our units of 
time are minutes, a vending machine that completes a transaction within thirty seconds will 
(together with the customer) obey the requirement 
end(choci) - _bMin(co 
ini) :! ý 1/2 
while a machine that shows unconscionable lethargy if the customer is in a hurry will obey 
end(coini) - _bSg , 
in(coini) 5 1/60 :: --> end(choci) - _begin(choci) 
ýt I 
Consider choci -= [t, (i), tf(i)]. We can make the vending machine serve customers between 
10am and 2am by requiring that, if we start (t = 0) at midnight, then t, (i) mod 1440 < 120 or 
t, (i) mod 1440 > 1320 implies t, (i.,, ) > 120. Notice we have imposed a "I've started so I'll fin- 
ish" convention allowing users whose transactions are straddled by the 2am borderline to 
complete them normally. 
A SOMEWHAT MORE INTERESTING EXAMPLE 
The typical bar is good example of a concurrent system. Suppose we have a countable 
number of drinkers (more would give a bar that is too dense) and a single barman. The 
labelled events we shall consider are 
LE =da f drinki, j, tusslei. jo servei, j ), i, j-E N 
for a habitu6 i drinking his jI drink, tussling at the bar for the P time and being served for the 
time. Clearly in order to get a drink someone must tussle for it and be served. 
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We will assume drinking in rounds, so that one cannot drink until someone is served that 
round 
V ij. 3 i'. begin(servei.. j) <b begin(drink,,, ) 
Altruism is regrettably uncommon here; one drinks before queueing and queues before 
being served 
V ij. end(drinki. j) <b begin(tussle4j,, j) 
Finally we shall impose onefaO barman 
V ij. bng: tn(tusslei, j)T => end(tusslei. j)t 
i, j. hggjn(servej. j)T => end(servei, j)T 
V i, j. end(tusslei. j) =: bbp in(servei, j)l g: - 
V j, i', j, j. begin(tusslei. j) < bgZ: in(tusslei.. j, ) 
begin(servei, j) < beg: in(servei,. j. ) 
The conditions are, respectively, finite waiting time, finite serving time, starting to be 
served as soon as finishing waiting, and a fair ordering of serving by the barman. (We will 
have some more to say about how the barman decides who to serve in chapter four. ) 
Here we have written constraints upon the hegLn and end times of events; in effect specifi- 
cations involving the timing of labelled events. In order for conventional specification 
techniques to be related to this model (so that we can determine when an interval event 
structures implements an atomic-e-vent specification, for instance) we need to shift the orien- 
tation of the specification to labelled events themselves rather than their branching times. 
We shall begin this in the next section using event orders, which are relations upon events. 
Whether these relations hold or not is determined by the bLegýin and end times of the occur- 
rence of the event, so we shall preserve the ability to consider detail similar to that of this 
section, while shifting the level of abstraction from the times that define labelled events to 
the labelled events themselves. 
We have focused upon the beginning and ending times of events as things we wish to rea- 
son about, thus, implicitly, limiting ourselves to a dyadic or interval logic [van Benthem 
1983]. Any further delving into the internal structure of events (for instance being interested 
in other points of time during the execution of an event) can be dealt with by event refine- 
ment, as discussed in chapter five. 
t- In common with many drinkers our notion of fairness is stronger than usual. 
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Notice also that specific reference to constants has been mostly avoided (saying 
"seventeen milliseconds later... "), - this is merely to keep the parallel with conventional 
specification methods clear thus far (by concentrating upon causality rather than time differ- 
ence) and will be remedied later (when we treat specification with a little less dalliance). A 
good way of considering timing is to see how to time the examples of section 1.0.3, but this 
will be delayed until a little more theory has been presented. 
DEFINITION 1.5 - Computational structures 
The philosophical position chosen for I. E. S. s is that of a model of distributed happenings. 
Those happenings may fulfil a computational purpose. A subclass of I. E. S. s is a reasonable 
model of computation; we will forbid more than a finite number of labelled events happening 
in a finite time (so as to disallow what [Joseph & Goswami 1985] call 'Zeno machines, ' 
machines which can do an infinite computation in a finite time). If 
vri, r2r= R. I [a I as LE, a -= [(r,,, a., ), (rf, af)], [r., rf] r) [ri, 
r2l # 0) 1 is finite, 
then the structure concerned is said to havefinite density. If, in addition, 
vt c= BT. I 
(t'l t'<b t, t'(=- BT) I is finite, 
then it is said to satisfy the axiom of finite causes. The axiom of finite causes requires that 
no transition causally depends on an infinite sequence of previous transitions. It is discussed 
in [Winskel 1980]. 
If a structure hfis finite density, satisfies the axiom of finite causes, and has well-defined 
times, 
vac LE - býqgin(a)t & end(a)T 
then it is said to be computational. 
(The class of all I. E. S. s, IES say, and the class of computational LE-S-s, cIES, have not yet 
been properly defined; this is postponed until chapter two. ) 
-III- 
Now that the sound and fury of the main definitions is over, it is possible to remark with- 
out causing too much confusion that the branching time model can be thought of as a separate 
entity from the I. E. S. model which is built on top of it. Branching time, BT =Ru (T) x Tr, 
can be used for much more than just building B. I. E. S. s. Here that use alone will be pursued, 
b y, identifying tags with the transitions of labelled events, that is elements of Tr, but that is 
not necessary, - BT could, for instance, be a basis for the investigations of temporal struc- 
tures carried out in [van Benthem 1983], if different tags were used. 
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1.2 Orders on Labelled Events 
David Murphy 
It is useful to be able to specify the relations between labelled events somewhat more 
abstractly than is possible using the total order < or the partial order <b. The following 
partial orders correspond to some common situations where one event enables another. Let 
a, =- [t, (, ), tr(j)], and a2 -ý [ts(2)) tf(2)] be labelled events. 'Men the following preorders on 
labelled events are7deeined: 
1. a, I. - ha2 --ýdcr ts(l) : ýýb ts(2) 
2. a, c-i a2 --ýdcf tf(l) -<b tsC2) 
3. a, g;. a2 : ýdcf ts(l) : Eýb tf(2) 
4. a, c:, a2 -: -df tf(l) -<b tf(2) 
The four preorders, gi, c; i, g., and c;, reflect four notions of enabling (or causality): 
1. a, is head-causal of a2 when the beginning of a, 00 0--0 0 
causes the beginning of a2l written a, C-h a2' 
2. a, is interior-causal of a2 when the end of a, 0--* G--O 
causes the beginning of a2, written a, c-i a2. 
3. a, is e-verior-causal of a2 when the beginning of *--0 0-0 
a, causes t4e end of a2l written a, [;,, a2.0 
0--* 
ý4. a, is tail-causal of a2 when the end of a, causes 0-40 
the end of a2, written a, g, a2.0 
The diagram above uses a black blob for the enabling beginning or ending of an interval and a 
white one for the non-causative one. 
We write [=-j for oneOf C; h, gj, [;,, cz, The orders c-j are called j-morphisms orj-orders. 
PROPERTIES OF r-j 
1. For point-like events all the c-j are the same. If a, =- [t, (, ), t, (, )] and a2 = 
[ts(2)v ts(2)], then 
(a, C- ha2) <--> (a, E: i a2) <--* (a, c. a2) <-* (a, c, a2)- 
2. Where one of the events is point-like some discrimination reappears. If a, =- [L(, ), tf(j)] 
and a2 ý- fts(2)9 t, (2)], then (aig; ha2) <: *(a, c-. a2) and (a, c, a2) <* (a, m a2)- 
3. C-hs gi, and i;, are preorders, as is easily verified from the definition. g;. is not transitive. 
A further discussion of the propenies of the E-j is postponed for the moment. 
Chapter One - Definitions Page 47 
David Murphy Time, causality, and concurrency 
1.3 Primitive Concurrency 
We need to decide what it means for events to be concurrent. Clearly they are concurrent 
if their times, in the branching model of course, are not ordered. But we can imagine a situa- 
tion (see diagram) where the start or end times of two genuinely concurrent events are 
ordered. 
-1 
First a notation for the abutment of labelled events is introduced; write a, ad 4* Ij a2 
end(ai) I-b_begin(a2) (i. e. a, is adjacent to a2-). Now consider: - 
If a gi b and a gi c then we may very well have aadi jb and 
a ad c. (Suppose a tf(. )], b =- [tý(b), tf(b)], c -= 
[ts(c), tf(, )]. 
aj For various reasons we may want tf(, ) =b ts(b) =b 4(c) as well as 
C the obvious rg. ) = r., (b) = r, (,, ). ) For this reason we formulate our 
definition of the primitive event concurrency predicate as 
(a, , a2) 3 t, re at-a inc 
t2 
11 2 ý: 2* 
tl 
- 
(Where we write 3t re a for a =- [t,, tf] &t=t, or t= tf. ) 
Two labelled events are primitively concurrent iff they are on different branches and (so 
cannot be said to be completely causally related to each other). Concurrency is entirely 
unrelated to simultaneity; in general -, ((a, , 
a2) --'* (a, ca2))& ((a, g a2) ==:. (a, , 
a2)). 
Primitive concdrrency is not hereditary either; (a, , a2) & a, gi a, ' & a2 g; i aý does not 
imply (a, ' , a2ý. (This is because our time branches can join up again; we do not have the sit- 
uation ffinskel 1986] calls 'stable. ') 
The figure above indicates why we need branching time equivalence `b; we might well 
have end(b) = end(c) but, if we want b and c to be on different branches, then end(b) ;% 
end(c) should hold. (It is probably misleading to think of branching time as really tree-like, 
since branches can join as well as split, and since more than one occurrence can be simulta- 
neously active in one branch. ) 
Notice, incidentally, that the predicates C; bl cQb and gb of definitions 1.3 and 1.4 can be 
expressed much more succinctly using the orders c; j and primitive-concurrency; § 
at ý; 02=* a2 Chat Aa, c;, a2 
a, c=?, a2 <-=> ai [; h a2 Aa, [;, a2 
a, 2ba2 : *(a, , 
a2)v a, gi a2v a2c-i a, 
ý- Ile first and third relations don't hold with e--> since the orders C-j use :ý rather than <. A correct version 
of die last relation with <-* instead of =* would have to conjoin a condition that end(ai) # býgiý&2) to the 
middle disjunct. 
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1.4 Specification and Inhibition 
David Murphy 
We will now deal with the matter of specification a little more carefully. To capture the 
sorts of relations on times that were used in the first section, we shall use the abstractions 
introduced above. A labelled event a, may j-cause another labelled event a2, written a, g; j a2. 
An elementary positive specification, S, involving labelled events LE and orders u; j, is just a 
conjunction of requireftients like a, c; j a2: 
S:: =LEgiLE IS AS 
indicating that the obvious set of orderings upon events should be present in the 
implementing structure. 
A negative specification expresses the notion that labelled event a, may inhibit the 
occurrence of another labelled event a2, possibly because of competition for a resource or 
because the two events are mutually exclusive choices, or for other reasons. If this is the 
case we write a, # a2. Notice that -, (a, c-j a2) merely captures the notion that a, does not j- 
cause a2- It does not capture the idea of active inhibition; even if -, (a, gj a2), a2 may be 
simultaneous (in linear time) with a, for other reasons. If a, # a2 an occurrence of a, should 
guarantee that a2 does not occur concurrently. Notice that inhibition, like concurrency, is 
symmetric; a, # a2 implies that a2 # a,. (In fact, # is very similar to the conflict relation in Petri 
net theory; it will be formally defined shortly. ) 
We need a notion of which branches of those which can be concurrent actually are 
concurrent: that is, we need to know which branches may be seen occurring together in some 
particular execution, and which branches can never be seen occurring together. The 
consistency predicate is introduced to meet this need. (The intuition behind the notion of 
different simultaneous branches is simply that a system might consist of several 
infrequently-interacting pieces such as distributed subsystems. Each of these pieces has its 
own causality and forms a branch. ) 
A consistency predicate, written Con, is a subset of the set of non-empty subsets of LE, 
written Con c: V(LE). It is intended that two labelled events coexist in some member of Con 
just when they can occur in the same history. An element of Con, then, is a set of events that 
can happen in one 'execution' of an I. E. S.; it constrains which labelled events on different 
branches can happen together. To prevent perversities, we require that Con covers LE. 
If a set X of labelled events is consistent in a history, then any set YgX should also be 
consistent, so we have the subset closure requirement 
XE Con& YcX=>Yc- Con 
Our intention that Con expresses conflict means that conflicting occurrences should be on 
different branches. If we had a, and a2with a, ci a2 (i. e. a, and a2 are on the same branch and 
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a, happen wholly first) then it is hard to see what interpretation to place on a, # a2. For this 
reason we will require that 
vai, a2 . (a, #a2)=> (a, , 
a2) 
which enforces the restriction that conflicting events be on different branches. (This is a 
rather strong requireffient; it means that things on the same branch cannot be. in conflict. 
Some comfort may be obtained from the fact that not much of the theory depends on this 
requirement. The intuition is that if two things are causally related, then they cannot be in 
conflict. ) The link between # and Con is obvious; the negative specification a, # a2 is just a 
constraint on possible consistency predicates; 
(a, # a2) ': -->(a,, a2) iS Con 
Finally, if two labelled events are causally the same, then they should be in the same Con- 
sets; 
Vc e- Con. (a, ec&a, (, ) =,, a, (2)& af(i) =ý af(2)) =: ý CUf a2) ECon 
Notice that our definition of conflict allows for events which retry if a conflict of one occur- 
rence is not resolved in its favour, and for ones which give up. The use of the conflict relation 
between labelled events rather than just events gives us this power. (It is possible to label 
events so that the impossibility of execution of two labelled events concurrently is equivalent 
to the exclusion of certain labelled events from execution in the same history; by this means L 
our Con over labelled events can act like Winskel's Con over events (Winskel 1986], or as' a 
means of forbidding certain occurrences. ) 
The branching interval event structure is now. jaken as the standard object (because linear 
structures are just special cases of branching ones). We will keep the concept of a linear 
event structure as an observation of a branching structure. (Thus all observations are 
L. I. E. S. s) 
DEFINITION 1.6 - Interval Event Structures 
An interval event structure (I. E. S. ) is defined to be a elementary B. I. E. S. with conflict, i. e. 
a triple (LE c; (L x E) u( *), Con, <b) together with all the structure indicated on page 41. 
(So that, for instance, it is assumed that L and E have been defined, so that BT and LE are 
defined, be. Tin and end are available, and 1-: % has been defined. We stress only LE, Con and '1% 
in writing the structure for brevity only; all of the other structure must be present too. ) 
Most of our notation was summarised on page 41; the remainder can be found on page 60. 
4: 6 
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DEFINITION 1.7 - Concurrency and Conflict 
The primitive concurrency definition can be altered so that conflicting events are not concur- 
rent, giving a more sophisticated definition of event concurrency. The labelled event a, is 
concurrent with a2 if it is consistent and primitively concurrent with it: 
a, ýgo a2 =d,,, f ((a, , 
a2) Afal, a2) ECon) 
4: 1. 
As usual in concurrency models, co is symmetric, irTeflexive and not necessarily transitive. 
Notice that if (a, , a2)A (a,, a2) iý Con then a, and a2are in conflict; 
a, #a2 : --d. f ((a, , 
a2) A [a,, a2) ECon) 
Consider two labelled events, a, and a2 say. Then precisely one of the following six state- 
ments holds 
(i) a, # a2 (that is, ai and a2are on different inconsistent branches) 
a, co a2 (that is, a, and a2are on different consistent branches) 
-, (a, , a2)&apa2 
(that is, a, and a2are on the same branelf, and do not overlap) 
(iva) a, g;; Ib a2 (ditto, and a, happens first, but overlaps only some of a2) or 
(ivb) a2 j;;; jb a, (ditto, and a2happens first, but overlaps only some of a, ) 
M a, C; ba2 (ditto, and a, happens within a2) 
(vi) a2 c; baj (ditto, and a2happens within at) 
So, our model can express conflict (i), concurrency (ii), sequentiality (iii), temporal overlap 
(iv) and temporal inclusion (v). Properties (i) and (ii) indicate occurrences on different 
branches, (iii), (iv) and (v, vi) indicate occurrences on the same branch, while (iv), (v) and 
(vi) indicate local simultaneity on that branch. 
DEFINITION 1.8 - Maximal consistent sets 
For a given I. E. S., 3= (LE, Con, <b), a consistent set CE Con_ is said to be maximal if no 
other events can be added to it without violating its consistency 
(c'rz Con &cccý =* c=c' , 
. Such a set contains all of the labelled events that can happen in one history of an I. E. S. The 
set of all maximal Con-sets of B will be referred to as M(S). If there is no conflict in an I. E. S., 
5 then Con = p(LE) and LE itself is maximal, (all branches are consistent) while if there is 
conflict, sets smaller than LE will be maximal. Clearly *, being just an on light, should be Con- 
sistent with all maximal Con-sets, so we require 
%43). * cz c 
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Notice, incidentally, that conflict is not hereditary in the sense that if a, # a2 and a, Chal, 
and a, and a, ' are in some maximal consistent set, then we cannot necessarily infer that a, ' 
will inherit the conflict, i. e. a, ' # a2may not hold. This is 'instability' again; inconsistent 
branches may join up. 
It should be stressed that at this stage # models some form of choice; if a, # a2 then we 
may see a, or a2-but not both, and nowhere have we stated how that conflict is resolved. In 
other words, so far, # has not been taken as a model solely of internal choice or solely of 
external choice; we shall commit ourselves to a decision in chapter three. 
EXAMPLE - Timing and conflict in Posets 
In this example the posets of subsection 1.0.3 will be revisited, and we will see the rich- 
ness added to our behavioural descriptiveness by conflict and effects of timing 
considerations. First consider some new pathological posets; our aim here is to demonstrate 
that many well-known behaviours can be represented in our model, and hence to lend weight 
to the claim that in 
I 
terval event structures are one of the most behaviourally-rich models of 
concurrency yet devised. 
The first new poset is called the V-poset in [Boudol & Castellani 1988]. It demonstrates a 
phenomena called asymmetric confusion in the Petri net community (see, for instance 
[Plfinneck, ý 1984]). Consider three events related thus, a,, <C af <' b" <c bf with a co c and c# 
b. If we represent conflict by thicker, more heavily dashed lines than causality, the picture 
might be 
id 
t, (3) c tf(3) - 
Arrow of time 
ts(l) a tr(l) t, (2) b tf(2) 
The V-poset 
The correct Con sets to describe the situation above are (a), (b)., (a, b), (c), (a, c). 
Consider a poset with labelled events a,, a2, a3, a4, with a, # a2, a2 # a3, and a3# a4, and 
with a, ýgo a3 and a2go a4. The diagram that displays this structure has too many lines to be 
helpful; some further insight can be gained from examining the net analogous to the structure, 
which is given in [Boudol & Castellani 1988]. 
Our next poset demonstrates the utility of dismissing conflict inheritance; see overleaf. 
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Consider a,, a2, a3, a4 with a., (, ) <r af(i) <r a, (2) < af(2), a, (, ) <c af(i) <c as(3) 
<c af(3) , a, (4) 
<, af(4) 
a, (2) < af(2), and a, (4) <, af(4) <ý a, (3) < af(3) and at # a4and a2 go a3, which might be seen as 
ts(4) a4 tf(4 4(3) 
a3 
tf(3) > 
....... Arrow of time 
t, (I) at 
tf(l) ts(2) 
a2 
tf(2) 
A poset without conflict inheritance 
The correct maximal Con sets to describe this situation are [a,, a2, a3)& ja4, a2, a3)- 
Finally, as an example of 'instability' consider the following poset. The labelled events 
are a,, a2, and a3, with a, (, ) <, af(i) <c as(3) <ý af(3), a., (2)<,, af(2)<, a,, (3)<ý af(3), and a, # a2; 
i I*, --,,,, ts(2) a2 tr(2) 
ts(3) 
a3 
tf(3) 
Arrow of time 
a, ts(l) tf(l) 
A poset exhibiting instability 
The correct maximal Con sets to describe this situation are [a,, a3)& 
(a2, a3). 
We will consider timing just two of these structures; take the V-poset first. The only non- 
trivial timing constraints required are that r,, (, ) < r, (2); remember we can have both a, Lo a3 
and a2 # a3 without any constraint on the real part of the branching times of at, a2 and a3. 
Hence, any timing a, -= a, (, )), (rf(I), af(i))] (and similarly for a2 and a3) satisfying the 
timing requirement r, (, ) < r, (2) and the obvious rgi) < rf(i) will do. 
Timing the N-poset of subsection 1.0.3 is equally easy; one can pick any assignment of 
times to transitions that respects the conditions imposed by causality. For instance the tim- 
ing a, [(0, a, (, )), (el -93 , ar(i))], 
a2 ý- [(20.8, a, (2)), (35.7, af(2))], a3 =- [(35.7, a, (3)), (666, ar(3))], 
and a4 [(7.6, a, (4)), (7E2, af(4))], is fine because the timing given is consistent with the causal- 
ity given, but if instead a4were timed by [(7.6, a, (4)), (35.7, af(4))] the timing would not agree 
with the requirement at(4) <, a, (3). while if instead a, =_ [(0, aý(L)), (61/3, af(i))] the requirement 
af(t) <, a, (2) would be violated. 
EXAMPLE - The bar revisited 
The possible branching event structures that might satisfy the reader's notioq of a hostel- 
ry will now be further examined. Many further properties of the bar can be deduced by 
manipulation of this specification using our specification logics (discussed later). Our require- 
ments, which we will rewrite using the event abstractions, were: 
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1. Someone has to get every drink 
Vij. 3i'. (end(tusslei-. j) =b begin (s e rvei.. j)) & (servei-. j[; h drinkLj) 
Notice that to capture the notion properly we should write 3% as each drink is bought by 
only one person; this, however, is, too constraining, as we cannot distinguish things that are 
directly caused from indirect causality. There may be some earlier serves which obey the 
above condition. 
Using the. ýjdjj operator this reads 
Vij. 3i'. (tusslei., jAdj servei-, j) & (servei-. jg; h drinki, j) 
2. No-one queues more than they drink 
V ij. drinki. j gi tusslei. j+l 
3. The barman serves everyone eventually (otherwise it is easy to implement the 
barman with a process which never serves anyone); 
vij. hMiýn(tusslei, j)T =ý end(tusslei, j)T 
4. People are served in the order in which they begin to queue 
Vi, i', j, f. (hggi: n(tusslei, j): 5be in(tusslei-, j-)) 
ýin(servejj) f- 
_begin(servei., j. 
)) 
5. Only one person can be served at once on any given branch (and any given 
client's serves do not overlap) 
j, Y. (s e rvei. j 2bservei.. j. ) <=> (i:;, - i'vi#f) 
CAVEAT - Event abutment and Liveness 
Notice that we have nowhere in our specifications specified the time between one event 
and another. We can, of course, force events to abut one another (by imposing a predicate 
like Val, a2 E LE . 
(a, c-i a2 & -, 3a3 . a, c-i a3 c-i a2) => rf(i) = r, (2)). 
However it suits the model 
not to force this to be everywhere true. Then we can use interval event structures to give an 
alternative semantics to languages, like timed CSP [Reed . 
1988], [Davies & Schneider 
1989], where the time taken between events can be unspecified. (The timed CSP process 
WAIT (16 0) ;a --) SKIP (in some semantics) only guarantees that a happens sometime 
later than 160 seconds after execution begins, not at 160 seconds after the beginning. ) 
We are dealing here with liveness issues. In our specifications the matter of liveness can 
be explicitly dealt with, for instance by predicates like 
V ai E LE . r, (i) - rf(i) < 100 
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(no events last more than 100 time units), or 
Vai, a2c LE. (a, c; i a2& -, 3a3 . a, c; i a3gi 
a2) =* rf(l) - r, (2) < 24 
David Murphy 
(no waits between causally-immediately-related events of more than 24 units). However 
we will not always want to do this. In general we shall merely assume that (unless 
otherwise mentiQ-qed- using T or ý), all labelled events mentioned do actually happen (i. e. 
have defined times). 
EXAMPLE -A travel agent 
A typical travel agents' on a Saturday morning in spring contains a finite set of people. 
Some of these people often hunt in groups known as families, and the family has a common 
purpose, - to book a holiday. Before they can do this, though, they must queue for the atten- 
tion of one of the "holiday consultants", - the other sort of people present, - who hold 
information about holidays. Then they must make enquiries about possible holidays, which 
may result in making a booking. We shall denote the event of the Ph farnily queueing by 
f. tussiej, inquiring by f. servei, and booking by f. booki. (The notation makes the paral- 
lel with the last example clear. ) Similarly the il holiday consultant serving her (pardon the 
sexism) P inquiry will be c. serveL j and making her jI booking will be c. booki, j. Dealing 
with all these inquiries is, of course, a computer. 
The computee can serve as many inquines as necessary simultaneously, but it must only 
deal with bookings one at a time and, to prevent confusion, enquiries are not processed while 
bookings are being made. The k" inquiry and k' booking are i. servek and i. bookk for the 
computer. A tentative specification might read: 
1. The family acts sequentially and with no dithering 
Vi. (f. ttisslejjýdj f. serve)& f bookit ==ý (f . servejýjd f booki) 
2. Someone serves each inquiry and, if it occurs, booking 
Vi. 3! i', j. (f. servejýb c. servei,. j) & f. bookiT (f. booki =b c. booki*. j) 
Here that we have written a '-- b a' to mean begin(a) =--b begin(a') and end(a) =: b end(a'), so 
that 2. implies that the family and the H. C. must synchronise upon the inquiry and the book- 
ing. This is a 'tight' notion of synchronisation in that the times must match exactly. In 
chapter two, when we discuss synchronisation in more detail, we will come upon a looser 
notion of synchronisation. Certainly, though, for two events to be synchronised they must, at 
least, be concurrent, so we require, if a is to synchronise with a', written a unch a', (and dis- 
cussed in chapter two, ) that a co a'. 
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3. Each inquiry and each booking is served by the computer 
Vij. 3k. c. serve Li :? b i. servek 
Vij. 3! k'. c. book,, Q-. i. book.. 
Time, causality, and concurren 
Here we have allowed the computer to be faster than the H. C. Notice that we have not 
forbidden multiple computer inquiries within the same family inquiry, but we have ensured 
that a family booVing corresponds to only one computer booking. 
4. Now we impose the requirement that the computer must not service inquiries 
or other bookings while it has a booking in hand. We can do this using the 
overlap predicate: 
Vk., 3k-'#k. i. bookk*C-7) i. bookk 
5. The queue is, unusually, fair, so that people are served in the order in which 
they start to queue: 
Vi, P. (f . tussleil; h f. tusslei. ) => (f . serveigh f. servei. ) 
6. Finally there are liveness requirements. If an H. C. finishes dealing with an 
inquiry or a". booking while some families are still queueing, then they must 
eventually serve one of those families: 
Vi, j. 3i'. (c. booki. jg, f. tusslei. )=ý(c. servei. j+, =f. servei-) 
Notice'that the family which is served by the H. C. who becomes free, is dealt with by 5. 
above. We have not required that the successive agent events abut one another, which 
leaves them free to take (arbitrarily long) tea breaks, nor have we required that anything at 
all happens if an H. C. does not manage to make a booking. The reader may care to try to 
specify some suitable predicate to constrain this eventuality. 
Notice that we have again used the ordering on the labelling set; we could rewrite the 
specifications without it, but it would not be as clear. In general we will allow ourselves this 
luxury; in chapter four when we have to provide explicit labels we use N, so no real contradic- 
tion is present. 
It is highly desirable here, as in all other aspects of specification, not to over-specify. The 
specification of interval event structures involves writing constraints upon structures; an 
implementation will be satisfactory if it satisfies all of the constraints. Thus over-specifica- 
tion is equivalent to overconstraint of the implementation. 
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1.5 Safety and j-morphism 
Having introduced the event orderings or j-morphisms gj, it is useful to know how they 
are related. In particular, the questions of interest here are, 'when can one ordering be 
replaced by another and 'when is one structure as good as another with respect to a 
particular ordering T 
An ordering gj is safer than an ordering 1; k, written 9i =) [; ko iff it preserves all the orderings 
Of C7k. This just means that the relation c; j includes the relation I; k- 
THEOREM - The preorders gh, g, gi and the relation g. form a 
lattice ordered by inclusion. 
I: 
h 
Et 
Proof. This is obvious from the definitions. E: ý 
The safer than ordering D can be defined so as to indicate when any expression involving 
E-k can be written with'E-j instead Of I: k; 
jD E-- k& aC- ka2)=: > a, c-i a2 
In particular, the safest ordering is c; i; if a, E-i a2 then a, c; j a2 for any c; j. 
Given any set Of labelled events with some gj relationships defined over them, where the 
cjs are ordered as above by =,, it is always possible to assign branching times to the transi- 
tions of those labelled events consistently (i. e. so that the cj relationships given follow from 
the branching timings). This is the free generation of timing from j-causality; we will consid- 
er it further in the next definition, and more comprehensively later. 
DEFINITION 1.9 - Securing 
We will now investigate when a series of events can all be said to be related. The idea is 
to have a chain of causality so that we can guarantee the occurrence of a given event a. by 
ensuring that its predecessors a,, ..., a. -, happen. 
In this view, a, <, a, ' is interpreted as 'the occurrence of a, guarantees the eventual occur- 
r. ence of a,. ' Thus (ai, ..., a,, -, ) secures a.. The 
interpretation of causality as guarantee makes 
the requirement (a, # a2) ý* (a, , a2) seem more reasonable, - an occurrence cannot both 
guarantee something and be in conflict with it. 
Let 13 = (LE, Con, <b) be a I. E. S. A sequence a,, a2, ..., a. ec C= Con, neN, is a j-securing 
of a. in 3, written (a,, a2, a. -, ) secures a,,, iff a, i=-i 
a2 F=j 
... [=-j a.. 
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If Vt, e a,, ... , tn e 
an 
- 
tl :! ýb t2 : 5b ... : 
5b tn then at, a2, ... , 
an-1 is a securing of an that is secure 
over all possible choices of a single time to represent an event. 17his kind of securing is just 
an i-securing; it means that for every possible choice of times to represent occurrences, 
those times guarantee t. and hence a.. This notion of times representing labelled events is 
discussed in the aside below. Similarly, a securing with an existential quantifier replacing the 
universal one, 
3ti Eal,... i 
tn e a. . 
tl : 5b t2: 5b ... : 
5b tn 
is true over at least one choice of times representing events, and is thus an e-securing. 
Notice, however, that all e-securings cannot be thus represented. Note that if a structure 
satisfies the axiom of finite causes, then a finite sequence of labelled events i-, h- and t- 
secures any given labelled event. (It might also be worth noting that c; i corresponds to the 
'completely precedes' order ) in [Lamport 1986] and the other c-js to his 'can affect' 
order ---). His framework is similar to a subset of ours. ) 
ASIDE - On some features of the timing of occurrences 
Obviously the usq-, of certain ordefings indicates what it is about an enabling of one event 
by another that we think important. If we write a, 9; h a2 then we suggest that ti = begin(ai), 
t2 = hegin(aA are natural choices of times to represent these events (so that if r, < r3 say, 
where t3 is some other "natural" choice of a time to represent an event a3, we might expect 
this to be reflected at the event level by a relation like a, C- h a3; this is what we mean by 
'natural'). The notion of a single time representing an interval of time is that used in atomic- 
event calculi. An i-securing of a indicates that any possible choice of atomic events within 
the structure that has the same event ordering will still secure a. This is not true for any 
securing: consider two events, a, = [0,31 and a2 = [1,2]. Clearly al c_h a2 is consistent with 
the underlying order <, and so a, secures a2. However, if we choose the ends of the events 
to represent them, then we can see that this is not a strong securing as, if ri =3 and r2 =2 
are the representing times, clearlytI 4. t2* 
Notice that when we represented untimed posets in subsection 1.0.3 and in the last sec- 
tion we used i-securings. We could equally well, for instance, (if we had a different view of 
what 'securing' means) have used h-securing. In that case the timing requirements for, for 
example, the N-poset, would have read rgj) < r, (2), r. (, ) < r, (3) ýnd rs(4) <c rj, (3)- Ile question of 
generating timing from causality will be revisited in the interlude preceding chapter three. 
Philosophically, it is hard to see how one transition can cause another without some time 
delay; that is why a, <. b, =* rq. ) < r, (b) and not a, <, b, =ý r, (. ) :sr, (b). This is not the view of 
causality taken by c-j; there : 5b is used. Both alternatives are available, - the more accurate 
version with < at the lower level, and the more convenient one with :5 at the upper, - but 
some care is needed in moving between them, as the footnote in section 1.3 indicated. 
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1.6 Observing Interval Event Structures 
DaVid Murphy 
An interval event structure is a model of the behaviours of an implementation of a concur- 
rent system. What can we actually see ? Recall that we had intended that labels merely 
serve to indicate which occuffence of an event we are talking about; all that is observable are 
events happening. lp this section we indicate which (multi)sets of timed events are valid 
observations of I. E. S. s. 
Our paradigm of observation is this; we sit down with a notebook and watch our I. E. S., 
recording the events that we see with their starting and finishing times. Nothing is hidden 
from us: no event can occur without us noticing, (- we are one of section 1.0's global 
observers). We shall assume that we do this through all time. Since we demanded that LE 
was countable, our record of what happened will be countable too. The result of this process 
is a L. I. E. S.; it is a list of occurrences of events with their starting and finishing times linearly 
ordered. (A L. I. E. S. is just another way of thinking about a linearly ordered multiset, since 
the labelling set is useful only to disambiguate one occurrence of an event from another. 
, 
Hence we consider " 
L. I. E. S. s which are equal up to bijection of labelling sets as equal. ) But 
which L. I. E. S. s are valid ones ? 
DEFINITION 1.10 - Possible histories 
A L. I. E. S. L= (LE', <) is a possible history of an I. E. S. 3= (LE, Con, <b), also known as 
an observation sequence, iff LE' is a maximal Con-set, i. e. LE' e M(S). (By abuse, we often 
write LE M(S) for L= (LE', <) and LE' e af(S). ) For the moment inite choice will be 
demanded; af(S) must be finite. 
Consider some maximal Con-set. Clearly all of its labelled events can occur in the same 
history. Since the set is maximal, no more events can occur than the ones given. Hence it is a 
possible history. We cannot deten-nine which of the many maximal Con-sets a given I. E. S. 
may have will be seen, since the whole idea of conflict was to model choice. 
It should be noted that an observation sequence is much more like a Mazurkiewicz trace, 
[Mazurkiewicz 1984], than a standard trace, as it incorporates information about temporal 
overlap (although it doesn't enable us to distinguish true (i. e. co-style) concurrency; if two 
labelled events overlap in an observation sequence, it can be either because they were con- 
current or because they were locally simultaneous: further, co labelled events are not 
necessarily simultaneous). 
This completes the basic definitions (summarised overleaf). 
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In the next chapter, we move on to consider how to combine interval event structures 
using simple categorical machinery. The interlude between this chapter and the next will deal 
with category theory and its place in computer science. 
Summary of definitions 
A version of the figure given on page 41 shows the relationship between branching time 
and labelled events; 
Events, E Labelled Events, LE Labels, L 
eEE aE LE c (L x E) u 1(=- L 
I 
begin(a) = t, (. ), end(a) tf(. ) 
I 
Branching Time with reals R and tags Tr = (LE, u LEf) 
(r, (. ), a, ) E= BT c BT = (R u (T)) x Tr 
(t, (. ), tf(,, )) e (BT x BT) 
<b respects both <c (over LR, u LEr) and < (over R) 
7--b respects both =,: (over LE., u LEf) and = (over R) 
<c &< and =, &= are consistent: 
a, <, b, =: > r, (. ) < r, (b) and a, =c b, =* ri(, ) = ri(b) 
e Next we surnmarise the main definitions given since page 41; 
Definedness (page 42). A labelled event a is defined, aT, if all of it's branching 
times are not T and undefined, al otherwise. 
Inclusion ordering & Overlap (page 43). A labelled event a, branching includes 
another a2, al c: b a2, if their branching times are included. Similarly for branching 
overlap (=b) and ordinary inclusion & overlap. 
The Outside relation (page 43). A labelled event a, is branching outside another a2, 
a, ob a2, if they are on different branches or share no temporal overlap. If only the 
latter, they just overlap Uo each other. 
Finite and Computational Structures (page 46). Yhese terms essentially forbid 
uncomputational (Zeno) structures. 
Event Orderings (page 47). The four forms of causality possible are starts causing 
starts (head causality, a, c-h a2). finishes causing finishes (interior causality, a, gi 
a2), starts causing finishes (exterior causality, a, g. a2) and finishes causing finish- 
es (tail causality, a, c;, a2)- 
Branching Time Notation (page 48 et prev). The branching time corresponding to a 
transition of an event a is written t, (. ) or tf(. ) depending on whether it is a start or a 
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finish. When we want to emphasize the components involved we write (r. (. ), a. ) or 
(rf(. ), af) instead. The notation a =- [(r, (. ), a,, ), (rf(. ), af)] or a =- [t, (. ), tf(. )] is used for 
timing. 
For a generic transition (a start or a finish) we write 't', so at is either the start or 
the finish of a, and t, is the branching time of that start or finish. This latter state- 
ment (that t, is the branching time a started or finished) is also notated t, C- a. 
Primitive Concurrency (page 48). Two labelled events are primitively concurrent, 
a, , a2if they are not causally related 
Consistency (page 48). The consistency predicate, Con, tells us which branches 
may appear together in any given execution of the system. 
Conflict (page 50). Two labelled events are in conflict, a, # a2, if they are primitive- 
ly concurrent but may never appear together. 
Interval Event Structures (page 50). An interval event structure (I. E. S. ) is an ele- 
mentary B. I. E. S. with conflict. It is normally written (LE g (L x E) U [*), Con, <b) 
but the extra structure indicated above (hVýin and end, =b etc. ) is also assumed to 
be present. 
Concurrency (page 51). Two labelled events are concurrent, a, ýgo a2, if they are 
primitively concurrent and consistent. 
Maximal Con-sets (page 51). A maximal Con-set is a possible history of an inter- 
val event structure. It contains one of the largest sets of labelled events that can 
possibly happen together. The set of all maximal Con-sets of an I. E. S. S is written 
'M(S). 
. 
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Interlude - Category Theory and Computer Science 
The next few chapters will make some use of category theory. Therefore, it seems appro- 
priate to discuss the use we will make of category theory, the prerequisites we assume, and 
the relationship between category theory and computer science. 
Category theory for us 
We shall use category theory only where it seems to offer a particularly clean way of 
expressing our ideas without unnecessary complication. It will be indicated where a categon- 
cal approach could be taken but wasn't, as it was felt that it was inappropriate or unwieldy. 
Prerequisites 
One of the least well defined terms in the literature is "elementary category theory. " To a 
mathematician this seems to be all of [Mac Lane 1971], while to a computer scientist [Blyth 
1986] may seem to be all that merits that description. We shall assume the latter definition 
of elementary, and suppose that the reader is familiar with objects, morphisms, products, 
equalisers, limits gýnerally (and dual notions) and with functors and adjunctions (although 
these will not be used extensively). More complex notions will be explained on the rare occa- 
sions that they are used; in general we shall keep the explanation as simple as is consistent 
with understanding the point in hand. Computer scientists may find [Pierce 1989] of use as 
an introduction. 
It should be stressed that (apart from a very small amount of material in the interludes) 
this thesis will not use any advanced category theory. I intend, in due course, to rework 
some of the material to incorporate more advanced categorical insights as suggested in the 
interludes. 
The motivation for the use of category theory in computer science has been extensively 
treated by various authors, [ADJ 1976] for example. I shall not attempt to convince those 
who still doubt its usefulness. 
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Operations on Structures: 
Synchronisation and Morphism 
The mind of Man isfram'd even like the breath 
And harmony of music. There is a dark 
Invisible workmanship that reconciles 
Discordant elements and makes them cling together 
In one society. 
Wordsworth 
In this chapter some operations on interval event structures and some relationships 
between them will be investigated. Operations such as the choice between structures, the 
sequential combination of structures and the parallel composition of structures will be con- 
Interval event structures are related by structure-preserving morphisms which 
naturally lead to categories of interval event structures. These categories will be used to 
describe our operations on interval event structures. 
The material in this chapter has been heavily influenced by ffinskel 1984i], ffinskel 
1984ii]. However, we have more temporal structure than him, and this leads to substantially 
different results, particularly for parallel composition with synchronisation. The general plan, 
though, is standard; we will try to define operations as universal constructions in appropriate 
categories. The interlude at the end of the chapter deviates from the standard course by con- 
sidering some more elaborate categories, and, hence, criteria for deciding whether a structure 
fits into our framework or not. Before we proceeding to define the operations, there is a short 
preamble concerning the timing of structures: - 
An interval event structure is said to be finite if it has a finite number of labelled ele- 
ments. In this section we will only consider finite structures. If a structure is finite (and 
sometimes if it is infinite) it will have a labelled event that begins first and one that finishes 
last. Recall that we endowed every structure with a unique labelled event that begins at the 
same time as the first labelled event begins and ends at the same time as the last labelled 
event ends. This event was called the 'silent event' of a structure, and was denoted by 
Intuitively this is an 'I am running' event. 
Recall that the 'special happening' * head-causes everything and everything tail-causes 
so that forVt Ea r= LE. begin(*) : 5b t&t : 5b end(*). This ensures that the structures are 
connected, and that a* can be happening at any time the structure is active. 
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DEFINITION 2.0 - The Beginning and End of an interval structure 
Recall that * lasts as long as the structure is active; it starts not latter than the first 
labelled event starts, and finishes not earlier than the last possible event finishes. This 
means that we can define the beginning and end of a structure by begin(s) = begin(*) and 
end(S) = end(*). These times are defined (i. e. reals) for all finite structures with defined 
times and for someinfinite ones. 
A structure is said to be bounded if begin(3c) and end(! 3) are defined (i. e. S has no unde- 
fined times and no unbounded ascending chains end(al) < end(a2) < ... so. ýýnd(S) # 
T. ) From 
now on we will only deal with defined structures; ones where all the times (except possibly 
end(*)) are defined. 
(If either time of any labelled event is defined, then the time _be 
in( is defined, (i. e. 3 is 
always bounded-below) since we required that 3*e LE with the property that for any a E-= 
LE, begin(*) : 5b hegLin(a). This means that beRin(*) !ý begin(a) and thus begin(*) :5 inf[r. Ia 
[(r,, a, ), tf], a E=- LEI and the inf is well-defined. ) 
Notice, incidentally, that we do not require end(*) = W[rf Ia -= [t,, (rf, af)], a C: LE) or 
begin(*) = inf(r. Ia =- f(r., a), tf], aE LE); the on light can go on before things start, and stay 
on after things have finished. 
We can formulate the time -9 starts doing events in some maximal Con-set LG _10(3) as 
begin(3, L= (LE-ý', <)) = inf(r, Ia [(r, a, ), tf], a r= LE') so that the earliest S can start 
doing events is min(begin(S, L) IL 5ý3)), and the latest it can start is max(bet: jn(Sc, L) I 
Lc M(S)). If end(-I, L= (LE, <)) = sup(rf Ia -= [t, (rf, af)], a C= LE'), then the latest it can 
finish doing its last labelled event is maxfend(! 3. L) I LE= M(S)) and the earliest it can finish 
doing its last event is min[end(S, L) I LE. M! 3)). Recall that M(S) is finite so these times 
are always well-defined on Ru (T) by max and min. 
41. 
It is important to be aware that the times begin(S) and end(S) can be very different from 
the times 3 is actually seen to be doing events; although S must restrict itself to exhibiting 
transitions within the interval [r., rf] where begin(S) = (r., *. ) and end(S) = (rf, *f), it need not 
occupy all of that interval. In particular there is no contradiction in end(S) = (T, *f) even if 
is, u -defined and finite; such an I. E. S. might be a model of W(rf Ia [t, (rf, af)], aELE) is well 
a CSP [Hoare 1985] process P; stop where P is finite. 
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NOTATION AND CONVENTION (Summary) 
David Murphy - 
Interval event structures will be symbolised by 3, Tj 19' etc.; their associated sets of 
labelled events, consistency predicates and temporal orders will be (LE, Con, <b), (LE, 
ýjon% <ý'), and (LE', Con', <) respectively. Labelled events in 3 will be ao, a,, a2, and so L 
on, and in 3' they will be bo, bl, b2, and so on. Silent events will be and *0 respectively in 
3,3'. and 19'. Con sets will be c, c, and e respectively, while maximal Con-sets will be either 
the same or f, Lf, and Lr. Helvetica-Bold will be used for categories. 
The conventions for denoting branching times introduced in chapter one will be retained. In 
particular, we denote, two things by beg: in(a); both the real value at which a begins (r. say) 
and the branching time ((r, (. ), a,, ) say); we will usually be able to deduce from context which 
is meant. Similarly begin(S) will mean either the linear time S begins, or the branching time 
(i. e. the linear time decorated with a tag, which will be *ý here). 
A continuing theme will be that labels are just a means of disambiguating one occurrence 
of an event from another. Labels will be manipulated and events relabelled without remit; we 
must just be careful never to make two different labelled events the same. 
A convention for substitution will be useful. The term a[b1c] will denote a with b substitut- 
ed for c wherever it occurs. If a is the same type as b and c, then 
a Rd =c 
if a =b 
a otherwise. 
In this chapter the transitivity of <band the subset closure property of Con will sometimes 
be exploited. (So the correct definition is obtainable from ours by taking a transitive or sub- 
set closure. ) 
The whole discussion of this chapter is presumed to be made relative to a fixed, prespeci- 
fled set of labelled events, called a universe of discourse. At the outset a -finite set of events 
and a countable set of labels must be provided, and no labelled event must ever be used 
which is not in the cross product of those sets. This requirement is made to avoid cardinality 
problems, and to provide a fixed set for quantifiers to range over., 
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2.0 Prefixing 
The operation of prefixing an event b onto an I. E. S. involves building a new I. E. S. just like 
the original except that the occurrence b happens first: - 
DEFINITION 2.1 - Prefixing 
Suppose S= (LE, Con, <b) is an interval event structure. Suppose also that we have a 
new labelled event, b, be LE. S prefixed by b, or b before 3, written W, is defined to be an 
I. E. S. IS' = (LE', Con', <, ) defined below. We will suppose that b has a defined duration, Ab, 
but an undefined statting time so that b =- [(r, b., ), (r + Ab, bf)] where r is variable. This 
accords with the intuition that we know how long a prefixing event is going to take, but not 
when we want it to start. By prefixing it to 3 we force it to start before everything else. Sup- 
pose 3 =- [(r,, *, ), (rf, *f)]. Then 
LE' =df (b 1b =- [(r - &, b. ), (r., bf)1 1u (LE -1 *) u (*'» 
Con'=d, 
,f 
(c u (bl 1c cz Con 
<be =de-Cýý U «r. - Ab, b), (r., bf)1 u «r., - &, *J), Q1teaE LE - (*) 
) 
-0 
? 
--b =dcf =b U( 
(r. 
- Ab, 
b. ), ! Le-L'in(ý3)1 
The first condition adds b at the beginning of the. structure, deletes the old silent event and 
adds a new one. 
, 
The second ensures that b is consistent with every consistent execution of the old struc- 
ture. The new silent event is, of course, [(r. - Ab, *, '), (rf, *f')]. The closure properties of 
Con are exploited here. 
The third ensures that the branching structure of S is preserved, that the beginning of b is 
branching-less-than the end of b, and that the new silent event *' has the required proper- 
ties. 
In fact, this description is not quite right, as <bwill have references to the old silent event 
in it, an event which no longer exists. Hence the 4 in the definition is related to <bby 
b a, (, )[bfl,. l [*f/*fl), 
(rt(2), a, (2)[bfl*, ][*f'l*fl) I (r, (, ), a, (, )), (r, (2), 
a, (2)) E <b) <J 
that is, the same ordering except that all *. tags become bf ones, and all *f tags become *f' 
ones. Similarly we should overwrite *. by bf and *r by *f' to obtain 1-J from =b in the definition 
Of =b'-) 
The fourth condition identifies bf with the start of ! 3, (so that b is now branching-less- 
than-or-equal-to, all of S, since x <by and y =b' Z iMplieS X <b' Z). 
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It might be argued that what is wanted is a prefixing construction that sticks b onto the 
beginning of every maximal Con-set rather than onto the beginning of the whole structure, so 
that (a version of) b (i. e. a labelled event with the same event part as b) finishes as the first 
event of each maximal Con-set starts. This, too, is possible, and might be thought of as a 
local prefixing. In general a local construction will be one relative to maximal Con-sets, in 
opposition to a global one that is made on the whole structure. 
A diagram may make the prefixing construction easier to visualise: - 
= bg 
Figure 2.1 - The effect of the prefixing construction 
There does not seem to be a simple categorical description of prefixing, which it why it 
was introduced before the substance of the chapter. All prefixing constructions of interest to 
us will be dealt wjth by using sequential compositions. 
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2.1 Morphisms 
For structures with a silent event we can define the notion of hornomorphism of interval 
event structures. A hornomorphism is intuitively a function that preserves structure. Our defi- 
nition resembles that of bisimulation equivalence [Milner 19891. 
DEFINITION 2.2 -j-Homomorphism of Interval Event Structures 
Given two I. E. S. s, 3 and 3'. with silent events a (-n asynchronous) j-honlonlorphism 
is a functionj, from LE to LE' such that 
(i) Silent events are preserved; f (*) = *'. 
(ii) The causal precedence order is preserved. If, for a, a' E LE. a [: j a' then this order is 
preserved; f (a) qf (a). (Here gj cornes from : ýb and gi from:! ýb. ) 
(iii) Previously consistent sets must remain consistent. If c C- Con then the image of c 
in f, f (c), E= Con . 
4te 
This choice of morphism ensures that if f: s --> S' then there is a matching ordering in 3' 
for any in 3 (although this may be the trivial one a c; j a) so that S' can be thought of as sinill- 
lating S. If there are arrows both ways, f: S --) T and g: 9' -, 3, then the two structures 
mutually simulat6 each other (if, that is, we think whichever g; j we have captures the essence 
of simulation). 
PROPOSITION - Categories of Interval Event Structures 
There are four categories whose arrows are I. E. ý. -j-homomorphisrns and whose objects 
are I. E. S. s. We shall call these categories IESj. Notice that, trivially, there is an identity 
homomorphism and that composition of morphisms is well-defined. 
We shall define a synchronous morphism by replacing condition (ii) by 
(iia) Suppose a c-j a'& a:;, -- a' then we requiref (a) g; jf (a) andf (a) #f (a'). 
The categories with synchronous j-homomorphisms as arrows will be called IESj, y,,. (The 
reason for the term 'synchronous' will become apparent when we consider the product in 
these categories. ) 
In tile following sections, we shall define operations on I. E. S. s as operations on the cate- 
gories formed here. The question of just which limits those categories have will be discussed 
later. 
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A picture may help at this stage: 
V. 
%7 
f, 
ýI ', 
/ 
a 
f(a) 
li 
i 
li 
i 
f(al 
Figure 2.2 - Asynchronous (top or bottom) and 
synchronous (bottom only) j-homomorphisms 
The synchronous categories IESj,,, are related to the asynchronous categories IESj just 
as the synchronous categories of [Winsk-el 1984i] are related to the asynchronous ones. 
Notice that, because of the relationships between orderings given by D in the last section, 
IESI, and IES, are wide subcategories of IES., and IESj is a wide subcategory of both IESI, 
and IES,. 
It is also worth noting the difference between the figure above and normal process graphs. 
Normally nodes are labelled by states and edges by actions. Here a node is a labelled event 
(which is like an action) and an edge is a causal dependency relation. 
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DEFINITION 2.3 - Strong homomorphisms and Temporal morphisms 
There is another definition of morphism that seems as natural as the one given above. 
This preserves rather more structure of time and is called temporal homomorphism. The idea 
is that one structure simulates another just when the labelled events of the second structure 
lie entirely inside the corresponding events of the first. We can formalise this as follows: 
We say that a morphism f, is a strong homomorphism just when it is a j-homomorphism 
for all j. In that case, it preserves all enablings and, hence, all securings. In particular, it pre- 
serves all securings, - hence the name strong homomorphism. 
Given two I. E. S. s, S and S', a temporal homomorphism, is a function, f, from LE to LE, 
which is a strong homomorphism and where Va r= LE if a =- [t, tf], and f (a) -= [t', V then ý, fI 
ft, tf] D [tS', tj] provided f (a) The idea is here that a simulating structure must do the 
same labelled events with the same causality in less time, except if we want to simulate a 
labelled event by a silent event, when it doesn't matter how long it takes since it is silent. 
Notice that homqporphisms are total, forf is defined on all of LE, and hence LE g; LE'. A 
temporal morphisni is a strong homomorphism that preserves absolute timing information. 
The category whose arrows are temporal homomorphisms and whose objects are I. E. S. s will 
be called UES: it is a wide subcategory of IESi. Similarly, UESy. is the wide subcategory of 
UES with synchronous temporal morphisms. 
Unless otherwise indicated, in future when a categorical operation is mentioned it will be 
assumed to be in tIES. 
We have not assumed that homomorphisms preserve the names of events (i. e. that the 
image of (1, e) has event part e; ffl, e)'= (1', e). ) This is because if "should be up to the user 
what 'simulation' means. It may sometimes be appropriate to place further constraints on 
but it is up to the user to examine the subcategory structure thus generated. 
Notice that none of the categodes we have defined are small. 
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2.2 The disjoint sum 
Consider two I. E. S. s, S and S' Their disjoint sum, .3+ ! 5, is obtained by glueing their 
silent events together and not letting them otherwise interfere in any way. It is a coproduct 
in the categories IESj and UES. To see this define the sumS + -Tto be the I. E. S. 31 where 
(i) The set of labelled events of 3 +S', LE-, is the set 
«(0, lo), eo), «0, li), ei), ... 1 (lo, eo), (Ii, ei), ... c: 
LE: A *) 
u «(1, lo), eo), «1,11), ei), ... 1 (lo, eo), (11, ei), ... r= LE'; -- *') 
A labelled event ((0, lo), eo) in 3+ S' has the same timing as (Io, eo) in 5, while a 
labelled event ((I, lo), eo) carries the timine of (Io, eo) inT. 
The new silent event is *'; it is timed by 
fmin(hMijn(S), begin(T)), max(end(S), cnd(T)ý]. 
(ii) The obvious injections on labelled events are io : (1, e) -> ((0,1), e), and i, : (1, e) -) 
((1,0, e). The consistent sets of -3 + S' are just the disjoint union of the consistent 
sets of eaqh component. Suppose c c- Con. Write io(c) for the image of c in io and 
ioQon) for the union of all such images. Then Con' = ioLCon) u ii(Con). This 
union is disjoint as io Qon) and ii QoT) are disjoint by construction. 
(iii) A time, t c= ((0,1), e), of S+ S' is <b' another t' e ((0,1'), e') iff t <b K Further, 
some tc ((1,1), e) is < t' (=- ((1,1), e') iff t <b' r Finally hegin(*') : ý4' t, and 
tt : 54' eifd(*') for t, E a' E LE- The equality =47 can be built in a similar fashion to 
the technique used for <. 
(LE-, Copý, <ý) is clearly an interval event structure. 'nie injections, io, ii, are obviously j- 
homomorphisms for any j (and hence strong homomorphisms). Further they define a 
coproduct: 
For arbitrary morphisms jo and j, to an arbitrary I. E. S., T, there is a unique j: S+5, -> T 
such that the following diagram commutes 
Figure 2.3 - Commuting 
diagram for the disjoint 
sum construction. 
5 +T 
0 
\jo 
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To see this, define j(v) componentwise: if v= ((0,1), e) then j(v) =&f jo(l, e) while if 
v= ((1,0, e) define j(v) =df j, (1, e). Then j- io = jo, and j- ii = ji so the diagram commutes. 
For the uniqueness ofj suppose k: 5 +T---ý T makes the diagram commute. 
Consider one labelled event in !3+ 13' and let k((O, 1), e) then jo(l, e) This works 
for ((1,1), e) too, so k =j. 
-1 This proof only holds if we remove the silent events of !3 and ! 31 before performing the sum. 
(So that io(*) = ii(*) = *'; since j is a homomorphism, j(*') = *y, so there is no problem. ) 
From the last two paragraphs (5 +'Sc', io, ii) is a coproduct of 5 and T in IESj. Since io and 
il are also morphisms in UES if jO and ji are, then j will be too, and uniqueness follows from 
the same argument as before. Hence UES has small coproducts constructed thus, and there 
it is natural to time, for instance, ((1,1), e), with the same time as (1, e). 
The disjoint sum of two I. E. S. s clearly corresponds to a choice between them. We can 
have either one structure or the other. (This is precisely what (ii) above requires. ) 
If .3 and S' beghY at the same time, the effect of the disjoint sum in 
UES is rather like the 
traditional picture of choice, but notice that there can be shrinkage of events. 
Figure 2.4 - The effect of the disjoint sum construction 
(homomorphism lines omitted for clarity) 
It can be seen that 3+T somehow corresponds to a structure that can either behave like 
,3 or like T. 'Me crucial point is that (mcAulo the renaming performed by io and ii) + just adds 
maximal Con-sets: 
M3 +T) =- MS) UW(T). 
So, modulo renaming, the maximal Con-sets. of 3 +T are just those in af(S) u MT). 
Pacie 73 Chapter Two - Operations on Structures I 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
2.3 Sequential composition 
David Murphy 
Sequential composition is a fairly natural operation on I. E. S. s; we just do one set of things 
after another. For two I. E. S. s, 3= (LE, Con <b) and T= (LE', on, <b) with silent events 
the local sequential composition of .3 and S' 
is written S E) T. 'ne definition of this oper- 
ation is fairly subtle, as we must stick a copy of T onto the end of every maximal Con-set of 
3. First identify the-la'st labelled events of these maximal Con-sets; for c (=- 945) define 
a (=- Last(S, c) 4=> aE= c& Va'E c. end(a) ýt end(a) & end(a) #T&a#* 
Now we must make 1%4! 3)1 copies of T and shift the (real-valued part of) the times of all 
the events in T so that X starts at end(a) for aE Last(S, c). A shift operator first- cc 
DEFINITION 2.4 - Shifts in time 
An I. E. S. 3= (LE, Con, <b) shifted by tER, written 31t, is simply an I. E. S. 13' = (LE', 
Lon', <b) where all the times have been shifted by t; 
f (a'= ((t, 1), e) = [(rr, + t, a., ) LE'=d, (rf + t, af)] Ia e) =- [(r,, a. ), (rf, af)] E LE) 
Con'--ýdd"Con 
(iii) ((r, (, ) + t, a, (, )), (r, (2) + t, a, (2))) E <b'ýý-> ((r, (, ), a, (, )), 
(rt(2), atc2))) E <b 
. I. 
We now want io define a set of I. E. S. s formed by shifting a copy of S' so that a member of 
the set starts as each maximal Con-set finishes: - 
Define ! 3+ý = 3+1 (= (LEý, K: onc, <bc) say) (where a r= Last(S, c) and t is just end(a) - 
min(t Ia -= [(t, a., ), (rf, af)] Ia c= LEc)), in orderto stick-a T+tc onto theend of each CE M(S). 
(In some perverse structures where a maximal Con-set is countablY infinite there may be 
no last a and we must take t= (L] (ýýnd(a) Ia ra c)) - min[ tIa _= [(t, a, ), (rf, af)] I aELEJ .) 
The construction Sc E) S' = (LE-, Con', <ý) say, which is defined if some maximal Con-set 
ofS is bounded, can now be defined as; 
LE- =dd LE u (a' = ((I, c), e) =- [t., tf] I*#a= (1, 'e) =- [t, tf] (=- LEc, c C= M(S)). 
That is, the labelled events of S E) S' are those of LE plus (a disambiguated 
version of) those of ! Y-I-tc for each c c. M(5). (We suppose LE r-i u LEc 0. ) C 
(ii) Define Con' c), e) 1 (1, e) c ccl I c'c c LoW c _cj (i. e. a disambiguated version of Logc. ) Then, 
Loy =,, f Con uu=L L Cr=945)[cuc, 
lc, c 011, C) 
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That is, every maximal Con-set c generating ! 3'+tc is consistent with every Lon- 
set of ! Y-I-tc. 
(iii) For <b' we must first disambiguate <ýc and then replace (*'C), by ar (where a is a 
last labelled event, a r: Last(S, c)) and (*c)f by the new silent events' finish *of. 
(This new silent event, *', by the way, is timed by tf(. -Il where 
tf(. -)] [(hegLn(*), *S), (t.., *1j)] 
tMax max fgnd(*') +tIt end(a) - _bgýin(! 
Y), ac Last(SI, c)) 
Then, if *c =- (rf(. -), (*ý)f)l c 
<býc =df R, (, )), (ripý, R, (2)) I ((r, (, ), (Q, e(i)), ), (r, (2), ((I, e(2)), 
)) E <b'c ) 
where R, (i) -"": drf 
(((I, c), e(j)[afl*,, ][*' for a r= LasKS, c) and 'A c 
rt(iý =def 
(i. e. (1, e(i)), with the right renarnings and a new, disambiguating label. ) 
Now, <ý isjust <band all the orders of <trc; 
<b* "def <b Uu <b ff C CE 
While the idea of sticking a copy of T, appropriately shifted, onto the end of each maximal 
Con-set of S is fairly obvious, the mechanics of doing so are rather complex. 'Mus far I have 
not found a simple category theoretic construction that gives -5 (D 3'. However, in the case 
that S is deterministic (has just one maximal Con-set, namely LE) and begin(T) > end(S), 
the construction simplifies somewhat; in the terms of section 2.1, local sequential composi- 
tion (sticking a copy of T on the end of each maximal Con-set) is, in this case, the same as 
global sequential conijosition (sticking T on the end of the whole structure). 
The global sequential compositionS (E)) S'is defined to be (LE-, Con', <j7) where 
(i) Define for aELE - (*), io(a) = (0, a), io(*) = *' and for bELE'- (*'), il(b) = (1, 
b), it(*') = *'. (i. e. io(l, e) = ((0,1), e) etc. ). Then define LE1 = [io(a) I aELE) u 
f it (b) IbE LE'). The new silent event is *'; it is timed by [(beg: in(*), 
(end(S'), *Iffl. 
u (ii) LO-e- =d-f'OLC-On-) UCE aýS) ('0(c) u "(0 1 C'c- Con') 
(iii) The effect of io and il on orders is defined in a slightly subtle way, so that all of T 
is greater than all of S. In order to do this smoothly we will create a new labelled 
event * =- [(end(*), *. ), (begin(*'), -*r)] with -* e LEI to take the place of the 
two missing silent event transitions, so that LE-=df LEI u( -*). 
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Define on tags io((I, e), ) = ((0,0, e),, io(*, ) = *,, io(*f) = *, 
io(<b) =ddf ((r, (, ), io(a, (, ))), (r, (2), io(a, (2)))) I ((r, (, ), a, (, )), 
(rt(2), a, (2))) G `ýb) 
and similarly il((I, e), ) = ((1,1), e),, ii(*, ') = *-f, io(*fr) = *'f 
il(<bf) ý-Fdd (((r, (, ), it (a, (, ))), 
(rt(2), i, (a, (2)))) I ((r, (, ), a, (, )), 
( r, (2), a, (2))) G ": ýb f) 
Now < =df io(<b) u il (<b) u (begin(*), end(*)). 
David Murphy 
A categorical description of (a construction similar to) global sequential composition (as a 
restriction of the free product) is given in section 2.6. 
We can give a sliver of justification for *; it is like of in CSP; it tells us that one process 
has successfully terminated. 
Aside: given structures with silent events, there are four possible ways to do sequential 
composition; stick silent events together (i. e. wait until one silent event is over and then 
start the next silent event), stick the events of the second structure onto the silent event of 
first (i. e. wait until-one silent event is over and then start the events of the second one), 
stick the silent event of the second structure onto the end of each maximal Con-set of the 
first (i. e. wait until this execution is over then start the next silent event), and stick the 
events of the second structure onto the end of each maximal Con-set of the first (i. e. wait 
until this execution is over then start the events of the second one). The first is global 
sequential composition, and the last local sequential composition. 
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2.4 Synchronisation 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
Parallel composition presupposes a notion of synchronisation. In this section, which was 
influenced by [Petri 19861, we will discuss a definition of synchronisation that encompasses 
the features of what is called 'synchronisation' in two disparate areas; languages for parallel 
computation, and (what we called in the introduction) physical concurrency. In the former 
area, synchronisation' means the mutual participation of two autonomous parallel processes 
in some act, usually either a communication from one to the other or some common event. In 
the latter area, which is typified by hardware, (see [Marino 1981]) there is genuine primitive 
concurrency in the sense that the two 'processes' are in different places. Such systems can- 
not be sidiulated on a sequential machine (as more abstract (discrete) concurrency can) 
without the loss of many behaviours (because the signals exchanged are truly continuous). 
In this area 'synchronisation' usually means an exchange of signals prior to some communi- 
cation or common action. The following two slogans seem to be a description of what is 
common to these two notions: 
Synchronisation involves the possibility of waiting. 
Synchronisation involves having something provided ifyou want it. 
In all forms of synchronisation there is the possibility that one process or entity might 
have to wait for another to be ready. This is equivalent to ensuring that something is eventu- 
ally provided when it is needed. Hence the two slogans above are equivalent. Hardware 
synchronis ation iý essentially used to ensure that signals are available until they have been 
properly dealt with. Occam-style synchronisation [Jones & Goldsmith 1988] is used to 
ensure that a communication happens in such a way that both partners can be sure of what 
has been communicated. 
It is important to distinguish between mere coninainication, which just involves the pas- 
sage of information, and synchronisation which we shall assume involves common 
participation in some action. The former may involve the latter (e. g. in CSP [Hoare 1985]), 
but it is not, in general, necessary; a parallel process can communicate by sending a signal 
out without waiting to see whether it is heard and by whom. If it waits, then, in addition to 
the communication that is happening, we shall say that it is synchronising with whatever it is 
communicating with. The distinction is that between two processes that merely communicate 
and two that must always synchronise, for instance (using the CSP notation) between 
a! 7 --)SKIP 11 a? x-ý SKIP and a-ý SKIP Ila--) SKIP 
The situation can be compared to the gedankene-xperiment of throwing sacks of mail 
between moving trains (an example of physical concurrency). A communication is just throw- 
ing a sack; synchronisation is waiting to receive a sack in return as well (which may indicate 
that the first sack reached its target). 
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The difference is illustrated in the diagam: 
Communication (left) 
sender's event and 
David Murphy 
/arrow of time 
sender's event 
receiver's event Synchronisation receiver's event 
(right) 
Figure 2.5 - Communication and Synchronisation 
Thus, finally, we reach our working definition: 
The synchronisation of matching events niust involve 
some temporal overlap between their intervals. 
Hence, for two labelled events, a -= [(r, (, ), a. ), (rf(, ), af)] and b -= [(r, (b), bs), (rf(b) bf)], to be 
able to synchronise, the intersection of their time intervals, [r., (. ), rf(. )] n [riý), rf(b)], must be 
non-empty; in that case we wnte a Unch b. 
In future we will write a r) b both for the subset of the reals [r, (a), rf(, )] n [r, (b), rf(b)] and for 
the timing [(max(rý(. ), r, (b)), (a, b), ), Cmiin(rf(, ), rf(b)), (a, b)f)]. The meaning will usually be 
obvious from the context. 
The thinking expounded in this section might be summarised by saying that it is only sen- 
sible to consider the possibility of synchronisation between two labelled events when there 
is some temporal overlap between them. Any weaker requirements on synchronisation 
would result in a theory that would not be a good model of physical concurrency. 
Notice, parenthetically, that our notion of concurrency relies on distribution. If two 
transitions are concurrent then it should be possible for them to occur spatially separated: 
this is just one of the earliest ideas of Petri, but it seems (unjustly, to me) to have waned in 
currency. This viewpoint brings out the difference between occurrences on the same branch 
(which may be simultaneous but can't be concurrent) and things on different branches which 
may be both. Different concurrent branches can happen in 'different places; any notion of 
synchronisation of concurrent happenings should make sense within this view. (Notice, 
incidentally, that if spatial separations are large, then there may be important relativistic 
effects as- well, and our definition of synch will have to be altered. We shall stick to a model 
where time runs at the same rate everywhere. ) 
(The whole issue of synchronisation is discussed in [Murphy 1987] and [Chaney & Mol- 
nar 1973]. The latter makes particularly scary reading. ) 
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2.5 The Free Product 
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I Consider two I. E. S. s, S and T; one way to represent the parallel composition of S and T 
which we shall write as 3 11 S'v is via an I. E. S. whose labelled events consist of pairs oý 
labelled events, one member of the pair from 3 and one from TA labelled event like (a, b) in 
S 11 T should represent the synchronisation of a from S and b from T Unsynchronised events 
can be thought of is synchronisations with the matching silent event; (a, *') will represent 
the unsynchronised occurrence of a. This insight is due to [Winskel 1984i]; it leads us to 
examine the categorical product of I. E. S. s. 
DEFINITION 2.5 - The Free Product of Interval Event Structures 
Suppose we have I. E. S. s 5 and T as usual. The product of 3 and 5c, written Sx 3'. is 
defined to be an I. E. S., 3' = (LE -, Con" <b) where 
(0) Given two events, a= (1, e) in LE, and b= (I', e') in LE' we will write the 
compound event ((I, V), (e, eý) as (a, b). 
LE - : --dd ((a, ' . b) IaE LE, b c= LE'). (Remember that LE and LE'. ) 
Suppose that a =- [(r, (, ), a., ), (rr(. ), affl, b -= ffr, (b), b. '), (rf'ýb), bf)], then (a, b) will be 
timed by [(min(rý(, ), r, (b)), (a, b), ), (max(rf(ý), rf(b)), (a, b)f)]. This timing will, in 
future, be written as aub. The real part of this is just the union of the intervals 
timi ng a and b with any gaps between their end-points filled in. The new silent 
event, 
(ii) Any consistent set of labelled events from .3 should be consistent with any 
consistent set of events from T. Hence we have the conditions that 
fo = (c x c'l c r= Con c'E Con') Ln: I- 
So, in any given set Con-set in the product, any given event can either 
synchronise with anything or appear asynchronously. If it synchronises it will 
appear as a labelled event of the form (a, b), with b# *', while if it occurs 
asynchronously, there will be a (a, *') in c' All possible synchronous and 
asynchronous behaviours are possible; hence the tennfree product. 
Notice that we can represent parallel composition without synchronisation by a 
construction like the disjoint sum, but using this definition for Con" rather than 
the one in section 2.2 (iii). 
(iii) Clearly Sx S' must have all the orderings of S and all those of S' via events like 
(a, *') and (*, b). In this definition we shall, for clarity, explicitly display some of 
the tags. The individual orders for 3 and S' give us the assertions 
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V (a,, *'), (a2, *') r= LE- with t, (, ) = (r, (, ), a, (, )) E=- ai, t, (2) = 
(rip), a, (2)) Ea2- 
tt(l) <b tt(2) => (rt(j), (a,, *')t) <b' 
(rt(2), (a2, *%) 
bi), (*, b2) c LE- with tt(i) = (r, (, ), b, (, )) (=- bi, tt(2) = 
(rt(2), bt(2)) E b2 
tt(i) <b tq2) => (n(i), (*, bi)) < (rip), (*, 
b2)t) 
We also have ý. ome orderings due to synchronisations. First we will consider the 
ordering between asynchronous and synchronous occurrences. Suppose that 
a -= 
[t, (ý), tf(,, )] E LE, b -= 
[4(b), tf(b)] E LE' where t, (. ) = (r, (,, ), aj etc. & (a, b) E 
LE- (so that a and b synchronise). Remember that (a, b) -= aub so suppose that 
(a, b) 
-= 
lts(ab)t tf(zb)]. We want everything that is <b7-related to a time of a, or <bý- 
related to a time of b to be similarly related to a time of (a, b). 
The only point where care is needed is in deciding which point; we only have 
ts(a, b)i tf(a, b) to play with, so we must be careful not to violate the linear order. (If 
(r, a) `ýb (r, a') then r< Suppose a' - tf(ý)] c LE and (a', -') -= 
c LE' then if tqý) <b t, (, ) we can only assert <17 tf(a, b) (for if we had 
< t, (,, b), 
. 
r, (ab) might be < rq. -) SO we would violate the linear order). 
Thus, for a, b, 'ý' as above, 
I- tt(a') <b ts(a) 
--7> 
t (abý 
where t(', b) = t, (, b) if ts(ab) = ts(a), t(a'b) = tf(,, b)othenvise 
2. ts(a) <b ý(a) (ts(a, b)i ý(a', *)) C- 
3. t, (, -) <b tf(a) (tt(a', *ji tf(ab)) C <17 
(a, b) 4. tf(ý) <b ý(., ) => (t E 
where t 
(ab) 
=t f(a b) 
if t f(a b) =t f(, ), t(a, 
b) 
. t, (,, b) otherwise 
and symmetrically for Y -= [t, (bý, 
tf(býl E LE with (*, Y) - 
lts(b'. 
*')ý tf(a,, *)] r= LE-. 
(That is, 1. becomes 
t, (b-,., <b' t, (b) => 
(tl(b', 
*')i t 
(ab) 
E <b' 
where t 
(a, b) 
= ts(ab) if ts(a, b) = ts(b)ý t 
(a ' b) =t f(,. b)othenvise 
and so on. ) 
Now consider the order we get from two synchronisations. Suppose a 
tf(, )] c LE and similarly for a', b& b' and suppose (a, b), (a', b')ELE-. Then 
1- ts(a) 4ýýb %(&') ": * 
(ts(ab)7 ts(&*, bl) rý 
< if ts(a'. b) = ts(a) 
2. ts(a) <b tf(al => (%(a. b)ý tf(a*. b*)) C< 
3. tf(. ) <b t, (, -) 
(tf(ab)i ts(i*. 
b*)) E <ý 
if tf(, 
) = 
tf(a, 
b) 
& ts(a'. bl ": - ts(a) 
4. tf(a) <b tr(a, ) 
(tffsb)v tf(a. bl) E <b, 
if tf(a. b) = tf(a) 
and symmetrically for b and V. 
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Finally, of course, end points are related 
Vae LE', a -= [t,, tf] . t, 
<b' tf 
The order <, ý is the smallest transitive relation satisfying these conditions. 
410 
A similar technique can be used for 
It is obvious that 5' is an I. E. S. It is also a representation of the parallel composition of 3 
and . 13' since it contains all unsynchronised occurrences of labelled events from 3 and 13' 
together with all possible synchronisations between labelled events of 3 and labelled events 
of 13' Notice that the silent event of 3 xT is (*, *'). 
One slightly unfortunate feature of this construction is that it can disconnect branches; 
things which were once causally-related to starts. may end up only being so related to finish- 
es, leaving the starts dangling. Moreover, an order that on two events that become two 
synchronisations may not be represented at all. 
TiIEOREM - The product of I. E. S. s is a categorical product in IESj and UES 
Proof: Consider the projections no(a, b) =a and nl(a, b) = b. These suggest possible mor- 
phisms from 3x S' to 3 and S' (these are, in fact, morphisms, as <b and <b' are both 
obtainable from <t7, as if two transitions are ordered in 3x S' then their projections will be 
ordered in'S or ! Y). For an arbitrary I. E. S., T, and arbitrary morphisms jo :T -ý -5, ji : 141'-> S' 
there is a unique morphismj: T -) 3x S'that makes the diagram below commute 
For a labelled event V in T define j(xV) = (jo(y)JI(y)). Then, obviously, 
7ro-j=jo and ni -j=jl 
so the diagram commutes. Further j is unique; consider k: T -> sxS, take V in T. Suppose 
k(W) = (a, b). Then if k makes the diagram commute jo(y) = iro(k(y)) = no(a, b) =a and ji(y) 
= ir, (k-(y)) = 7r, (a, b) =b so k(y) = Uo(y), ji(y)) and so k=j. Since (a, b) -= aUb this con- 
struction works in VES too. 
41. .. 
S XT 
Figure 2.6 - Commuting 
diagram for the product S 
ITC 
0 ný\ 
construction. \jO Y, 
T 
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The categorical product is a description of parallel composition, but it is an inadequate one; 
it contains sYnchronisations that cannot occur. Even if the intersection of the intervals of a 
and b, a r-) b, is empty, (a, b) is still a labelled event in Sx S' This synchronisation cannot 
occur, though, because a is over before b starts, or vice versa, and thus the criteria of section 
2.4 are violated. 
(Products (and-limits in general) are only unique up to isomorphism, so note that, in the 
categories IESj in particular, there may very well be other constructions for the product 
which give an isomorphic result. These might be worth investigating. ) 
Before we go on to explore more adequate descriptions three other things ought to be 
said. We shall outline an interpretation of the product in the synchronous categories. Then 
we outline why a result similar to the CCS decomposition theorem cannot be recovered from 
our constructions. Finally we give an example of the product construction (also known as the 
free product) for two simple process trees. 
The paper [Winskel 1984i] deals with a synchronous product and with a decomposition 
theorem, so must we; - 
(i) The Synchronous Product. For Winskel, the product in synchronous categories 
like IESj,,,,, plays a useful r6le in giving a semantics to synchronous calculi like 
SCCS. We shall not investigate this line of reasoning, firstly since it is very hard 
to see wha. t use a timed synchronous model might have, given the problems of 
building synchronisers, distributing clock signals and so on, ([Murphy 1987] dis- 
cusses these problems in some detail), and secondly since the relationship 
between time and causality makes the veracity of such a construction extremely 
problematic. 
(ii) A decomposition theorem. It is at this stage that a decomposition theorem is usu- 
ally introduced. There can be no decomposition theorem for I. E. S. s for two 
reasons. The first is well-known; no poset in which the N-poset (of chapter one) 
is embedded can be decomposed into elemental posets using choice, sequential 
composition and parallel composition alone. ([Boudol & Castellani 1988] discuss 
this result. ) The second reason is less obvious, and, like many subtle features of 
this model, has to do with the interplay between time and causality. The problem 
has to do with the uniqueness of points in branching time where branches join up: 
instability means that we don't know where a given point has come from; there is 
no unique maximal securing guaranteeing some labelled events. (A j-securing is 
maximal if it is a J-secunng and there is no set that contains it that is also a j- 
securing. Obviously maximal e-securings don't make much sense. ) 
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EXAMPLE 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
Consider the following two process trees, whose free product is illustrated in figure 4.7 
over the page: - 
a, a2 
a3 
41 
41. 
bi 
Q 
1 
b2 
Next we shall move on to deal with parallelism in more detail. First we shall concentrate 
on describing just which synchronisations can occur, then we shall deal with asynchronous 
happenings more fully. 
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(*. b, ) 
(*b2) 
(*, b, ) 
(a3, * ') 
(*, bo 
(a3, *') 
(a3, *) 
David Murphy 
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2.6 Synchronising Structures 
Time, causaiity, and concurrency 
In this section we shall concentrate on describing correctly the possible synchronisations 
which can occur between two interval event structures. Notice that in any representation of 
an execution of the parallel composition of two I. E. S. s, 3 and T, with aELE, b C= LE', there 
will be exactly one of (a, b) and ((a, *') or (*, b) (with a ;6*, b# *')). 
First notice that (a, *) is an invalid synchronisation if an0, so, in order to have a 
uniform treatment of synchronous and asynchronous events, we must agree to time both 
and *' by before proceeding. This just means that we want to regard both structures as 
completely contemporaneous. Parenthetically, notice that we have the (CSP-like) situation 
where more than two events can synchronise; a composite event results (not a 'r as in CCS). 
Our only restriction on synchronisation is that just one event from each I. E. S. is allowed to 
participate in any given synchronisation. Now consider just the genuine synchronisations. 
These form a set: -I 
DEFINITION 2.6 - Synchronisation sets 
The set of synchroinisations which occur when two I. E. S. s, S and S' say, are composed in 
parallel will be denoted by S$ S' This set, called a synchronisation set (or, sometimes, a 
synchronisation relation) of S and S'. is a subset of the cross product of LE and LE' 
03 IT) c LE x LE' 
t 
We now indicate the properties of this set: it only contains valid synchronisations 
(a, b) r: (S' $ 5") => (a n b) #0 
(a, b) c= (S 1 T) =: > a:; ý *&b:;, - *' 
but it may not contain all (or any) of these. 'I'lie first of these conditions ensures that (a, b) C- 
(S $ T) =ý a §ynch b. We will only allow a synchronisation set to contain at most one syn- 
chronisation for each labelled event 
-, 3 b'# b. (a, Y) E (S 1 S) & -, 3 a'# a. (a', b) e (3 1 T) 
The labelled events in a synchronisation set form a structure by themselves, -a structure 
just containing synchronisations. This structure can be formed from a restriction of the prod- 
uct to the given synchronisation set. (If 3T S' then S and 5' both run entirely oblivious of the 
other. ) Subject to these restrictions, the user must provide her own synchronisation set. 
We need not impose the requirement that the synchronisa ' 
tion set contains at most one 
synchronisation for any given labelled event from either structure; we could allow a more gen- 
eral construction and then say that only synchronisations which occur in the Con-set given 
will appear, but that alternative is rather complicated and of dubious utility, so we shall not 
pursue it. 
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An I. E. S., ! 3, restricted to a set Ag LE, writtenS ý A, is defined to be an I. E. S., S', where 
(i) LE' ýda LE n A. 
(ii) Con'=dd [ cnAlce Con 
(iii) Two times are <b' one another if they were previously <b one another and are 
both in the new structure; 
(ri, a, (, )) 
<b' (r2, a, (2)) <=: ý ((ri, a, (, )) <b 
(r2, 
a, (2)) & (a,, a, ) c; LEý 
This definition preserves the relation t, (. ) <b tgý) for all aEA. We shall suppose that 
restriction cannot remove silent events, and usually time *'with the same interval as 
4! 
The synchronisation set justifies every synchronisation by displaying a suitable labelled 
event timed with the appropriate intersection. We shall call the obvious structure on the syn- 
chronisation set the intersection structure: 
DEFINITION 2.8 - The intersection structure 
For two I. E. S. s, 3 and S, the intersection structure of 3 and S, written STTT, is defined to 
be the I. E. S. (3 x T) ý (S 1 T) except that 
* every event of STTT. (a, b) say, will be timed by anb, except that the silent 
event of SUS", *" say, will be timed by *u *' 
* the definition of <t7 is slightly different, since we have the intersection timing, 
and deal only in synchronisations. Suppose a =- [t, (ý), tf(, )] e LE and similarly for 
a', b& b' and suppose (a, b), (a', b') c= (3 VY). Then 
1- ts(a) `ýb ý(aj (ts(a, b)7 ts(a*, bl) C: <ý 
2. ts(a) <b tf(a, ) (ý(a. b)i tf(a^. b)) C: <17 
3. tf(a) <b ts(al (tf(sb), ts(a*, b)) E< 
4. tf(a) <b tf(ý-) => (tf(,,, b), tf(,, ', b)) G <b' 
if ts(ab) --ý ts(a) 
if tt(a) ý tf(a, b) 
& ts(a', b) : -- ts(a) 
if tf(a', b') ý-- tf(a) 
and similarly for <b. (In fact, the definition is even more horrific as we have to consider 
in 2. the case r(, -") = r, and in 3. the case r("-b) = ri separately. Both of these cases are f 
dealt with by tinkering with =17. ) 
Again, this construction can disconnect branches; we sometimes end up with no sensibly- 
timed transition to be causally related as desired, so we have to forget that particular causal 
relation (and hence no<brelation represents that unfortunate piece of causality). 
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The intersection structure allows us to treat multiple parallel compositions correctly. If we 
time (a, b) by aub (as we did in the definition of Sx S' in the last section) then the parallel 
composition modelled does not satisfy 
All (B IIC)=-(A IIB)IIC 
To see this, consider three structures with labelled events a -= [0,2], b =- (1,4], and c =- [3, 
4]. Clearly a 5yjEch b and b Synch c but -, (a §ygch c). If the synchronisation (a, b) is timed by 
aub then (a, b) =- [0,4] so (a, b) U. nch c and the composite ((a, b), c) is a valid synchroni- 
sation. 
However, since (asynch c) we cannot form ((a, c), b) which means that A 11 (B 11 C) is 
not even isomorphic to (A 11 Q 11 B. (We do, at least, have A 11 B =- B 11 A. ) This all comes 
about, of course, from the atransitive nature of co. 
In order to ensure that (a, (b, c)) can be formed just when ((a, b), c) can, we will time the 
composite (a, b) by a r) b; now in our example (a, b) = [1,2] and -, ((a, b) synch c). We still . t. have the problem that different occurrences can happen in the structure A 11 (B If C) compared 
with (A 11 B) 11 C, "---but at least the synchronisation behaviour is independent of the order of 
parallel composition. 
Notice., before moving back to deal with asynchronous occurrences, that the intersection 
structure can be a good model of global sequential composition; if begin T) > gnd(S) then 
the set S1 -15' will 
be empty and SMY will be a good model of the elusive global sequential 
composition. 
The description of S (e) 3' as ! 3TTS' with S1 S' empty is sufficiently clear (lacking, for 
instance, the unpleasant addition of *) that. 3 (E)) 3' will be defined thus. 
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2.7 Parallel composition 
We shall now return to asynchrony. Consider a single labelled event a in an I. E. S. S. 
Either a can synchronise with some b from S' to form (a, b) or it can occur alone. 
A structure which reflects this intuition, the union structure, will be defined. The union 
structure derived from- 5 and S' will be written SiLls' It has four kinds of labelled events: 
(i) silentevent*'-=*u*, 
(ii) asynchronous occurrences from 3, (a, [r, (, ), rf(. )], 
(iii) asynchronous occurrences fromT, (*, b) =-[r., (b), rf(b)] , 
(iv) and synchronisations (a, b) =- aub. 
We want the union structure to respect the Unch Acate, so a synchronisation (a, b) pre 
will be in SLLT iff it is in (S 1 19'). Of course, (a, b) lasts for all of aub, so (having the inter- 
section structure to record our intersection information) this need not trouble us. 
DEFINITION 2.9 - The union structure 
The union structure of two I. E. S. s, S and S'. is defined to be an I. E. S. Y where 
(i) The labelled events of S' are formed from pairs of labelled events fromS and 3', 
LE- g; LE x LE' 
all and only synchronisations in the synchronisation set will be in S, 
a:; e * c= LE, b# *'E: LE'. (a, b) c= (3 IT) <=> (a, b) cz LE- 
and each labelled event from either structure occurs just once in 
Va#* E= LE, 3! bELE'. (a, b) E=- LE- 
V b:,, - *'(=- LE', 3! ae LE. (a, b) c= LE- 
From these axioms we can deduce that every labelled event is either part of a 
unique synchronisation or it occurs asynchronously 
V a: t- *e LE. (3! b LE'. (a, b) E LE-) v 
((a, *') e LE- & --, 3 b ;, -- *'ELE'. (a, b) E LE-)) 
and similarly for b#, *f ELE'. A composite event (a, b)ELE- will be timed by the 
interval aub while an asynchronous occurrence like (a, *) or (*', b) will be timed 
by the time of a or b respectively. (This asymmetry between synchronous and 
asynchronous happenings is to prevent asynchronous events' times blowing up 
to the whole of the duration of the other structure. ) 
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! 1ý, as formed from two distinct (ii) We can think of the consistency set, Lo 
components: asynchronous occurrences are consistent with any set from the 
other structure; for VaE LE # *, b (=- LE' 9ý *'. 
LE- => u cp c= Con' 
(((*, b) Ib c- c', (*, b) r= LE-) u ((a, *')))E Con' 
b) -(=- LE- => UC (f (a, a c: c, (a, LE u b) 1) c. Con' cE Con 
while synchronous occurrence must be consistent in both structures: 
b) r= LE- => [cx cl cE Con, aEc, 
& c'E Con', bE c') E Con" 
Con' is defined to be the smallest set with these properties. 
(iii) The definition of <17 is an exact repeat of that forS xS' for the same reasons. 
PROPOSITION - The. relationship between the intersection and union structures 
There is a diagradi 
S 11 S' 
/Po \Pl 
31 
\io / 
S TFS, 
in UES which commutes. 
Proof: Consider the morphisms po and pi defined by cases; 
W po(., ) pl(*') 
(ii) po(a, pi(a, 
(iii) po(*, b) = pi(*, b) = 
(iv) po(a, b) = a, pi(a, b) =b 
Figure 2.8 - The 
relationship between the 
union and the intersection 
structures. 
The injection morphisms io(*) = *, io(a) = (a, b) and il(*') = *', il(b) = (a, b) will make 
the diagram commute. (The image of consistent sets is consistent by construction, and from 
equation (*) in definition 2.9 we know that there is a unique b for io to pair a with and similar- 
ly for il. ) 
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TIIEOREM - The morphisms io, il are a pushout of po, p, in UES 
Given a pair of arrows po : S-UT -) S, p, : WIT -> S' .a pushout of po, pi is a pair of arrows, 
io: 3 -43TT-Sy ii : T-4STTT such that the last diagarn commutes. 
Further for every jo :S -4 T, ji : ! 31 --) T where jo o po = j, - p, there is a unique arrow, say 
j: sus, --> T such that 
Figure 2.9 -A demonstra- 
tion of the relationship 
between the union and the 
intersection structures. 
5 iL! 31 
/ 
Pi PO 
x 
CY 
to ii 
S TTSI 
jo ii 
commutes. We propose that the pair io and i, defined in the proposition above form such a 
pushout. 
Proof. We already know that the first diagram above commutes. For the second diagram: e 
(i) Suppose that the silent event of T is *TI Thenjo(*) =ji(*') =j(*) 
(ii) The definition jo(a) = jl(b) =y for some y in T and (a, b) E (3 1 5') certainly 
makes the diagram commute, if j(a, b) = V. For the uniqueness of j suppose that 
k- io - no =k- ii - ni. If j :; -- k then there are some a, b such that k(a, b) # V. But 
then k- io:;, -jo or k- il #-ji, violating the assumption that the diagram commutes. 
(iii) It just remains to prove j is, in fact, an arrow. By definition j preserves order. To 
see that it is temporal note there are two cases. Since jo and ji make the diagram 
commute, if io(a) = (a, b) then the interval occupied by jo(a) is no larger than that 
occupied by io(a). The only other case is io(*) which follows immediately by the 
definition of temporal morphism on 
'Olt' 
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2.8 Coequalisers and Initial Objects 
Suppose we have two I. E. S. s, 5= (LE, Con, <b) and !Y= (LF, Con', <b), and two differ 
ent homomorphisms between them, f and g. Suppose further that there is a morphism from 
another I. E. S., k: T-4 0; 
The morphism k can be thought of as the cokernel (difference cokernal in [Mac Lane 
1971]) of the morphismsf and g if the diagram commutes. For some object EY and arrow j: S' 
-) EY with f-j=g-j, if j factors uniquely through k (i. e. if there is a unique arrow h' 
such that h' -j=k, ), then k: 31' -) E) is said to be a coequaliser forf and g. 
A category C is said to have an initial object, 1, if, for any object 0 of C there is a unique 
arrow i: 1 ---) o. Similarly, C has a terminal object, 0, if, for any object o of C there is a 
unique arrow i: 0 -> 0. 
All of the categories IESj, UES, IESj, y. and UES,,, have initial objects. These are simple 
to construct; consider an I. E. S. with just a silent event in it. This silent event, *, maps to the 
silent event of any other structure. Since * r-j * is tautologous, conditions (ii) and (iii) of the 
homomorphism. definition are trivially satisfied: 
FACT - Initial an4 terminal objects 
The I. E. S., 3=( [*), [(*)), (((-., *, ), (., *f))) ), the structure containing just a silent 
event that lasts all time, denoted by 1, is initial in the categories IESj and tIES. 
The I. E. S., 3 == ( (*J, ((*]), [((0, *J, (0, *f))] ), the structure containing just a silent 
event tUt lasts no time, denoted by 0, is terminal in the categories IESj. Note that UES has 
no terminal object; such an object would both have to last no time, as 0 does, and also have 
non-empty intersection with all possible labelled events, as 1 does. The combination is 
impossible. 
4: 01 
By similar reasoning, 1 is terminal in IESj (and hence isoMorphic to 0) but not, of course, 
in IESjy,, and VES., Notice that we can have only one silent event in an I. E. S. because of 
way we defined it in the first chapter; this ensures the uniqueness of some of our morphisms. 
LEMMA - The existence of coequalisers and pushouts in general 
A category C has all finite coproducts if it has an initial object and any pair of objects has a 
coproduct. The following statements are equivalent for any category C ([Blyth 19861 section 
3.4): - 
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(i) C has all finite coproducts and coequalisers, 
(ii) C has all finite coproducts and finite intersections, 
(iii) C has pushouts and an initial object. 
More generally, if we have an initial object, coproducts of all pairs of objects and 
coequalisers of all pairs of arrows, then, by Corollary 1, page 109 of [Mac Lane 19711, we 
have all finite colimits and hence a category that is small-cocomplete. 
If, additionally, we have a distinct terminal object, finite products and equalizers of all 
pairs of arrows, we have all finite limit and hence a category that is small-complete. 
410 
(Notice that Freyd's theorem about small small-complete categories being preorders 
(page I 10, [Mac Lane 197 1 ]) will not apply to us since none of our categories are small. ) 
We sliall find 'pushouts useful so, having all finite coproducts, it seems sensible to con- 
struct coequalisers. Unfortunately, we can't :- 
THEOREM - UES does not have coequalisers 
Consider a labelled event a [(r, (, ), aj, (rf(. ), af)] in 3, and suppose that we have two dif- 
ferent temporal morphismsf, g -> 3'. We would like to construct a k: 13' -> E) so that 
commutes. Consider f(a) =b =- [(r., (b), bj, (rf(b), bf)] say and g(a) =V =- [(r, (b-), N), (rf(b), bý)] 
say. Since f and g are temporal morphisms, [r, (b), r, (b)] c- 
[r, (. ), rf(, )] and [r, (bl, r, (b')] C- [r, (. ), 
rf(. )]. But, k must equalise f and g, so k(f(a)) = k(g(a)) =c -= f(r, (, ), cý), ftf(ý), cf)] say. Since'k 
must be temporal too, [r., (cý, rf(,: )] c- [rqb), rý(b)] and [rý(c), rf(c. )] c: [r., (b-), rý(b)]. But, this is only 
possible if [rýp, r, (b)] n 
[rý(bj, r, (b-)] # 0, which is not necessarily so. Hence, in general, we 
cannot construct k: S' -> E) in tI ES, and so ti ES does not have coequalisers. 
410, 
This is rather unfortunate. The obvious change, requiring that a temporal morphism 
expands rather than contracts durations, will not work either, since then we cannot preserve 
i-securings. (If we make the change, then there are structures which coequalise simulations, 
but they are not universal. As an example, define the subset of LE', 
b 13 aE LE. f(a) = g(a) = b) 
and form the obvious injection k: S' ---) ! Yt A. This coequalisesf and g, but to see that it is not 
universal, consider b c: LE' - A. Clearly, k(b) = *, but j: S' -4 e' which also coequalises f 
and g can take b anywhere, hence we won't be able to fon-n the unique It : S't A necessary to 
show that k is universal, since h(k(b)) must be *E),. ) 
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2.9 Concluding remarks and reformulations 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
It is time to take stock of what has been seen in this chapter so far. Categories of interval 
events structures were defined whose objects were I. E. S. s and whose morphisnis indicated 
when one structure could simulate another. We defined choice between I. E. S. s and sequen- 
tial compositions of I. E. S. s as limits in our categories. We discussed notions of parallel 
composition invoMng synchronisation, and decided that a labelled event a from an I. E. S. 3 
could synchronise with a labelled event b from an I. E. S. S'. giving rise to a compound event 
(a, b), just when anb#0. The synchronisation set 3$ S' was introduced to indicate which 
events we would like to synchronise. 
The categorical product was examined as a model for parallel composition and was found 
wanting. We saw that a representation of parallel composition that incorporated information 
about the intersection and union of the time intervals of synchronising events was needed. 
The union and intersection structures were introduced, and a pleasant categorical relation- 
ship was found between 3, S', ! WrSc', and SUS' 
Notice that 
* We have two structures, the intersection and the unions I. E. S. s, that 
together form our description of parallel composition; 
the intersection structure describes which synchronisations happened and 
suggestý an intuitively pleasing treatment of multiple parallel compositions, 
while 
* the union structure describes what the I. E. S. formed from the parallel 
composition can (be observed to) do. 
It will be convenient in the light of these results to assume in future that: 
An interval event structures S from now on should be regarded as a pair 
consisting of 3- and ! 3-. Each structure has the same events and the same 
causality, but different timings. The timings in 3- will indicate the times 
labelled events are prepared to synchronise, while those in S- will indicate 
how long they last. If a -= [tý, Q in -9 then a -= [G, til in -I- with [t', ti t, 
tr]. For I. E. S. s that have been generated without using parallel composition, 
5= 3-, (SO 5 QP S' = ((5- 0 ! 3-), (5- PJ2 ! 3'-)), P2 E [+, (D)), but for a 
parallel composition .3 11T 3' the inter - 
section and union structures are non- 
trivial; (3 "T T)- = SLLS' aný (S 11T T)- = SMY This is the definition of the 
parallel composition of two I. E. S., 5 11T ý3'- (When deciding Whether a Unch 
b, of course, we should use the timings in -9- and T- while those in 5- and 
T- will tell us how long the composite (a, b) will last. ) 
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The synchronisation set will be given with every parallel composition; S "T ý3' 
indicates that S and S' are in parallel composition, with synchronisation set 
Tg LE x LE' 
One interesting result of the investigation of parallel composition was a further insight 
into sequential composition. The sequential composition of two I. E. S. s can be seen as a spe- 
cial case of their-patallel composition where, one structure starts after the other finishes. In 
this case no synchronisations are possible and we have a construction similar to the global 
sequential composition of section 2.3. 
We investigated the properties of limits in categories of I. E. S. a little further, and discov- 
ered, much to our chagrin, that VES did not have coequalisers, and hence wasn't small- 
cocomplete. Our proof relied on the impossibility of building certain temporal morphisms, so it 
remains an open question whether our other categories are small-cocomplete or not. 
This investigation of the existence of limits in our categories (bar a small detour) ends 
this chapter. In the interlude which follows some other categories of interval event structures 
are examined, witli.. a view to separating causal from timing concerns. This investigation will 
enable us to ascertain the consistency of structures which purport to be interval event struc- 
tures. 
The advertised detour concerns the class of all I. E. S. s, IES. Just what should be in it ? 
DEFINITION 2.11 - The class of all interval event structures 
In this definition we briefly recall some of the salient features of I. E. S. s in order to be able 
to define the class of I. E. S. s, IES. Not all of the properties of an I. E. S. are given here. 
Recall that an I. E. S. was a triple (LE, Con, <b) with LE g (L x E) U [*), and *E LE. The 
set E must be finite and L must be countable. The set of transitions Tr = (LEý U LEf) was 
endowed with some causality and each element of it was given a time. The branching times 
assigned to transitions obey 
(r, a, ), tb = (rb, b) E BT. t. <b tb 4-* (r. < rb & a, <,, b, ) 
ta =b tb <=-> (r. = rb & a, =. bý) 
The special nature of * includes the requirement 
VaELE. (*, -, r, a, v *. =. a, ) & (a, <. *f v a, =. *f) 
Further, starts must be related to finishes; VaELE. a, <, ar. 
Notice the asymmetry between causality and timing: Va, a' C: LE. (a, <c a, ' =* r, <c r, ' and 
a, =, a, ' => r, =. r, ). 
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Furthermore, we have the disjunction a, # a2or a, go a2or a, p a2or (a, -C:: -Dba2v a2 ýý a, ) 
or a, gba2or a2 c; b a,. 
The consistency predicate, ConC: fn. p(LE) must be subset-closed, 
XE Con &YcX=: > Ye Con 
and affect separate --bfanches, 
Va,, a2 . (a, # a) 4* (a, , a) 
Furthen-nore, * is in every maximal Con-set, Vc (=- M(S) .*(. - c. 
We also require finite choice; the set of maximal Con-sets is finite: 
c= 
If all the times in an I. E. S. S are well-defined on Ru (T), and the above axioms hold, 
then 3e IES. 
If, in addition, we have 
v ri, r2 cRVc cz Con. .I [a Ia r= c, a =- [(r., a, ), (rf, af)], [r,, rf] n [ri, 
r2] 0) 1 'E N 
(finite density) 
and 
vt c BT. I 
(t'l t"-b ti t'e BTJ I r= N (finite causes) 
and 
ac LE - (* I. begin (a)T & end(a)T (defined transitions) 
then 3 is said to be computational. 
(Notice the change in the definition of finite density; we demand in any Con set that a 
finite number of things can happen in any finite interval. This is more philosophically attrac- 
tive than demanding finite density for the whole structure at once. ) 
The class of all computational I. E. S. s will be written dES. 
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Interlude - Categories of computations 
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The reader will have noticed that we have introduced categories where the morphisms cor- 
respond to relationships between interval event structures; there is an arrow from 3 to S' 
just when S' can simulate S. We are dealing exclusively with simulation at this level, - we 
are not interested -in -how ý3 or S' do their computation, except insofar as that effects the 
observed structure of events. 
Another approach, which allows us to argue at the level of causal orderings, is possible. In 
this case we aim to represent a single I. E. S. as a diagram in a category. Then operations on 
I. E. S. s will correspond to operations on diagrams rather than objects in a category, and 
hence would turn out to be limits or colimits. 
This approach has been used extensively by Vaughan Pratt's group [Pratt et al. 1989], 
and we will briefly indicate how to incorporate it into our framework. It will lead us to a 
characterisation of a structure whose causality is consistent with its timing, and a technique 
that might lead to.. a way of freely generating timing information that satisfies a given 
causality. This last work is an application of [Thonzason 1984], [Thomason 1987]. 
It should be stressed that the material in this interlude, like that in all the interludes, is 
rather sketchy and speculative. We will merely give the briefest possible introduction to the 
ideas: we will not, for instance, investigate limits in the categories we shall define, consign- 
ing the treatment of operation s-as-limi ts to further work. 
12.1 Categories of causality 
Most concurrency theory is about causality. In particular, it is common to model causality 
as a partial order, or a preorder, so that the behaviour of a concurrent system is just a mem- 
ber of the category of all partially-ordered sets POSet, or the category of all preordered sets 
PrSet. However, this view assumes that there is one fon-n of causality, whereas we have 
seen that, with interval-like events it is natural to have four forms of causality, the E; js. In 
this interlude we will explore which category seems to be a natural generalisation of POSet 
to our framework with four forms of causality. Then we will investigate how to give timing to 
transitions within this categorical framework. 
12.2 The properties of the causal orders revisited 
First we need to encapsulate our logic of causality. The basis for this is the orderings q 
between labelled events. Recall that these were related in chapter one by inclusion; we had 
the diagram overleaf. 
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This tells us about the strength of the causal precedence orders. How are they composed ? 
Suppose a [; j b and bI ---- k c, and write the strongest relationship that can be inferred between a 
and c as (9; j 0 [; k). The composition of the c-j is defined by a multiplication table (overleaf). 
The order q runs down the left andE- k along the top, while the relationship between a and c, 
C-i 0 C; k, Mound in the body. 
The relationship between a and c is not always one of the c: j; the set C-j is not closed under 
0. For this reason we introduce two new orders; 
0 means the weakest relationship, so that a0b always holds. 
= means the strongest relationship, so that a=b holds only if a is the same as b. 
Clearly, if a=b then a gi b, and if a c-, b then a0b, so we can extend the lattice a little. 
Our new lattice is 
r- 
1 
Z) c 
lih E:, 
while the multiplication table for BOrder = (0, [;,, c;,,, E-,, gi, =) under 0 is as given overleaf. 
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t h e 0 
t h e 0 
t t 0 
t t 0 0 0 
h h e h e 0 
e h e 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
David Murphy 
b&b c-k c -.,: * 
a (g; j 9k) C 
For convenience we will now let c-j stand for some member of the set BOrder. 
We can make the set BOrder into a category, BOrder say, by allowing an arrow from 
some xE BOrder to ye BOrder just when xcY. An interesting question is what happens 
to 0: the tensor product 0 on elements of BOrder lifts to an obvious bifunctor 0: BOrder 2 
BOrder, with unit 
The structure (BOrder, e, =) is a monoid (and there is a similar monoid on arrows): for 
this reason, BOrder is a special sort of category, a strict monoidal category- - 
A strict monoidal category, D= (D, 0,1) is a category D together with a tensor product, 
(namely a bifunctor 0: D' -) D) and an object I of D, called the unit, such that both the 
object and the morphism part of D each form a monoid under 0 with identities I and idi. 
(Often 0 is just called 'tensor. ') 
A monoidal category, D= (D, 0,1, cc, X, p) is a category D together with a tensor product, 
a unit I, and isomorphisms (x, X, and p satisfying cc : ((x (D y) 0 z) -= 
(x (y o z)), X: 10 d -= 
d 
and p: d (D I -= d. (There are also certain coherence conditions, outlined in [Mac Lane 1971], 
but these need not detain us here. ) It is easy (although tedious) to check that BOrder is a 
strict monoidal category with tensor (D and unit =. 
12.3 Using the properties of BOrder 
Having discovered that BOrder is a strict monoidal category it is natural to ask what use 
this infonnation is. The answer, as we shall see in this subsection, is that we can charac- 
terise a valid set of labelled events and their causality using BOrder. In this subsection the 
tenninology of [Pratt et al. 19891 will be used, rather than the more standard usage of [Kelly 
& Street 1974]. 
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Suppose that we are just interested in causality. This can be expressed using the 
elements of BOrder; we can write aE- hb meaning that a., must cause b. and the timing must 
be assigned in such a way that aE- hb holds. Seen this way, it is interesting to know when 
some set of untimed labelled events and some specified set of BOrder relations over them 
can be timed consistently (i. e. so that the specified BOrder relations respect the timing). In 
this subsection we shall give a characterisation of the sets of untimed labelled events and 
BOrder relations --tlfdt can be so consistently timed. This characterisation will use the 
concept of enrichment. 
Suppose we have a set A which we want to turn into a category, and a small monoidal cat- 
egory D= (D, 0,1, a, X, p). For every pair (a, b) of elements of A we would like to associate 
an object of D in such a way that this object represents the arrows ftom a to b. This is the 
basic idea of A enriched over D. 
in particular, we would like to associate every pair of labelled events in A with a member 
of BOrder. However, we cannot do this freely; firstly if we assign [; j to (a, b) and C-k to (b, c) 
then we must assign (9j 0 9k) (or something stronger, if it holds) to (a, c). Secondly, we 
must assign = to (a, a). 
A small BOrder-category, or set enriched over BOrder consists of a set A together with 
a function 5: A2 _ý BOrder, families of morphisms of BOrder, 
-> 5(b, Inabc : 5(a, b) 0 S(b, c) 
(for composition) and an isomorphism ja :I -) 5(a, a) such that the following diagrams 
(below and overleaf) commute. Since BOrder is strict monoidal this is a special case of a 
category enriched over a symmetric monoidal. category (cf. Interlude 3). 
(5(c, d) 0 8(b, c)) o 5(a, b) 5(c, d) 0 (5(b, c) 0 5(a, b)) 
IlIbcd 10 11 110 nlabc 
S(b, d) 0 5(a, b) S(a, d) d) 0 5(a, c) 
Illabd Mabd 
ac; jb 
&bC--k C&cc-td=ý a[; j (b( Ukogj) d= 
(a(C-i 0 E---k)c) gi d 
Io 5(a, b) ý S(a, b) ý 5(a, b) 01 
ja oI1 11 11 (gib 
5(a, a) 0 S(a, b) ) 5(a, b) ( 8(a, b) o 5(b, b) 
Maab Mabb 
a [; j a 
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These two diagrams express the associativity of composition and the left and right identi- 
ty laws. (Obviously this definition holds for any monoidal category D: a set enriched over D 
is called by [Pratt et al. 1989] a D-category. What [Kelly & Street 1974] would call a 2-cat- 
egory, [Pratt et al. 1989] calls a Cat-category. ) 
The laws of enrichment, rather neatly, express just the properties we want of the relation- 
ship between A and'BOrder: if A is a category whose objects are labelled events, and 
whose morphisms are objects of BOrder, then A can be given a consistent timing just when 
A is expressible as the set of objects of A, obj(A), enriched over BOrder. 
The category of all sets enriched over BOrder will be called QOSet, in analogy with the 
category of all sets enriched over 2 (the two element category with 0< 1), the more familiar 
PrSet. There arrows of QOSet are just the c-j-preserving functions (i. e. if A and B are cate- 
gories represented as the sets A and B enriched over BOrder respectively, then there is a 
morphismf from A to B just when Va e A, bEB, rel Eq. a rel b <=ýfla) MI f(b). ) 
12.4 Validating timings 
The programme of validating our structures can be taken one stage further. In this section 
we shall see one might freely generate valid tirning information from a member of QOSet. In 
[Thonzason 19871 an adjunction between a category of linear orders and a category very like 
QOSet is given. 
. (Thomason's category is equipped with a 'wholly precedes' relation rather than our 
'wholly precedes or abuts, ' ci, a 'begins strictly before' relation rather than our 'begins 
before or at the same time as, ' 9; h, a 'ends strictly before' relation rather than our 'ends 
before or at the same time as, ' g, and an 'abuts to the left relation' which we might write as 
(a ci b& (a c-, c gi b => b g. c)), so he can be seen as taking the < case rather than the :5 one. 
He has the same definition of morphism, 3f :A -4 
B just when va e A, b E=- B. a rel b ý-> f(a) 
relf(b), but with his relations rather than ours. ) 
The key points of Thomason's work are surnmarised below: 
* Any sensible model of timing should be based on a linear order. 
Hence, given any model of time, R, Q, N or whatever, and a causal category much 
like an element of QOSet, Thomason can assign timing to happenings in a uni- 
versal way. 
It should be possible to add a few axioms to QOSet (essentially adding an 
I abuts' relation) and then use a similar construction to generate an adjunction 
between QOSet and the category of linearly ordered sets, UnSet. This would 
enable us to characterise valid timings axiomatically and universally. 
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Meanings of Structures: 
Semantics and Interpretation 
Oh, oh 
It makes me mad to see what men shall do, 
And we in our graves 
This world's no blotfor us, 
Nor blank; it means intensely, and means good: 
Tofind its meaning is my meat and drink. 
Browning 
This chapter is devoted to an examination of a notion of equivalence of interval event 
structures. A variety of different inter-related semantics will be presented. All semantics are 
based on an idea of behavioural difference; two I. E. S. s should have a different meaning iff 
they can be observed to behave differently. Various notions of 'observation' and 'difference' 
will be examined, leading to various semantics. The more detailed the notion of behaviour, 
the more discriminati ng the associated semantics. 
Two orthogonal approaches will be taken to investigate various notions of behaviour: the 
first will concern the timing of behaviour. We will start by considering the order in which the 
transitions of labFIled events happen, and then move on to consider stricter timing condi- 
tions, requiring things to happen within a certain interval of time. Our most temporally- 
constraining semantics will be based on the precise time things happen. 
The second approach we will take concerns the functional behaviour of an I. E. S., - what it 
does rather than when it does it. Our paradigm will be observational: consider an observer, in 
the spirit of the last section of chapter one, viewing an execution of an I. E. S. After a while, 
rather than continuing to observe the structure, she goes to a betting shop to bet on what the 
I. E. S. will do next. (In this chapter we only consider computational I. E. S. s that start at t=0 
that is, begin(*) = 0, and are bounded. This gives us handy finiteness properties; no struc- 
tures extend infinitely backwards or forwards in time, and all structures can only display a 
finite number of labelled events. Furthermore, we will assume that we are always dealing 
with the union structure S_; it would be straightforward to extend our results to the intersec- 
tion structure 3-. ) 
Firstly she will be allowed to bet on the occurrence of a single transition. (the start or fin- 
ish of a given occurrence of an event); she will bet on which transition the structure will 
display next. The possibilities that she may win the bet and that she must win the bet will be 
distinguished. Various combinations of bets will then be considered; these will allow the 
observer to deduce more about the functional behaviour of the I. E. S. under scrutiny. In partic- 
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ular, we shall characterise the extra discrimination available once certain combinations of 
bets are allowed. 
The observable behaviour of an I. E. S. is brought about by its internal causality; it is usual- 
ly assumed that causality cannot be distinguished from mere temporal order. The 
consequences of relaxing this assumption will be investigated; bets not just on what hap- 
pens and when, buLon how it was caused, will be allowed. This sort of bet will be seen to be 
more powerful (in the sense of necessarily winning on fewer structures) than bets which do 
not consider causality. For this kind of bet, of course, we must assume an omniscient bookie. 
Each of the notions of bet presented (including compound bets, - combinations of bets, - 
but not the causal bets of the last paragraph) can be seen in the testing tradition of 
[Hennessy 1988i]. Semantics is all about saying which structures are the same: each kind of 
bet defines a notion of sameness; two structures are the same under this notion just when all 
bets about one that must win must also win if placed on the other. (Or, alternatively, we 
could replace "muse' by "may" to obtain a different semantics. ) 
The aim, then, ist. to distinguish between interval event structures just when that distinc- 
tion can be made without leaving the comfort of the bookies'. 
The next few sections will be organised as follows. First we present the notion of observ- 
ing an I. E. S. in more detail, and outline the betting methodology. A primitive bet is 
introduced, 'and the conditions when it may and must win are investigated. Next some tempo- 
ral information is I added by considering bets that have a 'within 5 of now' stipulation. The 
case 5=0, - demanding precisely when a transition must happen, - is investigated. 
The power of bets to discriminate between structures is considered, and ways of combin- 
ing primitive bets to increase this power are investigated. Having defined a notion of 
tsameness', we then go on to define a notion of difference; two structures are different when 
they cease to be the same. Ile length of time that two structures remain the same is a mea- 
sure of their difference, and this leads us to a metric space structure, with untimed and strict- 
timed forms of betting generating different metric spaces. 
A basic grounding in metric spaces is needed for the latter sections; [Kelley 1955] might 
be suitable. Also of (computer science) relevance are [de Bakker & Mayer 1988], [Golson & 
Rounds 1983], [Goltz & Loogen 1987], [Kok & Rutten 1988], [Reed 19881 and [Rounds 
1983). (An appendix giving all relevant definitions is provided at the end of the chapter. ) We 
provide some explanatory material. - 
Finally, in the interlude, we consider a uniform categorical treatment of our semantics in 
the tradition of Lawvere, and suggest a possible connection between the categories which 
underlie the work of this chapter and those of chapters two and four. This leads us to suggest 
a more general interpretation of betting equivalence than the metric space one. 
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3.0 Observing interval event structures again 
The matter of observing I. E. S. s was first tackled in chapter one; there it was discovered 
that an L. I. E. S. L was a possible history of 5 just when L was a maximal Con-set of S. 
(More precisely, L is a valid history of .3 if it is equal to some c c= MS) up to bijection of 
labels, the idea being that labels are just a way of disambiguating occurrences, so the precise 
way they are assigW should not be important. ) 
Suppose L= (LE'c; (U xE) u f*), <)is a L. I. E. S. t,! 3 =(LE c; L xEU [*), Con, <b) is 
an I. E. S., E' g E, and that f: 1: --> L is a bijection between the disjoint countaWy infinite sets 
of labels L and U. Then, L is a valid history of 3, iff 3c r. MS), which, viewed as an L. I. E. S. 
is (LE', <), and V (1', e) = a' =- fr.,, ýfl r= LE'. 3 (; E(/'), e) =- [r, rf] ELE. In future we will write 
L ra af(S) meaning L= (LE', <) and LE' is equal up to bijection of labels to some cEMS). 
In this section we examine not just entire histories, or complete executions of S, but also 
observations of just a part of the behaviour of S. We can tell whether a behaviour is complete 
or not because of the presence of *; recall that Va e LE . end(a) <b end(*) so that when we 
see *f (the 'on light"going off) we know that S has displayed all the behaviour it can in this 
run. The following definition will enable this to be formalised: - 
DEFINITION 3.0 - Truncation of L. I. E. S. 
What happens if an I. E. S. S is only observed for a limited period, say from the beginning to 
t=T? Only part of some history L r= M! 3) will be seen. An observation of 3 is defined to be 
any valid history L truncated at T, written LI, defined thus; 
Suppose L= (LE, <) E M-9). Then L' = L, 'T for T c: R+ is an observation of S iff it is an 
L. I. E. S. Lol = (LE', <) where 
LE'= (aIaE LE, begin(a) < T) 
An event a in LE' carries the timing [r, rjj iff a in LE carries the timing Crý, rf] where rý = rf if 
rf <T and ri =T otherwise. That is, events in LE' keep their timing except for finishes that 
happen later than T, which become T. 
Notice that every observation must contain both *. (with the smallest timing, here 
assumed to be 0), and *f (with the largest timing). In a truncated history, LeT, end(*) may be 
T, - that just indicates that it is incomplete. (Recall tha t we are dealing with computational 
structures here, so no times are T in complete histories. ) 
With *E LE, of course, as in chapter one. 
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If a, is some transition of a labelled event in an observation L we sometimes loosely say 
that a, has been observed, or that it is observable. 
ASIDE - Testing, Choice, Nondeterminism and Parallelism 
There is a fundaffiental philosophical difference between interval event structures and the 
structures that testing equivalence is normally applied to; this concerns the nature of choice. 
It is important to understand this difference before proceeding, as the semantics presented in 
the next few sections represents an attempt to explore what testing equivalence would be 
like under our assumptions about the nature of parallelism and choice, rather than the con- 
ventional CCS ones. In the rest of this section a reasonable understanding of the testing 
methodology of CCS is assumed; see [Hennessy 1983] for details. Chapter four contains a 
further discussion of nondeterminism which extends that given in this chapter. Also of rele- 
vance is [Abramsky 1987]; there observational equivalence is shown to be formulateable as 
a testing equivalence - here we pursue almost an opposite programme in considerably less 
depth, showing how testing equivalence can be redefined using single observations. 
Recall from chapters one and two that no interpretation has yet been placed upon either 
the disjoint sum construction or upon the conflict relation. Here and henceforth it will be inter- 
preted as internal choice or pure nondeternzinism: if we have a#b then we may see either a 
or b but not both, and we cannot predict or effect which is seen; similarly we cannot know or 
influence which of 3 and T the I. E. S. 13 + Twill behave like. More generally: - 
An I. E. S. with conflict will have more than one maximal Con-set. The interpretation 
placed on this is that 3 will display one member of the set M(S) in any given execution, but 
we cannot tell or influence which. The reason for choosing the presence of internal rather than 
extemal choice as the interpretation of the existence of more than one maximal Con-set will 
now be discussed. 
First consider CCS choice: in (some interpretations of the testing view of) CCS, the 
choice operator + can sometimes be influenced: in-the case a. nil + b. nil the operator + 
represents an external choice; it will do whichever of a. nil and b. nil we want, and we 
tell it what we want by participating in the desired alternative, so that a. nil + b. nil 11 
a. nil --L-) nil. (Of course CCS isn't always so obliging, as can be seen by considering 
a. nil + c. b. nil, but that isn't the point right now. [de Nicola & Hennessy 1984] discuss 
t he nature of the CCS + operation in detail. Note that, due to typographical limitations, we 
write underbar instead of overbar. ) 
Now consider a parallel combination of two CSP processes. If the onlY form of choice the 
processes contain is internal choice (CSP then one partner of the parallel combination can- 
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not influence the choices made by the other; the possibility of synchronisation is irrelevant to 
internal choice. External choice (CSP U), on the other hand, requires that a choice is resolved 
through the participation of a partner placed in parallel. The testing methodology was devel- 
oped with this in mind -a process is tested by placing it in parallel with a tester; the process 
and the tester must participate in all the processes events, with the tester resolving the 
external choices of the process (and vice versa). (See [Hennessy 1988i] for a clear and com- 
prehensive explanati6h. ) In the example of the process a. nil + b. nil we can think of 
a. nil as the tester; the result of the 'experiment' a. nil + b. nil 11 a. nil (successful 
tennination) tells us that a. nil + b. nil must always do an a (if we ask it nicely, i. e. by 
putting a. nil in parallel. ) The testing methodology, then, assumes that partners in parallel 
participate in each others' events and resolve each others' external choices, - we shall call 
this participatory concurrency. This view does not match our perspective on parallelism very 
well; we would like to think of an I. E. S. as getting on with things independently of an observ- 
er and what she might 'want' to see. We have no mechanism for a synchronisation to 
influence subsequent behaviour (as it must if external choice is to be resolved via paral- 
lelism); an interval event structure should be observed not interacted ivith. 
(It is worth notiiýg that this is the view of semantics that Petri net theory leads us to; 
there we have a rich notion of nondeterminism, and a semantics (in terms of reachable mark- 
ings) based on observation rather than inter-action. ) 
Interpreting conflict 
We have chosen to interpret conflict as due to the presence of internal choice: why ? It cer- 
tainly fits with our notion of an I. E. S. as an independent entity that can evolve without 
reference to its environment, and (as we have seen above) it is a reasonable interpretation 
given our notion of parallelism. Also, the notion of testing has not been applied to entities 
with non-participatory concurrency to my knowledge, so what follows is an exploration of a 
new point in the concurrency semantics design space. 
It would be best, of course, to have models of both forms of choice - external choice is 
obviously desirable. However, I feel that it is dishonest not to differentiate between the 
potential (PUQ may behave like P, or it may behave like Q, depending on what is chosen) 
and the actual (PFIQ will behave like P, or it will behave like Q, regardless of the environ- 
ment) in a semantics. I do not know how to articulate this difference (i. e. that between "if 
the environment chooses a now, then iV" (where xV is some behavioural property) and just 
V') cleanly. 
This difference, of course, only becomes important when we have non-participatory con- 
currency. As long as events can be shared, we can live with external and internal choice in 
the same framework; it is only when events become private, and synchronisations are merely 
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composites of private events (so that observation rather than testing is the primary way of 
finding out about a process), that we are forced to decide what form of choice conflict should 
model. 
(We could interpret the choice present in I. E. S. or event structures due to the presence of 
conflict as either internal or external; it is merely (philosophically) inconsistent to model both 
sorts of"choice trVe same way. The main change necessary to our reasoning, if we were to 
deal with external rather than internal choice, concerns the definition of must; [Hennessy 
1988i] contains the necessary details. ) 
In the next few sections a theory of observational equivalence of I. E. S. s will be presented; 
this theory is an attempt to transplant the testing theory of CCS to a world without participa- 
tory concurrency or external choice. In this world the most sensible approach seems to be to 
avoid external choice altogether (but see the interlude at the end of chapter four for a possi- 
ble hack in the world of non-participatory process algebra). 
e 
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3.1 Betting on transitions 
David Murphy 
A notion of testing the behaviour of I. E. S. s without interacting with them is presented in 
this section: it is based on the notion of a bet about what a structure might do. First a formal- 
ism is presented that will capture the concept of betting. This is developed to the point of 
being able to say just when a bet might or must win when placed on a structure, given some 
information about what it has already done. 'ne forms of bets allowed are then refined to 
allow bets to be placed not only on what can happen (i. e. the functional behaviour of an 
I. E. S. ) but also when it can happen. 
3.1.1 Observing structures 
Consider some I. E. S. 13 (LE, Con, <b) being observed. Suppose, thus far, some 
(possibly empty apart from L. I. E. S. has been observed. Ibis observation must result from 
some maximal Con-set of 3, but we may not have enough information to decide which. 
DEFINITION 3.1 - Observational consistency 
The beginning and ending times of a L. I. E. S. L= (LE', <) are the reals assigned to * in it. 
(Remember we assume that begin(S) is always 0 in this chapter, so * will be timed by [(0, 
(r, *f)] where r.. ER+ u [T). ) 
A L. I. E. S. L= (LE', <) is observationally consistent with a given maximal Con-set X1, 
with K= (LE, <) E M(S), iff L is equal (up to the usual isomorphism of labelling sets) to 
K+-Twhere T= gnd(L). It is worth expanding this a little. We must have: - 
(i) All labelled events of L appear in R with the same (or more defined) timings; 
for V (I', e) -= [r, rij c- LE'. 3 (; C(1), 'e) -= [r,, rf] r= LE such that rý = rf if rj < 
end(L) and rý =T otherwise. (Remember that we assumed that begiln(*) in L 
begin(*) in S=0. ) 
(ii) Moreover, we should not have missed any occurkences that happen in K 
within the time covered by f4 -, 3 (Q0, e) =- fr, rf] r: LE such that r, < end(L) 
& (1, e) e LE'. 
We shall write P(S, L) for the set (K IL is observationally consistent with K) of possible 
histories a given observation is consistent with. If we have LE' c; (1: x E) u (*') and LE c; 
(f(L) x E) u [*), observational consistency implies that E'c- E. 
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Consider our observer. She has seen 3 do L: what next ? She is actually observing some 
Kc P(3, L), so she will either see the start of a new occurrence a -= [r,, rf] E LE next, where 
r, = min [r, Ia -= [r, rf], a c= (LE - (E(I; ) x E'))) (i. e. the smallest start in K which is not in 
L), or the ending of an old one a' =- fr, rf] E LE' where rý = minfrf I a' = (1', e) e LE', (E(Q'), 
e) -= [r,, rf], end(a') = T) (i. e. the smallest finish in Kwhich is undefined in L). She will see a., 
o' depending on whether r, < rý. In either case we will have a new obse ation, and, by r af rv 
definition, this observation must be consistent with K. In general, given some L observation- 
ally consistent with KE M(3), we can state when the occurrence of a transition a, extends L, 
that is, produces a larger observation, Lu (a, ) say, which is still consistent with K. 
DEFINITION 3.2 - Extension 
Suppose that we have a L. I. E. S. L= (LE, <) and a historY K= (LE, <) (= qqp) with L 
consistent with K; K E= P(! 3, L). Also, suppose we have a transition of an occurrence (a start 
or a finish of a labelled event) a, = (I', e), at time r,: - 
If we have a stah, a, ' at r., ', then a., ' extends L in K, written a,, ' extends L in Y, just when 
e) =- [r, rf] E LE such that 
(i) This occurrence hasn't been observed yet; r, ý! end(L) and a' e LE'. 
(ii) The beginning we are seeing has the right time; r, = r. '. 
L (ii) The occurrence and a, are still consistent with K. Define Lu (a') as the L. I. E. S. 
(LE'u (a'), <), with a'-= [r,, T] in L. Then Lu [a') must be consistent with K. 
Likewise, if we had a finish aý at rý, af' extends Lin %, iff 3 (E(V), e) =- [r, rf] c- LE s. t. 
(i) The start of this occurrence has been observed with the right timing but the end 
hasn't been seen yet; be&in(l', e) = r, and end(l', e) = 
I, (ii) The end we are seeing has the right time; rf = rf. 
(iii) It was the right thing to see next, Le. 'K is still consistent with the occurrence 
and af'. Define Lu [a') as the L. I. E. S. L except that end(l', e) = rf. Then Lu 
(a') must be consistent with 
(We assume that the labelling of a, is consistent with the labelling policy used by f, that 
is I' E U, but (1', e) e LE'. Notice, too, that all we really needed was the condition LU (at') 
must be consistent with 9ý; the extra conditions just make it easier to see what is going on. ) 
Providing at most one labelled event starts or finishes at any time in a given maximal Con- 
set, there is at most one transition a, which extends L in a given K. 
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3.1.2 The betting methodology 
Given some observation L, the things that 3 may do next are just the extensions of L in 
each consistent observation KE P(S, L). This insight enables us to formulate two predicates 
which will tell us when bets may and must win. 
DEFINITION 3.3 ----'N4ay and must for transitions 
S must engage in the transition a, next, given some history L, written 3 must a, ' after L, if 
it must do it in every history L is consistent with; 
S must a, ' after Lt-* V KE P(S, L). a, extends L in K 
while 13 may dopt I next if it must do it in some history L is consistent with; 
mav at' after Lc=-> 3 KE P(S, L). a, extends Lin K 
Notice that if P(S, L) is empty, S must a, ' after L is true vacuously. This can only happen if 
can display no events, or if we are already in an inconsistent situation (i. e. L is not a valid 
observation of -3). 
The latter case is a 'miracle' and anything can happen (this is just e-xfalso 
quod libet). The former is more irksome and is forbidden by demanding that LE r-) 0. 
410, 
If 5 must a, ' after L our observer, having seen f, is certain to win a bet that S will do a, ' 
next, while if 3 Elay a, ' after L she may or may not win, depending on which K is actually 
being executed. Notice in particular that if S can never be observed to do L, neither ý3 may a, ' 
after L nor 19 must a, ' after L holds. 
The bet 13 will do a, ' after having done L will be formulated as 3 will a, ' after L. It is not nec- 
essary to specify a time for a, ' in this form of bet; the bet wins if there is some a, in LE with 
timing t, such that a, ' timed by t, extends L in K. The only case in which two different bets 3 
will a, (,; after L and S will a, (2; after L (with a, (,; : t- at(2; )will both win is if a, (, ) and a, (2) have 
the same branching times in S (i. e. are necessarily simultaneous). Note that for our purposes 
we suppose that E is known in advance; the universe of events whose occurrences can be 
bet upon is predetermined. 
We will always assume that we are dealing with valid observations; the bet .3 will aý' after 
L will always lose if Lis not a valid observation ofS. 
(The must and may predicates we have defined are rather different from their counterparts 
used in testing equivalence with participatory concurrency. The predicates we have present- 
ed seem to be a plausible translation of the usual ones into a world without participation. See 
[Aceto 1987] for an alternative (and more conventional) approach. ) 
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Time, causality, and concurrency j 
Let us suppose that our observer, like so many young people today, is rather impatient, 
and doesn't want to wait around arbitrarily long to know if she has won a bet or not. She 
wants to make a timed bet, claiming not only that a transition a, ' will be seen next, but also 
that it will be seen within a time 8 of completing an observation L. Since we are only dealing 
with computational- sttuctures, transitions are ineluctable, - no transition can be put off indefl- 
nitely long, - and hence we can take 8ER, rather than SER u (T), and reserve T for dealing 
with transitions whose timing we cannot yet predict. 
DEFINITION 3.4 - Must and may for timed bets 
The bet -q will do a, ' after having done f, and within 8 of the end of L will be fon-nulated as 
S will (aO8 after L. Iff a, ' extends L in X and a, ' is timed by r, with end(L) : 5; rt < end(L) + 5, 
then we say that (a, )S extends L in K. The must and May relations for 6-timed bets can now 
be defined as 
3 must (atýS after L 4* V Ke P(S, L). (at, ')5 extends L in K 
a,, iy (a, ý8 after L ýý 3 KEP(13, L). (a, ')5 extends L in K 
In other words, a 5-timed bet on a, ' will win if there is an occurrence of the right transition 
of the right event with an appropriate label which not only extends L (and hence happens 
next) but also happens within 5 of the end of L. 
L 
Here again, P(S, L) must be nonempty for S must (a, ý5 after L to hold. (Notice that this is 
a 'before 5 has elapsed ... ' bet, since we have rt < end(L) +8 not r,: 5 end(L) + 
The bet !3 will a, ' after L can be thought of as a bet 5 will (a, ')5 after L with 8 This 
insight leads us to investigate the case 5=0: - 
DEFINITION 3.5 - Must and may for strict-timed bets 
The bet 3 will do a, ' after having done L, at precisely t=y after the end of L will be formu- 
lated as 3 will (ajy, after f- (The 's' for strict. ) This fon-n of bet (referred to in future as y, - 
timed bets, or strict-timed bets), enables us to check if things happen precisely when we 
want. 
Iff at' extends L in % and at' is timed by r, with end(L) +y= ri, then we say that (at*),, 
extends L in WI. The must and may relations fovy, -timed bets are 
5 must (aoy, after L 4=: ý V KE P(S, L). (a, ý7, extends Lin K 
S may (a, )ys after L 4-* 3 Ke P(S, L). (a, ýys extends Lin K 
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3.1.4 Examples 
It is instructive at this stage to examine some interval event structures, and some obser- 
vations of them, and to see when various bets may or must win when placed on a structure. 
As before, I. E. S. s will be represented diagrammatically; time will flow down the page, 
lightly dashed lines will indicate causality and thicker dashed lines conflict. Small horizontal 
lines will indicate the durations of occurrences of events. The formal I. E. S. definition will also 
be given, in terms of labelled events with their beginning and end times (including *), 
maximal Con ' -sets, and 
the orders <band =bon branching time. Obvious inequalities (a, <b 
af) will be omitted. 
Bets will be framed in terms of the labels used by the structure; this is just a notational 
convenience: usually the better will not know how the structure is labelling events, and 
hence must bet in terms of her own labelling system. In general the labels used in an obser- 
vation will be related to those in the structure being observed via a bijection E, and this 
bijection can never be discovered by the observer. 
51 =(( ei =- [(0, e, (1», (2, ef(1»1, 
-32 
ei e2 -= 
[(2, e, (2», (4, er(2»1), 
t (ei, e2)12 
e2 
( (2, ef(1», (2, e, (2»)1) 
ei -. - 
e2 
S2 =(( el =- [(0, e, (, )), (2, ef(l))], 
e2 -= [(I, e, (2)), (4, ef(2))]) 
f fel, e2)), 
( (((0, e, (, )), (1, e, (2))), ((2, ef(j)), (4, ef(2)))), 
'17he following hold; 
must e, (I) after 
n2ay e, (, ) after 
S, must ef(l) after fe, (, )), 
Si must e, (2) after (e, (j), ef(j)), 
Si must e, (2) after (e, (, )), 
32 must e, (, ) after 
32may e, (, ) after 
-(! 32 must ef(l) after (e, (, ))), 
S2 must e, (2) after (e, (j), ef(i))) 
-92 must e, (2) after 
(e, (, )). 
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c 33 
e** I*le2 
33 ei =- [(0, e, (1», (2, ef(1»1, 
e2 = [(0, e, (2», (2, ef(2»1), 
(ei, e2) 
111 
( «0, e, (1», (0, e, (2»), «2, ef(1», (2, ef(2»») 
34 may e, (, ) after 
ý(54 must e, (, ) after 
34 must ef(2) jifter e, (2) 
--, (! 34 must ef(l) after 
(e, 
(2))), 
34 May ef(l) after (e,, (, ))). 
34 
Fel 
-je2 
C3 
35= e1 =- L(l, e, (, )), (2, ef(i))], e2 [(2, e, (2)), (4, ef(2))], 
e3 -= [(I, e, (3)), (2, ef(3))], e4 [(2, e, (4)), (4, ef(4))]), 
(el, e2). (e3,, e4)), 
e4 
((2, ef(j)), (2, e, (2))), ((2, ef(3)), (2, es(4))))) 
Some example bets relating to 
the I. E. S. Ss follow overleaf. 
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The following also hold; 
33 must e, (, ) after 
. 33 may e, (, ) after c 
33 must ef(j) after (e, (j), e, (2)), 
33 must ef(2) after ( e, (, ), e, (2)), 
-(33 must ef(j) after fe, (, ))). 
54 ei =- [(1, e, (1», (2, er(, »], 
e2- e, (2», (2, e f(2»] ý 
l(12 
(e , 1, (e21 
0, 
( «0, e, (1», (0, e, (2»), 
» 
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(1 e2 
-ý [(2, e, (2», (4, ef(2»1, 
e3 =- RO, e, (3», (2, ef(3»1, 
e4 M [(2, e, (4», (4, ef(4»]), 
(e3, e2) i (e3, 
e4) 
«1, er(3», (2, e, (2»), «2, ef(3», (2, e, (4»)l) 
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36 
e3 
le2 -ý 
e4 
Some more examples; 
35 may e, (, ) after 
(35 must e, (, ) after 
.3s mus tes (2) Af -ter 
es (1)), 
! 5s must ef(3) after e, (3)) 
Ss Day es(3) after (), 
-, (3s, may e, (4) after (es(j))), 
05 must e, (3) after 
36 may e, (2) after es(3)), 
(36 must e, (2) after ( e, (3))), 
36 May e, (2) after es(l))), 
36 must e, (3) after f)2 
S6 May e, (4) after e, (3) 
-(! 36 May e, (2) after fes(3), e, (4))), 
56 es(2) after ( e, (3), ef(3), e, (4))). 
Finally, some timed examples; 
35 fg-IlSt (es(2))3 ilfter (e, (, )), 
ý-s must (es(2))O. s jifter [ e, (, ))), 
35 MUSt (es(2))3s Ll-fter 
I e, (, ))), 
Ss atist (e, (2))Os after (e, (j), ef(j)), 
-95 must (e, (2)),. 5 after fe, (, )), 
Ss must (es(2))js after fe, (, )), 
-56 D-a-Y 
(es(4))2.1 
Ll-fter 
f es(3)) 
-S6 D--a-Y (eS(4))2s after 
(e, (3)), 
- (36 D--(I-Y (e!, (4))2 after ( e, (3), ef(3))), 
-1(36 must (es(2))Os after fes(3), ef(3))), 
36 D--'C-IY- (e (4))2s LLf -ter 
(e sp), ef (3) 
-36 MUSt 
(es(2))2s after (es(l))). 
Notice that 13, and -92 are indistinguishable using bets on untimed starts alone, while 
if e3 
(3, e), el = (1, e), then we cannot always tell 35 and 36 apart using just one bet (36 may 
do anything 35 must do, so the result of a single bet, if we are unlucky, might not be enough 
to distinguish them); in the next section this will be remedied as we see how to compile the 
results of several bets. 
N. B. We cannot have conflict present at the start of time, since if something starts at the same time as *, it 
must be causally the same as it, and hence in every maximal Con-set. This is because we had a single first 
cause; we cannot handle distributed state at the start of time. Note that this doesn't stop us from modelling 
P+Q; we just have to assume there is a state before the choice is resolved: nondeterminism is notionally 
resolved at run-fime. If we wanted a distributed starting state, we have to allow some time between i=0 and 
the first action so that the silent event can cause (rather than be necessarily simultaneous with) whatever ini- 
tial distributed state is required. 
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3.2 Characterising structures using bets 
In this section the power of the various sorts of bets to discriminate between histories of 
interval event structures will be investigated. First a way of combining the results of several 
bets about a given structure is presented. Then we see how to construct complex bets from 
simpler ones in order to reason about complex behaviours. The discriminatory power of vari- 
ous kinds of bets-is ihen examined. This section is based on [Abramsky 1987] which, in turn, 
draws on the work of Hennessy. 
3.2.1 Characterising the results of betting on structures 
It is time to consider the outcome of a bet in more detail. Any particular bet can win or 
lose. We shall use T to symbolise a win and I for a loss. (Do not confuse the result of a suc- 
cessful bet, T, with, the undefined time in the future, T. ) Given some observation, L, we 
cannot always predict the outcome of the bet -9 will a, ' after L due to nondeterminism or lack 
of information. Hence, the set of all results of this bet placed on 15 at any particular time form 
a set, L, a, ) c: f T, J-1. 
DEFINITION 3.6 - Powerdomains 
The result of any particular bet is either a win, T, or a loss, I, and a win is better than a 
loss, T ý: -L, 
The results of all bets placed on 3 in any state KE P(S, L) will be collected into a 
set of results NS, "fl a, ) g (T, -L) 
defined thus; 
(i) TE Ns, L, a,, ) <* SpLay a, ' after L 
(ii) I t4- N3, f, a, )t-* 3 must a, ' after L 
Since T 2: 1, the result of a single bet placed on one execution lives on the two-point lattice 
0; 
while the set of all possible results of a bet, N5, f, a, ), lives on one of the powerdomains of 
E). Various ways of forming the powerdomain of 0 correspond to various notions of how to 
define the result of a set of bets: - 
if we care only about the certainty of winning, then the correct powerdomain to 
choose is the Smyth powerdomain ps(E)); this corresponds to the notion of must, 
while if the possibility of winning, is all that is important, (i. e. we are considering 
may) then the Hoare powerdomain Pn(8) will do. Finally, 
if we wish to distinguish between the certainty of winning, the possibility of 
winning and the certainty of losing, then the Egli-Milner powerdornain pEM(G) is 
the right choice. 
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(T) 
s(E)) = 
(T) (T, 
Pn(G) = 
pal(G) = 
Figure 3.1 - The powerdomains of 6 
411. 
(T) 
I 
(T, 1) 
I 
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Since the Egli-Milner powerdomain (also known as the convex powerdomain) contains 
the greatest discrimination between the results of multiple bets, it will be used from now on. 
In the next subsection operations on these powerdomain that correspond to combining bets 
will be considered; 'ý. these will be important because the discriminating power of betting will 
be seen to depend on which ways of combining bets are allowed, rather than on the complexi- 
tY of a primitive bet. The orders on ps(e), pn(G) and PEM(G) will be written ýýs, ý! jj and 2! ONI 
respectively. 
First, however, t it is necessary to consider what a computable combination of bets might, 
be. An obvious choice is a continuous function. Note that for finite domains monotone func- 
tions are automatically continuous. 
FACT - Operations on Powerdomains 
Given any monotone function f: W -ý E) (n ý: 0), there is a pointivise extension of f onto 
prim(e), writtenft : (PEM(E))n) _ý PENI(E)), that is monotone: 
fl (X ... X, ) = (f(xi, ... x. 
» 1 xi r= Xi, 1 :5i: g n1 
The pointwise extension is also multilinear, in that it preserves unions in each argument 
separately. 
3.2.2 Betting on more elaborate untimed behaviours 
In this section all bets will be of the untimed fonn 5 will a, ' after L. Suppose that our 
observer is interested not just in a single transition happening next, but in a sequence of 
transitions a, (, ), at(2)', ... happening next. 
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She can place a series of bets (an accumulator) 
13 will aq,; after f, and 
S will a, (2; After Lu (aq,; ) and 
S will a, (3; after (L u (a, (, )')) u[ at(2; ) and 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
which will enable her to explore this situation. Sin-dlarly, if she doesn't care about which of 
two transitions happens next, she could bet , 
(3 Ivill a, (,; after f, and . 15 will atg; after Lu (a, (,; )) or 
(S will a, (2; after f, and! 3 will aq,; after Lu 
ta, 
(2; 
)) 
Clearly, conjunction and disjunction of untimed bets should be powerful enough to distin- 
guish between all L. I. E. S. up to the order their events happen. Hence, the following two 
operators over the results of bets will be interesting: - 
ATI 
TTTTI 
TIIII 
Figuýe 3.2 - Truth tables for the disjunction and conjunction of bets 
They correspond to the disjunction of bets (S will aq,; after L or !3 will at(2; after L) and the 
conjunction of bets (s will at(,; after L and -1 will a, (2; after L). 
By abuse, the pointwise exten- 
tions of v andAwill also be written v andA. The truth tables for these extensions are shown 
below. 
(T) (T, 1) (1) 
(T) (T) (T) (T) (T) 
(T, 11 (T, 1) (T, 1) 
(T, 1) (1) (1) 
[T, 1) ( 1) 
I (TI) [T, I) (1) 
III III III 
Figure 3.3 - Truth tables for the pointwise extensions of v andA. 
In addition to conjunction and disjunction of bets, we will allow quantification over bets. 
The observer will be allowed to bet that "there is a run on which the bet will win, " and "on 
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all runs the bet will win. " This assumes that at any point in time we are allowed to copy an 
I. E. S. in order to examine the consequences of possible nondeterminism at that point. 
[Hennessy 1988i] assumes global copying, - that at the beginning-of a test an unlimited num- 
ber of copies of an object are available, - we will assume local copying, - that, at any stage, 
an unlimited number of copies of an I. E. S. in its current state are available, - as well. This is 
a fairly stringent, although, I think, reasonable assumption, as a computational I. E. S. can 
only display finife- nondeterminism, (because it has a finite number of maximal Con-sets), 
and so only a finite number of copies are necessary. The truth tables for all (V) and some (3) 
are shown below. 
The intuition behind the bet combinators V and 3 can be seen by considering must and 
may; v just picks out the ps(e) subdomain of while 3 picks out the pli(E)) subdo- 
main. Hence if S will Vat' after L wins, then -3 must at' after L, while 
if 
.3 will 3a, 
' after L wins, 
then 31 May at after L, One might read V as 'for all possible (nondeterministic) paths from 
here ... ' and 3 as 'for at least one possible path from here ... ' 
(T) (T) (T) (T) 
fT, 1) (1) fT, 1) (T) 
Figure 3.4 - Truth tables for the bet quantifiers v and 3. 
Note that the operators V, 3: PENI(E)) --> PENI(O) are monotone but not linear. 
A syntax of bets can now be introduced. We shall write the primitive untimed bet -3 will at' 
after L as just at' and assume that at` = (1, e) where e ranges over a nonempty universe of 
events Ebt, and I over a countably-infinite labelling set L. Then, all untimed combination bets 
beB (Eb., ) can be specified by 
b :: = Win I Lose I atb I bi v b2l bi A b2l Vb I 3b 
Similarly, BB(Eb, ý, ) will be the class of all 8-timed bets, and By, (Et,, ) will be the class of 
all strict-timed bets. 
The 'semantics' of bets is defined via an extension of the Rfunction to the new bet combi- 
nators. The meaning function S: IES x LIES xB -ý PEM(O) is defined by 
S(S, L, Win) = (T) 
S(3, f,, Lose) = (1) 
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S(. S, f, at' b) = 91Z(! 3, L, atý A S(% Lu (at), b) 
S(S, f, b, v b2) = S(S, f, bi) v S(S, L, b2) 
S(% f, bi A b2) = S(S, f, bi) A S(% L, b2) 
S(S, L, Vb) V-q, 9, L, b) 
S(% L, 3 b) 3 S(% L, b) 
Here the auxiliary function Ris defined as before; 
I 
Time, causality, and concurrency I 
JNS, L, at) = (T) if 5 must a, ' after f, 
NS, f, a, ) = (T, -L) 
if must a' after L) andS Ma 'after L I a, t 
NS, f, at,, ) = [1) if at' after L). 
In the next subsection the uses of compound bets are discussed, while the subsection after 
that is devoted to exploring the discriminatory power of various kinds of (untimed) bets. 
The semantic function for &-timed and strict-timed bets is defined in the obvious way. 
I vý 
3.2.3 What are . compound bets for ? 
Intuitively, the idea of the compound bets a, ' b, bi v b2, bi A b2, Vb and 3b is clear, at' b is 
just a bet about the next transition, followed by some bet about the state that results from 
that, bi v b2 is just the bet either b, or b2, b, A b2 is similarly the bet both bi and b2, Vb is the 
bet "in all executions from here b, " while 3b is the bet "in some execution from here b. " (The 
use of the compound bets will be illustrated by reference to the examples first presented in 
subsection 3.1.4 in subsection 3.2.6. ) 
Several subsets of B can be identified as familiar classes of bets; if the observer is just 
allowed to bet on a sequence of starts (no conjunction, disjunction or quantification). then we 
have a betting system based on the order in which things start; this is very much like the trace 
theory popularised by [Hoare 1985]. Note however that, although we cannot distinguish a 
concurrent system from its sequentialisation using these bets, we can distinguish branching 
points; in terms of the examples, S(Ss, fe, (, )], e, (2)Win) = [T) & S(56, (e, (, )), e,, (2)Win) = (T, 1). 
Once bets are allowed on finishes as well as starts we havý the ability to distinguish tem- 
poral overlap, and thus have roughly the same kind of model as Lamport. 
For finite I. E. S. s these bets p lus conjunctions and disjunctions of them are sufficient to dis- 
tinguish all functional behaviours, as is indicated in the next section. We have said that 
disjunction and conjunction involve local copying, - after any observation we can make two 
copies of an I. E. S. and observe the result of different bets placed on each copy, combining the 
results in a computable fashion. The multilinearitY of v and A then corresponds to the intuition 
that the results of these test are independent. 
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Since no internal unobservable action is possible in an I. E. S., refusal testing [Phillips 
1987) is a redundant concept here. The bet "S can refuse to do a, ' after Lý' can be formulated 
as N3, f, ao = (-L). 
Notice that if we allowed countable nondeterminism (a situation which might be notated in 
CSP as n P) or infinite density, (an infinite number of transitions in some finite interval of 
iE CO 
time), then the betting methodology may not be able to extract all the information that can be 
obtained about I. E. S. s by observation. The ability to formulate quantified bets in the pres- 
ence of countable nondeterminism presumes the ability to make a countable number of copies 
of 3 so that each alternative can be explored separately. This is both philosophically 
unattractive and technically trying, hence the restriction that P(3, L) must be finite for any 3 
and f- Ibis still leaves us with the problem that Vb and 3b allow us to combine the results of 
all sub-bets at some point. This relies on the ability to enumerate the (finite number of) 
alternatives; it may be argued that this enumeration is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of 
observational equivalence. 
The full syntax of bets, B(Eb,,, ), can be seen at the most powerful (and least plausible) 
end of possible obs ervation-based semantics, with various subsets (single bets, (b :: = ao; 
traces, (b :: = Win I LoseJ a, ' b); traces & local copying (b :: = Win I Lose I at' bIb, v b2 I b, A b2) 
etc. ) having less power and more plausibility. In [Abramsky 1987]- -it is argued that (a set of 
test analogous to) B is in some sense the largest syntax that makes sense in the participa- 
tory world; here iwe merely remark that B (and the timed versions B5 and Br(Eb,,, )) have 
just sufficient power to make all the distinctions we want to make, as will be seen in the next 
two subsections. 
ASIDE - On countability 
The total number of transitions any I. E. S. can engage in in any given run is finite since we 
demanded bounded computational structures. With only bounded-below computational struc- 
tures the number of points in time at which a transition happens is countable. This is 
because, in chapter one, we insisted on computable structures having finite density; 
vtl, t2E R, V! 3, E clES, VL=(LE, <)E 94-9). l (a, Ia c= LE, a, arti:! ýt: 5h) 
I EN 
We have only allowed untimed and 8-timed bets to be placed just after something has 
happened (i. e. at end(L)). This has the advantage that we can limit consideration of bets to a 
countable number of points in time (analogous to testing over a countable number of states). 
We propose that it is desirable in all real-timed models to exclude uncountable sets except 
where strictly necessary. (In the case of strict-timed bets it is necessary to have an uncount- 
ably-based bet; things could happen at any teR, they just do happen only on a countable 
subset of R. ) 
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3.2.4 On the power of untimed bets 
In order to assess the power of untiMed bets, it is necessary to formulate an untimed mod- 
el which keeps the temporal order and simultaneity implicit in an L. I. E. S. The right structure 
for this will be a sequence of sets of transitions, the sequence order reflecting temporal 
precedence and the set structure simultaneity. The ordering presented here was first consid- 
ered on [Hennessy- 1988ii]. [Aceto & Hennessy 1988] details an approach to testing process 
algebras using a test similar to the S will a, ' after L form of bet. 
DEFINITION 3.7 - L. I. E. S. sequences 
Consider Tr =,,, LE, u LEf. The sequence generated by a L. I. E. S. L= (LE', <), written 
seg (L), is a member of (p (Tr))*. The properties of a sequence are as follows. 
SUPPOSe P =-- PIP2 ... Pn G (pCFr - 0))* is a sequence of nonempty sets of transitions, 
and that any given a, E Tr is timed by ri. Then we require 
(i) Vi. Va, a, ' r= Pi . r, = r, ' (sets contain simultaneous transitions). 
(ii) V i, j. i<j ý1=*V a, (j) c= Pi, ab) r= Pj. ri(i) < rO) (sequence order reflects a 
temporal order). 
Note, though, that the times are forgotten in the passage from L to seq(L). 
We will define the L. I. E. S. sequence projection operator (for use later): suppose se (L)= -M PIP2 
... 
Pn then mn(seg(L)) = PIP2... P., if n>m and PIP2 ... 
Pn otherwise. 
The sequence seq(L) is generated as follows. First consider the simultaneity set of a 
transition [a, ] = (a, ' I r, = r, '). Then define seq(L) as PIP2 ... Pn r= (p (Tr))* where 
(i) Vi. 3a,. Pi = [a, ] 
(ii) V i, j. ij <-: > r, (i) < ro) where Pi = [ac, )]. 
(ifi) Va'ELE'. 3Pi. a'EPj 
Two sequences are equal just when all their components are equal. * Notice that the Pis 
are finite since we have finite density. Further, the set M(S) = (. aN(L) ILE 94(3)) I'S 
finite since we have finite nondeterminism. 
The next theorem shows that a subclass of untimed bets brings out just the distinctions 
§Leq over finite observations cares about. 
*- Pedantically, we should say "up to bijection of labelling sets, " since the observer need not necessarily use 
the same set of labels for recording both observations. 
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THEOREM - The power of (untimed) bets I 
Given two computational I. E. S. s 3 and S', and some observation that can be made of both 
of them, L, we can distinguish between the complete histories, 5E P(S, L) and KC P(S', L) 
using untimed bets just when sN(5) # We can do this since we can formulate a 
compound bet which has a different outcome when placed on 5 and K using just sequences of 
primitive bets and conjunction. 
Proof. Suppose Eeq(-Y) = JJ2 ... J. andaM(50 = KX2 ... K. and suppose further that the 
first place seq(5) and M(9,0 differ has index i (i. e. Jj = Kj forj < i, Jj: t- Ki). 
Suppose we have a set A. Let A be the set of all sequences generated by taking all the 
elements from A (e. g., if A= [a,, b, c, ), jaAct, a, cA, bata, b, ca,, cab,, aka, )). Then the 
bet 
B12 A Win ]_ý E Jj 
will win when placed on S doing -7 and 
it will lose when placed on T doing K. (That is, 
1ý(S, L, By) = [T, 11 b. ut NIS', f, By) = f-L). ) 
This is easy to check. The bet A W_e ... J, i-I win I _1,, 
j c -Jj 
) may win on both structures 
since both display the same transitions up to A, but the bet By can't win on both since they 
are different at Ji. 
Furthermore we can distinguish between the untimed. behaviour of structures with more 
complicated bets: 
THEOREM - The power of (untimed) bets Id 
The bet 
b=3 A By 
-1 
E SM(S) 
will distinguish between all different untimed behaviours. 
Proof. Suppose 
. 5eg(! 
3) = (ýe (J) IJe M(3)). Now if Le without loss of gen- 
erality we can assume that some §ejU(-I) E sea(. 3) is not being equal to a EgQ(90 E §M(T). 
Hence b will distinguish between all untimed finite behaviours, since 
, 5(! '3, [*,, ), b) = (T) while S(T, (*, ), b) = (1) 
Observe that there is a By which cannot have the same result when placed on 3 as when 
placed on S', and this difference will lead to one of the conjuncts evaluating to -L when the 
bet 
is placed on 51', and hence to the whole conjunction evaluating to -L 
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In contrast, we will always get ( T, -L) when any 
bet By, for 
-7 E geg(S) 
is placed on S. 
410' 
So, the form of bet S will a, ' after L is capable of extracting all the information about 
causality that is present in a maximal Con-set (viewed as a L. I. E. S. ), if we allow bet 
combinators as described. Notice, incidentally, that the power of this form of bet depends on 
having an unlimife'd number of copies of 3 to observe, and on being able to make compound 
bets composed of the disjunction and conjunction of simpler ones. Also, we must be able to 
bet on old things ending (wiLl aý bets) as well as new things beginning (will a, ' bets) in order 
to gain this power. 
This result is directly complimentary to that of [Aceto 1987]; there, single bets do not 
have this power, as they are made on rather less rich structures. (Aceto applies the betting 
methodology to event structures. Since occurrences are atomic in that world, in order to 
obtain the discriminating power we have with single bets, he needs bets based on the occur- 
rences of a sequence of multisets of events. In order to obtain the power of causal bets, 
(which we introduce in the next sectionj Aceto needs bets based on the occurrences of a 
partial order of evdhts. The considerable descriptive power of our bets, and the consequent 
simplicity of our formalism relative to Aceto's, seems to lend weight to the claim that it is 
reasonable to consider occurrences of events as having distinct starts and finishes. ) 
Notice,, incidentally, that if two computational I. E. S. s differ, they do so at some finite time 
into some execution; for this reason we do not need to restrict ourselves to dealing with 
finite structures. 
3.2.5 On the power of betting on elaborate timed behaviours 
Given the result of the last section, it seems hardly surprising that strict-timed bets can 
distinguish between all executions. That is, given IE P0, A KE P(T, L) for any possible 
observation, L, if Y : P'- K then we can formulate a bet which has a different result when placed 
on Y and K. (Again, really we should say Y:; ý Kup to bijection between labelling sets. ) 
Notice that, intuitively, we can always state an untimed bet as a &-timed bet by making 8 
large enough, (since no transition can be indefinitely postponed), and a strict-timed bet can 
be seen as (an uncountable) disjunction of &-timed bets. Thus an untimed bet can always be 
made as a &-timed bet or a strict-timed bet, and a &-timed bet can always be made as a 
strict-timed bet. 
In order to assess the power of strict-timed bets, it will be convenient to label each ele- 
ment of the sequences of the previous section with the time at which it occurred. (This just 
gives us a structure with exactly the same descriptive power as L. I. E. S. s, but which it is 
easier to define sequences of strict-timed bets upon. ) 
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Suppose M(y) = JiJ2 ... J,,. Then IM(Y) = 
(Ji, ri)(J2, r2) ... (J., r. ) where ri times every 
transition in Ji. (There is such a time, by construction. ) 
THEOREM - The power of strict-timed bets 
Given two corýputational I. E. S. s S and T, and some observation that can be made of both 
of them, L, we c. an distinguish between the complete histories, y r= P(S, L) and KE P(T, L) 
using strict-timed bets just when "e (Y) # M(90. 
q(y) = (Ji, ti)(J2, t2) ... (J., tj and Lseq(-170 = (Ki, ti) 
(K2, t2) 
... (K., t. ) Proof. Suppose Lse 
and suppose further that the first place Lseq(y) and Lseq(-, 70 differ has index i (that is Jj = Kj 
forj < i, Jj#- Kj). Then the bet 
I)s 
Win 1.4 ej (B I)ys At QqQ(r 2-r, ý ... 
(O(rl-r, 
_, -r 
will win when placed on -9 doing _Y and 
it will lose when placed on 5' doing K. (The interpreta- 
tion of if a, b, cd,, is the strict-timed sequence (a, ), 4b, )O, ý(ct)Oý(QO,; this ensures a 
proper treatment of simultaneity. ) 
. Further, we can distinguish between I. E. S. s up to bijection between ! Ms. Suppose 
tsM(S) = (Lse - "e (T) this m6k be due to some q(5) 15c M(3)). Now, if ! M(S) 
tsgýq(5) E ILse .e (190 r= Lse q(3) not being equal to a Hence the bet t 
bys =3A "e C. 3) (13y)y, 
will distinguish between all timed finite behaviours, since 
S(S, (*s), bys) = (T) while S(T, (*, ), by., ) = [1) 
for the same reasons as before. The conjunction is finite since we demanded finite nondeter- 
minism. 
Untimed bets, then, have all the power necessary to distinguish the order in which things 
happen, while strict-timed bets have all the power necessary f6 distinguish the order and the 
timing of happenings. The power of &-timed bets lies between these two extremes, and 
depends on the structure concerned. As we have said, untimed bets and strict-timed bets 
can be seen as the special cases of &-timed bets 8=- and 8=0 respectively. 
We will go on, after an example of compound timed and untimed bets, to consider the 
observation of causality and the implications its introduction into the betting framework 
might have. 
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3.2.6 Examples 
Reconsider the examples 31- 56 ftOM subsection 3.1.4. The following assertions about the 
results of compound bets are true. 
For the purely deterministic structures 31 and S2 the results are straightforward: 
e, (I)ef(I)e, (2)ef(2)Wjn) = (T) 
NS,, e, (I)e, (2)ef(I)ef(2)Win) = (T) 
P029 e, (I)ef(I)Win A e, (I)e, (2)Win) 
N327 es(I)ef(I)Win v e, (I)e, (2)Lose) 
tp(ct e, (I)ef(I)e, (2)ef(2)Lose) = (1) 
P,, (! 31, e, (I)ef(I)WinAe, (I)e, (2)Win) (T) 
P023 e, (I)ef(I)Win v e, (I)e, (2)Win) (T) 
Pý(329 e, (I)ef(I)Lose v e, (I)e., (2)Win) (T) 
The presence of nondeterminism, as in 34, means that quantification becomes useful: 
N331 (*, ), e, (, )Win) = (T) 
N53) [*sl, 3e, (, )Win) = (T) 
N331 (*s), ve, (, )Win) = [T) 
Pý33,3e, (j)ef(j)V%6n) 
'q! 341 (*, ), e, (, )Win) = [T, I) 
Tk(, 34,3e, (, )Win) (T) 
! Pk(! 341 Ve, (, )Win) f I) 
Pý34Y I*., ), 3(e, (, )Win A es(2)Win)) = [T) 
The last bet indicates that one should read 3(e, (j)VTIn A e, (2)Win) not as 'there is an execu- 
tion from here where e, (, ) wins and e, (2) wins, ' but as 'there is an execution from here where 
e, (, ) wins and there is an execution from here where e, (2) wins. ' The more complicated struc- 
turesSs and! 35 offer a host of interesting bets, for example: 
N35, [*, ), e, (, )Win) = (T) 
N! 35, f 3e, (, )Win) = (T) 
PV59 es(3)WinA 
3es(3)ef(3)e, (2)Win) = fT, -L) 
Pý35, Ve, (, )Win) = (1) 
'ku(S 6, *, ), e, (3)ef(3)e, (2)Win) = (T, -L) 
N36,3e, (3)ef(3)e, (2)Win) = [T) 
Pý(56, e, (3)win A 3es(3)ef(3)e, (2)Win) = (T) 
Pý(56) (*, ), Ve, (, )Win) = 
Finally, consider some timed causal bets; we have: 
N337 (es(l))OsWin) = (T) 
P1,03) (e, (, ))2sWin) =fI) 
N531 (es(INWin A (es(2))3Win) 
PV37 (*,, ), (es(102SWin A (eqj))2ýWin) 
'k(349 [*., ), (e, (, ))O!; Win) = (T, -L) 
N, 34s (e, (j))2sWjn) = (1) 
N34s 3(e, (2)),. 5Wm) = 
(T) 
_3((e, 
(, ))0.5Win) v 
v (e, (2))O., 5Win) = (T) 
'ý(35, (*, ), 3(e, (, )), sWin) = (T) 
N351 (*s), V(e, (, )), sWin) = (T) 
lk(Ss, ( *,, ), 3(e, (, ))Os(ef(l))2s(es(3))2$Win) = (T) 
N359 (*r. ), V(e, (j))Os(ef(j))V(e, (3))2sWin) = (1) 
P%. (569 [*, ), 3(e, (3)), sWin) = (T) 
9ý(! 36) (*s), V(e, (, ))OsWin) = (T) 
JN! 367 
[*, ), (es(3))3(es(2))3Win 
v (e, (3))3(e, (2))3Win) = (T) 
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3.3 Causal bets 
David Murphy 
An interesting elaboration of the betting methodology is possible if causal bets are 
allowed. In some instances it might be reasonable to-suppose that causality is observable; 
we may be able to observe co, for instance if concurrent happenings happen in observably dif- 
ferent places. In this case, the branching structure of time would be a model for a genuinely 
distributed systetW With message passing, process creation and so on. (For example, two 
branches splitting might correspond to a computation being rescheduled on two geographical- 
ly distributed processors. ) In these cases it is reasonable to allow bets that specify how 
things happened. These will be called causal bets. 
Causal bets have- a fairly respectable history, given that process algebra theorists usually 
assume that causality is unobservable. Observational techniques which allow the observa- 
tion of causality are implicit in the positions taken in [Aceto et al. 1987], [Degano & 
Montanari 1987] and particularly in [Reisig 19871. The position taken on the nature of con- 
currency in [Shields 1987] also seems to suggest that causality is observable. 7ý 
The causal syntaix is the same as before, except for sequencing; BCz for causal) 'Ubct) CC' 
is defined by: 
b :: = Win I Lose I (a, -). - a, ) bI bi v 
b2l bi A b2l Vb 13b 
with a,, at`ý e ((I, e)s, (1, e)f Iec: Eb. --t). The interpretation of (at - at) is that a, has already 
happened, at' should happen next, and at must cause (or be causally the same as) a,. In the 
case a, = *s this reduces to a non-causal bet, since va _= [t, (ý), tf(. )] (=- LE . hegin(*) : 5b 
Some new definitions will be need to give a meaning to causal bets. 
DEFINITION 3.8 - Causal Extension 
Suppose that we have a L. I. E. S. L= (LE', <) and a history K= (LE, <) C= M(S) with L 
consistent with 9V; KE P(S, L). Suppose further that we have some transition a, = (1, e), at 
tirner, ', which hasn't been seen yet, r, ' ý: end(L), and also some transition we have already 
seen, a, = (1', e ), E L. 
We want to state when a, causes a,, i. e. when (a, --)-- a, ) extends L in K. We write this 
causal extension as (a, -)- a, ) Lxtendsc L in K. 
First notice that a, ' must extend L in K, and suppose that the labelled events in LE that 
justify inferring a, ' extends Lin Kare a= (E(O, e) =- [r, rf] and a' = (f(I), e') =- [r,, rf] say. 
The definition now splits into two cases: - 
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(i) at' is a start, a, ' say. Then we require that (r., a, ): 5b (rs', as`). 
(ii) at` is a finish, af' say. Then we require that (rf, af) : 5b (rý, aý). In this case, of 
course, as will be in LE' already. 
419, 
Using this definition of extension we can now skip through the definitions that lead to the 
meaning of causal bets; must and May just use the new notion of extension; 
!3 must (a, aý) after L <* V KE P(S, L). (at at) extendsc L, in K 
S Mpy (at at) after L <-* 3 KE P(S, L). (at ao Lxtendsc L in K 
The meaning functions are then defined in the obvious way; 
S(! 3, f, (at -ý- atý b) = f, (at -ý- at)) u S(, 19, Lu [at), b) 
N3, f, (at atý) = (T) if! 3 must (a, -)-- a, ) after 
NS, L, (a, at)) = (T, J-) if ý(S must (a, a, ) after L) and 3 may (a, a, ) lifter 
NS, L, (a, atý) =(II if -, (! 3 May (at a, ) after L). 
Causal bets clearly give us more power than non-causal ones (it is easy to think of two 
structures distinguished by causal bets and not distinguished by non-causal ones, - for 
instance S'2 of subsection 3.1.4 and 5; = (fe, [(0, eqj)), (2, ef(i))], e2 _ý [(I, e, (2)), (4, 
ef(2))] e 1, e2) [((0, e, (j)), (1, e, (2)))), [)) which has less causality). 
In order examine the power of causal bets, we will have to examine a structure like jim 
and LsAe but which incorporates causal information. Previously, we just had linear structures 
to represent executions; now we must have branching ones. Thus our logic of observations 
will become branching rather than linear. 
Suppose we have an I. E. S. Sc displaying the maximal Con-set cE M(5). We will see 
those transitions of 3 that belong to labelled events in c, with the causality 3 specifies, so a 
reasonable representative of a timed causal execution is the conflict-free I. E. S. 3 ýc. (This is 
conflict-free since M(S t c) =(cI provided cE M(3). 
THEOREM - The power of strict-timed causal bets 
Given two I. E. S. s 5 and S, displaying maximal Con-sets c and c. then we can distinguish 
between these histories using non-causal bets iff tseq(! 3 ý c): t- M(31 c'). 
However, if "se (3 [ c) = M, (T t c) then, provided Stc and S' t c' are not equal up to 
bijection of labels, we can fon-nulate a bet which has a different result when placed on Stc to 
that which it has when placed on 31 c'. 
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Proof. Clearly if LM(S t c) = tseq(! 3' t cý then S and T are not distinguishable by non- 
causal bets. (For if they were there would be some transition at which they were different, 
either in timing or causality, violating the assumption that jM(S t c) ; e; ! M(31 c'). ) 
Suppose that 5ýc and Tt c' differ in their causality at at(d), SO that al(d)' causes different 
things in! 3 tc and 31 c'. 
Suppose further that the difference in causality refers to at(,;, so that at(d; <, a, (,; in 3, but 
-, (aqdý < a, (. )) in T. Now, define the necessarily simultaneous set of transitions of a given 
transition as 
[a, ]. = [a, ' I a, =, aj 
and say that [aq, )]Jaq2)]c ... [a, (. )Ic is a maximal causal securing of a, 
just when 
[a, (I)lc, at(2) G [a, (2)1,, a, (. ) E= [aL(n)lc . a, (, ) <C. at(2) <c ... <c a, (") <c a, 
and 
-ý 3 a, (f) E Tr . aq) <, a, 
& aq) o [aq, )], u [a, (2)], uu [at(,, )],. 
Define, analogously with A, the set of sequences A for some set of transitions A, so that 
-I- if A= (a,, bt, ct), then 
c,, a, c, ->-- b, b, a, ->- c,, b, c, -ý- a, c, a, --)- b,, c, 
Now, rýturning to a, (d;, suppose that its maximal causal securing is [a, (j)jjat(2)1C 
[a, (,, )]c. Then the b6t 
(B c%ý A (a')r, - -4- 
(a2)(r2 
- r, )s 
(a n)(r. 
_ r. -... -r 
(aqd)ý r, ), Win I ai c [a, o)],, ) (rt(d) r, ý 
(at(e; ) (rt(e) 
- rt(d) r, 
will win when placed on S doing c and it will lose when placed on T doing c'. 
(Again, the interpretation of (aj)r, if a 
"' 
i=a, -), - b, -). - c, -3-- d,, is the strict-timed sequence 
(at),, -)- (&)oý --)- (ct)oý --)- (Qos; this ensures a proper treatment of simultaneity. ) 
We assume that the common time of all of the transitions in [atojc is rj, that r, (d) times a, (d; 
and that rt(, ) times a, (d)' -) 
. 
As the reader will probably have guessed, if -, (V CE MS) .3 c' c= 9VI(S) .Sýc= S' 
t c') & 
if --, (Vc'r= MS) . 3cE 94-1) . Scýc =51c) (up to bijection of labels) then the bet 
A bC. ys =3CE %k! 5) 
(B 
cc)y, 
will distinguish S and 3'. (Since we are only dealing with equality up to bijection of labels, we 
cannot distinguish between S and 5+ 13 by any form of bet. ) 
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The bets of the previous few sections will now be used to compare interval event struc- 
tures. Consider two I. E. S. s, S= (LE, Con, <b) and S' = (LE', Con', <: ý) and suppose that our 
universe of bets Eb. --, will be Eu E' (i. e. we will suppose that we can bet on the occurrences 
of events that 3 can isplay and on those that S' can display). The results of bets made on 3 
and S' can be compared using S. 
Suppose that both I. E. S. s have been observed to engage in some (possibly empty apart 
from *, ) L. I. E. S., L= (LE- gUx Eb, u [*), <). Then the behaviour of 5 at end(L) can be. 
compared by examining S(S, L, a, f) and S(T, L, atý for at-' E LE-; 
DEFINITION 3.9 - Betting equivalence 
The I. E. S. 3 is more reliable, or a better earner than the I. E. S. S' with respect to the bet 
a, given the observation f, if S(S, L, a,. ý) ýýaj S(! 3', L, a, '). Clearly the outcome of all possible 
bets is important, so we say that -5 is more reliable than 5' given f, written S 2ýL 3', iff 
Vb r= B(Eb,, ). S(-S, L, b) ->Em S(T, f, b) 
Our observer will sometimes see no need to leave the betting shop to make an observa- 
tion. Then she just has *, at t=0, and 
2'<=>Vb e B(Eb). S(2, (*), b) ýýum S(T, (*J, b) 
The same principle can be applied to timed bets; 
2 2: LS Vb E B5(Ebr, ). S(S, L, b) >-., S(S', L, b) 
b r= B5(Eb). S(3, (*J, b) >--r-m S(5', 1 *, 1, b) 
-5 ýtLY5! 3' <-* VbE Bys(Eb,, ). S(S, f, b) ->Em SCY, f, b) 
S' >-y5 3'4* VbE Py, (EbA). S(-15, ( *, ), b) >-Em S(T, ( *, ), b) 
We write -->z (German Zeit, time) for one of ýt, ýtS or >--y.. 
If S >-z T and T ->z S then we vaite !3 ~z T and say that 5 and T are observationally 
equivalent up to ->z: 
,9-5, <* 3 ý: T & ýt! 3 
-55' 
4. 
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3.5 An introduction to metric space semantics 
Metric space semantics can be quite complex and subtle, so before defining metrics that 
reflect the testing equivalences we have defined, we shall give a short introduction. This 
introduction will be based on the process tree formalism, an intuitivelY appealing model of 
processes. Our aim will be to investigate various notions of equivalence for the process tree 
formalism, and their inter-relationship, showing how these notions can and cannot be used to 
define suitable metric spaces. 
This section draws heavily from [Klop 1988], from whence further details should be 
sought. (Incidentally, process graphs capture all the information available using untimed 
causal bets, so they bear the same relationship to causal bets as §equences do to untimed 
noncausal bets. ) 
3.5.1 Process trees 
A process graph "'is a rooted, directed, connected, edge labelled graph. A process tree is a 
process graph without cycles and where at most one arrow goes into every node. (This is 
called a synchronisation tree by Milner, see [Milner 1980] or, for a modem approach, 
[TVinsk-el 1984]. ) We shall just deal with process trees. (A process tree can always be tree- 
unwound to produce a process graph; this just involves removing cycles, - see [Kok & Rut- 
ten 1988] for details. ) 
a 
4 
b)z 
NOTATION 
Figure 3.5 - 
A tree unwinding 
Process graphs or trees are denoted by g, h, ... 
The nodes of process trees are denoted by s, t, ... The set of all 
nodes of a tree g is denoted by N(g). The roots of trees are & 1, 
The edge-labels of process trees are denoted a, b, c, ... The set of all 
edge-labels of a tree g, the alphabet of g, is written ag. 
For a node sE N(g) the branching degree of s, brd(s), is the number of edges leaving s. 
Let Gmp be the class of all process graphs over a fixed alphabet of cardinality cc and with 
branching degree less than 0 for every node. 
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DEFINITION 3.10 - Bisimulation and projective equivalence 
The notion of bisimulation is used to compare process graphs; if two process graphs bisim- 
ulate each other, then they can in a certain sense do the same thing. 
Bisimulation is closely related to our definition of homomorphism in chapter two. Let g, h 
be process graphs with roots s and t respectively. A relation Rc N(g) x N(h) is a bisintula- 
tion from g to h, written g '(-4 Rh, iff 
(i) Roots are related; sRt. 
(ii) Similar steps are simulated: if there is an edge of g from s to s' labelled a, 
written s -). s, and sRt, then there is an edge of h, t t' such that s' R r. 
= 
a 
S 
S t 
a a 
R 
' 
__ 
(iii) Vice versa (i. e. as (ii) but with the roles of g and h interchanged). 
If there is some R such that g S: 2 Rh then we write g &: I h. The example (below) -shows 
some process trees which bisimulate each other and some that don't. 
EXAMPLE 
a 
Q 
a 
Q 
a a 
,a 
a 
Q 
a 
Q 
b b b 
2 3 9 9 9 
No pair of gs or pair of hs bisimulate each other. Each g bisimulates 
just the matching h, so that g' <-4h', g2 " h2, g' (4 h3, but -, (g, <-4 g2), 
-, (g' " g3), etc. This shows that bisimulation can distinguish between 
choice and interleaving. 
4. 
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Another equivalence on process trees which is less discriminating than bisimulation 
equivalence will be introduced. Projective equivalence identifies two process at level n if 
they 'do the same thing' for at least n steps. 
DEFINITION 3.11 - Projective equivalence 
Consider a path ss s', s", s"', from the root of a process tree g to a node s*. If g is a pro- "$' 7 
cess tree then this path is unique. If there is a transition from the root of g, s' then if g, is 
the subtree rooted at s'we write g ---). g' 
The number of steps of s* from the root, or the distance of s*, written I(s), is the number of 
nodes in this path, and the distance from the root of a given edge is the distance of its terini- 
nal node. For all process trees g and h, define 
(i) g =0 h always. 
(ii) g =n,., h if g ýnh and g ->. g, then there is a edge of h so that h ->. h'. 
(iii) Vice versa. 
If g =-n h for all n then w, e write g =- h, and say that g and h are projectively equivalent. 
A projection operator, ir,, (g), which cuts away everything below level n, can be defined. Its 
effect is straightforward: 
t 
7L3 
Figure 3.6 - 
The effect of the tree 
projection operator 
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THEOREM - Bisimulation is equivalent to projective equivalence in Gtt,,. mý 
Consider finitely branching g and h with roots &I respectively. We have to show that 
g <-4h 4* g =- h 
Proof: For =* notice g =- h <=ý V n. -n. (g) j: ± n. (h) and the result is immediate. For 4--, con- 
sider the sets of 4i5imulations Bo = {(s, jtj, B.., ={RIR is a bisimulation from 7c, +, (g) to 
7rn+l(h)). Form the union B=u. B.. This collection of 'partial' bisimulations between g and h 
forms a tree ordered by set-theoretic union. Moreover, since g and h are finitely branching, 
there are only finitely many extensions of a bisimulationfrOM 71n(g) to 7cn(h) to one from 
Irn+I(g) to 7r. +, (h) so the tree is finitely branching. Furthermore, since Vn- 7rn(g) ±: j 7r. (h) the 
tree must have infinitely many nodes. Hence, by K6nig's lemma, B has an infinite branch. 
Consider the infinite sequence of bisimulations that live along this branch; Ro g R, g R2 ... A 
given R., is a bisimulation from 7rn(g) to 7r,, (h). Thus u,, R. is a bisimulation from g to h. 
Clearly, projective equivalence can 'see' behaviour out to w but no further. Bisimulation, in 
contrast, has perfect -, ', sight, ' as it is defined locally rather than by induction. 
DEFINITION 3.12 - Projective limits 
A projective limit of a process g is a limit of the projections, liM nn(g)- The metric this lim- n 
it is taken with respect to (and hence the existence of these limits) will be discussed next. 
4f . 
'01 
All processes are their own projective limits, but other processes may be as well. We 
shall see this in the next example. First however we shall impose some metric structure 
using the projection functions, so that we can define the limit above formally. 
3.5.2 Metric spaces of process trees 
The standard approach to metric space semantics starts from the assumption that pro- 
cesses (or their traces, failure sets etc. ) can be thought of a points in a topological space. 
This space is a metric space -a distance function or metric allows us to determine how far 
processes are from each other; this difference should depend-on how semantically different 
the processes are. Various metrics and various spaces (spaces whose points are traces, 
sets of failure sets etc. ) correspond to various notions of semantic difference. 
We shall start with a space whose points are process trees and whose metric is based on 
projective equivalence to illustrate the idea. This space will be seen to be inadequate; sever- 
al solutions are suggested before we return to the main problem; defining metric spaces of 
observations which reflect the testing equivalence of the last few sections. 
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DEFINITION 3.13 - The projection-induced pseudornetric on process trees 
There is a natural way of assigning a distance between processes based on the projection 
operator. The projection-induced pseudometric defines processes to be further away the 
sooner they fail to be projectively equivalent; 
2-M if, (9 -=nh) and Vm < n. g E:, h cl, (g, h) = 
10 
otherwise 
This metric is unsatisfactory because it does not distinguish between some processes, 
that is, not all the (Gmp, dii) are metric spaces; they are merely pseudometric spaces. To 
show that this is so we must exhibit two processes, g and h say with dpi(g, h) =0 and g#h. 
EXAMPLE - Two different processes in Gcc, z; O that have non-zero distance. 
- Consider g=Z at' and h= (Y, an) + a'ý (This is just notation for the process tree with one 
branch of length one with label a, one with length two and both labels a and so on, (g) and 
the same plus an infinitely long bmnch (h). ) 
A picture may help the reader to visualise, the processes g and h: e 
Figure 3.7 - Two processes which prove that (Got, p, dpi) 
is not a metric space; g: p, - h but di(g, h) = 0. 
The process h is the projective limit of g. 
It is obvious that g 9ý h. To show that di(g, h) =0 consider the following lemma. 
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LF, MMA - Relating bisimulation and projective equivalence. 
Consider two process trees g, h. If g is finitely branching and g and h are countablY long, 
then bisimulation of all projections guarantees bisimulation of the original structures; 
n. sa n. (h) => g <-4 
Proof - [Klop 1989). 
It is clear that njg) ±2 njh) for our two processes, so, by the lemma, g ±1 h. Furthermore 
since g =- h <-* V n. 7r. (g) ±: j n,, (h) we have g=h and the veracity of the counterexample follows. 
Metric spaces can be produced from the projection-induced pseudometric, but not for 
GKO. NO; the problem in our example is the infinite branching of h. 
There are several alternatives; we can restrict ourselves to a smaller space such as 
GmHO with (x < No, but this has the disadvantage that projective limits sometimes do not 
exist, and hence we c4nnot have a complete metric space. 
Alternatively, the congruence induced by projective equivalence can be divided out. This 
leaves us with a metric space, but not necessarily a complete one; a further metric comple- 
tion is needed. 
These considerations leave us well-armed to attack the main problem; defining and inves- 
tigating metric spaces of observations of interval event structures. 
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3.6 Metric spaces and bets 
This section will be devoted to the construction of two metric spaces based on untimed 
bets and strict-timed bets. The obvious construction (analogous to definition 3.13) is to con- 
struct a space whose points are interval event structures and whose metric assigns a 
smaller distance to. processes the longer all bets made- about them have the same result. A 
few technical details will cloud, but not totally obscure, this simple idea. In order to restrict 
ourselves to set rather *than proper classes, we assumed a fixed set Eb,, as before. 
The idea of using metric spaces to give a semantics to concurrent systems has been popu- 
larised by a group under de Bakker (see, of instance, [de Bakker & Mayer 19881). Similar 
constructions can be found in [Goltz & Loogen 1987], [Kok & Rutten 1988], and [Reed 
1988]. The work of Reed and Roscoe [op. cit. ] is, perhaps, of most relevance to this section, 
as there too the presence of real-time is important. However, our approach is strictly obser- 
vational rather than denotational, and is rather simpler. (The results of the first few sections 
of the chapter indicate that we need no more complication than strict-timed bets give us, in 
order to distinguish between all observation ally-different behaviours. ) This work, then, may 
ýe seen as a counterpart to Reed's; we have different ideas of what 'observation, ' 
4 concurrency, ' and 'behaviour' mean, and hence we are exploring a different point in the con- 
currency semantics design space. 
It will be important to have a metric that reflects the intuition that two I. E. S. are closer the 
longer they simulate each other. Simulation will be captured by the betting equivalences, - 
what does 'the longer' mean ? 
For untimed bets, we must use the sequence order of M just as we used depth for pro- 
cess graphs; hence we need a projection function on M(3). In the strict-timed case, a con- 
struction for I. E. S. s like truncation of L. I. E. S. s is needed, as the temporal analogue of 
projection. Suitable operators are then: - 
DEFINITION 3.14 - Projection of LE. S. s 
Given an I. E. S. 3, and the set of sequences generated by 3, §eq(S ), the projection of 3 to 
the m1htransition, written ir. (S), is defined to be the set of sequences 
krn(PIP2 
... Pn) I PIP2 ... Pn E §M(! 3)) 
where the projection operator on sequences is as given in definition 3.7. 
DEFINITION 3.15 - Truncation of LE. S. s 
If an I. E. S. 3 is only allowed to run for a limited period, say from t=0 to t=T, only part of 
some history will be seen. The possible histories seen will be precisely L., ', for L cz jM! 5). 
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Define 3 truncated at T, written 3. #, T, as the I. E. S. which can display just the behaviours 
L#*T. This I. E. S. can be characterised in the usual '... is the I. E. S. (LE', Con', <ý) where' 
way: 
Suppose 3= (LE, Con, <b); then -9, *T is the I. E. S. (LE', Con'. <br) where 
(i) LE' =def (aIae LE, begin(a) < T). For a ri LE', a =- [r, rf] iff a =- [r., rr] C- LE 
where i'f'= rf if rt <T and rý =T otherwise. 
(ii) Klon=dr ( cr) LE' Ic (=- Con ) 
<bI : --def ( ((rt(,;, at(, )), (rig)', a, (2))) I &q, ), aq, )), (r, (2), a, (2))) E <b, 
riciý = r, (i) if rt(i) < T, rqj; T otherwise) 
4l 
The obvious definition of a metric generalising definition 3.13 is then in the untimed case; 
2-'n 
djEs(2, ! 3') = 
and in the strict-timed case; 
dý, Es(9,3, )=2 
10 
if -, (n. (S) = n. (T)) and Vn<m. Tc. (! 3) = n. (S') 
other-wise 
if -, (! 3 +, T -ys 3'., -T) &Vt<T. 3 
otherwise 
These metrics have the same problem as before; there are processes S and S' with S# S' 
but the distances between them, du]ES(! 39 5% and dýEEs(! 3,3% are zero. For this reason we 
divide out the equivalence caused by -z. Suppose that cIES is the class of all computational 
interval event structures under consideration. Then 
DEFINITION 3.16 - Observational equivalence classes and metric spaces 
The set of equivalence classes of a computational structure 5E cIES under -z, written 
[! 3]z, is just the set of all things that -z it; [S]z = (S' 1 S' -z S ). The factored class [cIES]z 
is then ([! 3]z 1SE cIES). (From now on, [S]z stands for [3] or [! 3]y,, dz for d or dy., and so 
on. ) 
The metric associated with [clES] is; 
2-1 if -, =7c. (! 3')) and Vn<m. n. (! 3) = n. (! 3') 
0 otherwise 
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while the metric associated with [cIES]-r is 
2-T if -, (S -#*T -r T#") &Vt<T. S 
0 otherwise 
LEMMA - Well-defined metrics 
David Murphy 
We have to show that the metrics d and dy- given above are well-defined. For the 
untimed case this reduces to showing that untimed betting equivalence is a congruence of 
projection, i. e. that for all MEN. 
7r. (S) - 4* VTE [3]. 74. (T) - 
While for the timed case, this reduces to showing that strict-timed betting equivalence is a 
congruence of restriction, i. e. that for all TER". 
! 3+*T -YS! 3'+ -T <=> VT C- [! 3]ys. 
5,. FT -ys 3,4, 
T 
- Proof. (Untimed case. ) Note that -9 - 5- =* Vni cN. 7r,. (! 3) "s n. (S') so we 
just have to 
show that 
5- S' 4* V S' e [3]. -9, - S, 
which follows by definition. 
(Timed case. ) Note thatS -y, S' => VT (=- R+. 3(,, *T -y, -9'#, 
T so we just have to show that 
3 --ys 3, 'tý VT (=- [. '5]ys. -T -ys S, 
which follows by definition. 
THEOREM - Metric spaces of observational difference 
The spaces ([clES], d) and ([clES]y.,, dyý) are both metric spaces. 
Proof. Properties (i), (iii) and (iv) of definition AM (the definition of metric spaces) hold 
since -z is an equivalence relation and since JES]z is the factored space generated by that 
equivalence. That leaves the triangle inequality; 
V x, y, z cz [cIES]z. dz(x, y) + dz(y, z) 2: dz(x, z) 
For the untimed case, define mx. y =ms. t. -, (n .. (X) = x. (Y)) &vn<M. 7rn(X) = Iýnffl- 
Then note that either mx. y = myz, in which case mxz = 2mxy, and the inequality holds, or we 
have mx. y > myz or myz > mxy. From symmetry we need only take one, so suppose that 
MX. Y > MYZ. 
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Now, obviously, n,, (X) = n,, Q) implies r. (X) &(Y) for o<n, so 7rmxy(X) = 7rmx. y(n 
implies that irmyz(X) = 7rmyz(Y). But 7umyz(Y) 7rmyz(Z) so we have 7rmyz(X) = 7rmyz(Z) 
and hence mx7- ý: myýz and thus d(x, z): 5 d(x, y) + d(y, z) as required. 
For the timed case, the proof is similar. Define txy to be the T such that -, (X+*T -T YeT) 
and Vt<T. X#" Y#*'. Then note that either tx. y = tyz, in which case txz = 2tx. y, and the 
inequality holds, Vr we have txy > tyz or tyz > txy. From symmetry we need only take. one, 
so suppose txy > tyz. 
Now, obviously, ! 3, -T _Y, ! 3/. v*T implies ! 3-, u --,, ! 3'#-u for U<T, so X#, tx. y --y., Tetx-y (or 
rather, X#*t -y- Y#, t for any t< txy) implies that X,,, tyz -7, Y. P'ty. z' But Y-#'tY- z -y, Z#'ty, z 
so we have Xo*tyz --jý Z#'ty. z and hence txz'ý: tyz and thus dz(x, z)!! ý dz(x, y) as required. 
We have been rather cavalier about the treatment of infinite structures in this chapter. 
There is a good reason for this; we can only have infinitely 'long' computational I. E. S. s (ones 
that go on for all time); infinitely 'fat' ones, - ones with infinite nondeterminism or infinite 
density, - are disall6wed. Furthermore, infinitely long structures are made up of a countable 
number of labelled events, all with defined transitions, and all finitely caused, so, as we 
remarked earlier, if two infinite computational LE. S. s differ, they do so at some finite time. 
(The class of infinite computational structures, then, in some sense isolates those infinite 
I. E. S. s that are recursively generable. ) Hence, any Cauchy sequence of computational I. E. S. s 
will tend to a comýutational I. E. S.; in particular, &IES]yý, dy, ) is complete: 
THEOREM - The metric space ([clES]y,, dys) is complete 
Consider a Cauchy sequence of equivalence classes of I. E. S. s, [! 31]y.,, [! 32]y.,, ... We will 
construct aS so that [! 3]y. is the limit of the sequence, and so that 5 is computational. 
Proof (following [Goltz & Loogen 1987]). Since [! 32]y-, ... is a Cauchy sequence, 
there is a monotone increasing sequence of natural numbers, ki, k2, ... such that 
vm, nEN. m ýt k. =* dy, ([Sk. ]y', [3mly. ) < 2-n 
In other words, for any TER, there is always a point in the sequence after which we can 
be sure that the structure from t=0 up to t=T is fixed: it is just the structure 3k, +'T dis- 
plays, where k. is the first integer greater than T. 
Now, the construction L]y. is insensitive to bijection of labels, so we can suppose that 
the ! 3ks are (LE,,, Con,,,, <4,, ) where LE,, c; LE. for n :5m. In particular, since with m=h we 
have ko ý: k. =: ý dy-([3k. ]y.,, [3k. 'jy-) 
< 2-n so we can assume that for o<n 
pk, ý-n] y,. Thus, assuming ! 3ýmV*n 'jknýen 
involves no contradiction. (Y) 
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Define S as the structure such that ! 3+, n = 'jkný. n . 
Now, 
.3 
is a well-defined I. E. S. since by 
virtue of (v) it has only a countable number of transitions and hence only countable Con-sets 
and orderings. 
Further, since each Sk. are computational by definition, S is computational in any interval 
and hence computational in general. 
We need to show that [! 3]y- is a limit point. Note that 
dy'([, 'Iy, ', [knly-) < 2-n 
Then, for any F, < 2'-', there is an m such that dy., ([! 3]ys, [%j-Ys) < c, namely m=k. - 
Hence [! 3]y- is a limit point. But we have already shown that it is computational. Hence it is 
in cIES and the space is complete. 
4! 
This completeness means that betting equivalence is defined over all the structures that 
will be of interest to us. 
One final observation before leaving the chapter: notice that we have the capacity with our 
metric spaces to do tiniewise refinenzent; we can develop an I. E. S. to the point where it 
behaves as we desire using untimed bets, then we can examine timing considerations using 
timed bets. Or, we can mix timewise refinement with conventional functional refinement, 
dealing with timing considerations as and when they occur. 
The dichotomy between functional behaviour, - the what of the system, - and fiming 
behaviour, - the when, - is a common one in this thesis: we will often see two kinds of struc- 
ture, one derived from a concentration on functionality, the other derived from a consideration 
of timing. 
A good example of this phenomena is the two kinds of substructure of an I. E. S. we have 
discussed, one generated from restriction to a time, - the of this chapter, - and the other 
generated by restriction to a set of events, - the 13 tA of chapter two. 
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Appendix, Some topology 
DEFINITION A3.1 - Meuic spaces, pseudo-metric spaces, and ultrametrics. A metric space 
M= (M, d) consists of a non-empty set M and a mapping d: MxM -> R' (the nonegative 
reals) with 
(i) V x, ye MA(x, y) = d(y, x) and 
(ii) V x, y, z c= M. d(x, y) + d(y, z) 2: d(x, z) and 
(iii) Vx, yeM. d(x, y)=Oifx=yand 
(iv) V x, yEM. d(x, y) =0 =* x=y. 
A pseudo-metric space satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii), while an ultrametric space satisfies the 
stronger version of (iii) :Vx, y, zeM. max[ d(x, y), d(y, z)) ýt d(x, z). 
DEFINITION A3.2 - Topological spaces. A topological space T= (T, T) consists of a set T 
of points together with T, a set of subsets of T, the open sets of T or the topology on T, 
satisfying 
(i) T, 0 r= T and-,. 
(ii) u, vET =* u r) v E: - T and 
(iii) ui ET =* Y ui c= T. I 
DEFINITION A3.3 - Cauchy sequences, convergence. A sequence xi in a metric space M= 
(M, d) is a Cauchy sequence when given any e>0 there exists an N such that d(xn, xm) <c 
for all m, n>N. A sequence xi converges to x when given any c>0 there exists an N such 
that for all n ýý N. d(x,,, x) < F- 
THEOREM - Any convergent sequence in a metric space is a Cauchy sequence. 
DEFINITION A3.4 - Completeness. A complete metric space M= (M, d) is one in which 
every Cauchy sequence converges to a point in M. 
DEFINITION A3.5 - Covers, subcovers and compactness. 
U A cover for a set A is a class U of sets such that A c: u ý=- U u. A subcover of a given cover 
some V c: U that is still a cover. 
A space T is compact if every cover consisting of open sets of T has a finite subcover. 
THEOREM - In a metric space M= (M, d), compactness is equivalent to requiring that for 
any XgM, which has a convergent subsequence, that subsequence must converge to an ele- 
ment of A 
THEOREM - Any compact metric space is complete. 
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DEFINITION A3.6 - Continuity, homeomorphism and Isometry. 
David Murphy I 
A function f: T -) U from one topological space T= (T, T) to another U= (U, U) is contin- 
uous if ueU =* f -1 (u) (=- T. If both f and f -1 are continuous and both are one-to-one, then f is 
said to be a homeomorphism. Similarly a one-to-one function f: M -ý N from the base set of 
one metric space M= (M, d) to that of another N= (N, e) is an isometry if it preserves dis- 
tance; e(f (x), f (y)ý = d(x, y) for all x, YEM. 
DEFINITION A3.7 - Closure, limit points and density. 
Given a topological space T and a subset A of T, a point x is a limit point of A if every 
open set containing x also contains some point of A other than x. 
The closure of A in T is the union of A and all the limit points of A in T, written cl(A). A 
subset A is said to be dense in T if cl(A) = T, and closed if A= cl(A). 
THEOREM - The closure of A, cl(A), is the smallest closed set containing A. 
DEFINITION A3.8 - Compactification and completion. 
A compactift cation of a space T is a pair (f, U) where U is a compact space and f is a 
homeomorphism, of T onto a dense subspace of U. A completion of a metric space M= (M, d) 
is a pair (f, N) such that N is a complete metric space and f is a isometry of M into N such 
that f (M) is dense. n N. 
THEOREM - Every metric space has a completion; further these completions are unique up 
to isometry. 
DEFINITION A3.9 - Induced Hausdorff metric for subsets. 
Let M= (M, d) be a metric space and P(M) be the class of all compact non-empty sub- 
sets of M. Define a new metric dh(x, A) for xEM and Ae P(M) by dh(x, A) = inf ( d(x, a) I 
a rz A ). The Hausdorff metricfor subsets, dit(A, B) for A, BEP(M) is defined as 
dn(A, B) = max f M(di, (a, B) Iae A), aup(d,, (A, b) Ib c- B) ) 
The space (P(M), d1l) is metric. 
DEFINITION A3.10 - Contraction maps. A mapping f from a metric space M= (M, d) onto a 
metric space N= (N, e), f: M -4 N is a contraction if there is a constant, 0<K. < 1, such 
that for all x, ycM. e(f (x), f (y)) !ýK d(x, y). 
THEOREM (Banach) - Fixed points exist. If f: M -4 M is a contraction over a complete met- 
ric space M then f has a unique fixed point in M, written tif. 
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Interlude - Categories of behaviours 
David Murphy 
In this interlude we will suggest two pieces of formalism that might be used to connect the 
material of the previous chapter with the more categorical techniques of chapters two and 
four. In both cases, we just sketch the (rather involved) machinery and show why it is appo- 
site or, at least, plausible; a real application is left for further work. 
Categories of metric spaces 
In order to compare our betting equivalences with the work of chapter two, it is necessary 
to rephrase our metric spaces in a more categorical setting. There is a good reason for treat- 
ing metric spaces as a particular kind of category, which we shall outline. This connection 
between metric spaces and categories was popularised by [Lawvere 19731. In this section 
we will only rely on the triangle inequality and the property d(x, x) ýt 0, hence Lawvere's 
term 'generalised metric spaces. ' 
The essential idea is that many mathematical structures can be represented as categories 
Whose hom-functoris valued not necessarily over Set, but over some closed category V. 
(So hom(a, b) e- obi V. ) We will discuss three examples, our aim being to make our treat- 
ment of metric spaces more plausible by preparing the way. 
Let P= (P, : 5) be a poset, and denote by P(x, y) the truth-value of x !5y, so P(X, Y) is 
I true just when x: 5:, y. Then the transitivity and reflexivity laws for s are just the entailments 
M X, Y, Z r= P. P(x, y) A P(y, Z) ý- P(x, Z) 
true ý- P(x, x) 
This suggests viewing P as a category whose set of objects is P and where there is an 
arrow from x to y just when x !ýy. ne hom-functor for this category is valued over the two- 
point category 2, (whose objects are true and false, and where there is just one nonidenti- 
ty arrow false -4 true) so that if hoM(x, y) = true then x:! ý y. 
-0- Let M be a category, and denote by hom(x, y) the abstract set of M-morphisms from 
an object x to an object y. Here the hom-functor is valued over Set; the abstract set compris- 
ing the product of the hom-set of morphisms from x to y and the hom-set of morphisms from 
y to z has an arrow from it in Set to the (abstract) hom-set of morphisms from x to z; this is 
just what composition means in M. Furthermore, there is an arrow from the one-element set 
I in Set to the abstract set of morphisms from x to itself, this is just what identity means. 
So, using -4 for an arrow in Set: 
x, y, ze obj(M). hom(x, y) x hom(y, z) --> hom(x, z) 
1 --> hoM(x, x) 
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Let M= (M, d) be a metric space. Then we certainly have 
V x, y, z Ez- M. d(x, y) + d(y, z) k d(x, z), 
Vxe M. d(x, x) k0 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
Thus, associated with a given metric space, there is a chaotic category whose objects are 
the points of the metric space. (In a chaotic category there is an arrow between any two 
objects. ) The und-eilying category that the hom-functor is valued over is R+ (whose objects 
are the nonnegative reals plus infinity, and where there is an arrow from x to y just when x :5 
y). Composition in R+ gives us the triangle inequality, and identity in R+ gives us d(x, x) = 0. 
In summary, we can view posets as categories whose hom-functors take values over the 
category 2, categories as categories whose hom-functors take values over the category Set 
and metric spaces as categories whose hom-functors take values over the category R'. Each 
of these underlying categories V is closed (i. e. symmetric monoidal with a right adjoint to the 
tensoring endofunctor -0 b). Composition in V represents well-known properties of the 
structures concerned. V is endowed with a tensor product which often represents properties 
of the identity in the 
, 
overlying structure. We have seen the analogies: - 
,0 
Structure 
Metric space, Me 
Category, C 
Poset, P 
V-valued category 
hom-values for 
stnicture 
nonnegative reals 
abstract sets 
truth values 
objects in V 
composition and domain of domain of 
identity laws composition law identity law 
mapping 
entailment 
morphism in V 
sum zero 
cartesian product one element set 
conjunction 
tensor in V 
true 
unit for tensor 
in V 
The table suggests that we should pursue the analogy for metric spaces a little further 
interpreting ý! as morphism in R+, + as tensor, and 0 as 1. Then 
hom(x, z) =z-x if z ý: x 
0 otherwise 
If we denote by a long dash, -, this truncated subtraction, then we have 
(ykz-X)<=>(x+y 22z) 
This is interesting because it indicates an adjointness between the internal hoM in R, -, 
and the internal tensor, +, and hence a natural one-to-one correspondence between the R+ 
morphisms y ---> hom(X, z) and the R+ morphisms x-y -4 z. 
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To sum up, then, we can view a metric space as a category whose objects are the points 
of the space, and whose morphisms are valued over the closed category R+. This interpreta- 
tion places the metric spaces of the preceding chapter on a categorical foundation, which 
should be useful for comparing them to other models, such as the categories of chapter two. 
It also has the advantage of being part of a general programme of viewing mathematical 
structures as categories whose hom-functors are valued over a closed category: this 
approach allows ffs to predict many of the properties of the structures we seek to represent 
uniformly via categorical properties of the underlying closed category. 
If we view our metric space structure in this categorical framework, certain difficulties are 
avoided. Consider three categories, Bet(cIES)z whose points are computational I. E. S. s that 
start at time 0. Suppose there is an arTow in Bet(cIES)z from 3 to S' just when 3 ->z T. We 
can recover the metric structure we had previously by endowing these three categories with 
an endofunctor -o'. Furthermore, the category derived from the strict-timed metric space, for 
instance, can then be viewed as chaotic 2-category structure, - there is a 2-arTow on every 
isomorphism of Bet(eIES)y-, and the 2-hom functor is valued over R', and similarly for the 
untimed space. This approach gives us the logic of betting as arrows, and the metric struc- 
ture as 2-arrows, plus -a representation of the &-timed case, all within the same framework. 
We shall not explore Lawvere's interpretation of a metric space any further, except to 
remark upon a connection between BOrder and R+; just as objects of QOSet can be seen 
sets enriclied ovýr BOrder, so, as we have seen, metric spaces can be seen as sets 
enriched over R+. 
Next we suggest a different way of associating time with structures. Again the category 
R+ will be important, but now we will be more interested in behaviours. 
The time-evolution of interval event structures 
It is possible to describe the time-evolution of I. E. S. s using sheaves. An execution of an 
I. E. S. is just a L. I. E. S. If we can observe causality, then this is just a poset (all conflict has 
been resolved, so we are left with a set of partially-ordered transitions). Sheaf theory will 
give us a natural means of associating a poset with a point time (or, indeed, with a point in 
any topological space). 
A poset A- = (A, : ýý) is said to be embedded in another poset A' = (A', just when AC A' 
and a :5b =* a : 5' b and a': 5' Y& (a, Y) cA =* a': 5 Y (so that A' agrees with A on all of A 
but may have additional orders on things outside A). An indexed set C= ((A,, : 51), (A2, : 52)) 
..., (An, of posets is said to be compatible if (A,, : 51) is embedded in (A2, : 52) is embed- 
ded in 
... 
is embedded in (An, -:! ý, 
). 
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To describe the time-evolution of an I. E. S. 13, then we need to associate some poset with 
each reR, or, equivalently, some set of compatible posets with each interval (ri, r2) of R. 
We will give a very ragged introduction to the idea of sheaves; a standard text is 
[Tennison 1975], from which these definitions are taken. A more interesting application of 
sheaf theory will be very briefly sketched in the interlude preceding chapter five, for which 
this section lays theýgroundwork. 
My thanks are due to Barney Hilken for suggesting this diversion. 
Suppose T is a topological space. A presheaf F of sets on T is given by two pieces of infor- 
mation: - 
(i) For each open U of Xa set F(U) (called the set of sections of F over U). 
(H) For each pair of opens U, V of X, a restriction map pu from FM to F(U) v 
such that 
VU. pu =id uu 
and 
u VU, V, W. (Wcvc: u)=: > (p w= Pvw 0 puo 
Let T be a topological space and Fa presheaf of sets over T. is called a separated 
presheaf iff it satisfies: - 
Suppose that U is an open set of T, and that U Uj- c- j Uj is an open cover for U, 
and 0, Cj r= F(U) are two sections of F such that 
Vj E J. PUU 
i 
(Cj) =P 
UU 
i 
(C) 
'llien ci = cj. 
If additionally, the following condition is satisfied, then F is called a sheaf of sets over T. 
Suppose that U is an open set of T, that U=U. j c- j Uj is an open cover for U, and 
that Ci, jEJ is a family of sections of F with VjE J. Cj E= F(Uj) such that 
ViJE J. pu luj r) uI 
(ci pui uj n ui 
then there is a CEF(U) such that Vj E J. pUU. (c) = cj. 
i 
In other words, in a sheaf we can define things piecemeal on a cover, and if they are con- 
sistent on the overlaps, then they define something unique on all of U. 
The application for us is obvious; take R with the usual topology as T, and associate with 
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an open interval a set of compatible posets representing the progress of the execution over 
that interval. 
For an open interval of R, (ri, r2), and a given execution L of . 3, define F(ri, r2) as the com- 
patible set (L.. r Ire (ri, r2)). T'his is finite since we demanded finite density. 
For U= (rl, r2), V= (r3, r4) g U, the restriction map pu just t es (fer I rE 
(ri, r2) ) to VA 
rE (r3, r4)). This gives us a presheaf of sets of posets on R, since F(r3, r4) g F(rl, r2). 
Suppose (ri, r2) is any open of R and ((rjo), r2i, )) Ij rz J) is a cover of (ri, r2). Take f, -, Lj c 
F(U). Clearly F is a separated presheaf since pu (Lj) = [L,. r Ir ri Uj) = pU Ui Ui 
Finally, F is a sheaf since p 
uj 
n (I 
uj 
uj uj 1) = (L,, r Ir rz Uj r) Uj) p Ui r) U, 
There is a more categorical way of dealing with sheaves. Suppose C is a category whose 
objects are sets, and that the objects of C will be sections of some sheaf F. If U C: V, then we 
will require that thete is an arrow in C from F(V) to F(U). (In the case C Set this reduces 
to the previous definition. ) 
Consider 0(7)P, the opposite of the category of open sets of T with arrows as inclusions 
(there is one arrow in 0(7)'P from U to V if V c: U). Then the obvious functor derived from F, 
F say, is functori6l. from 0(7)'P -ý C. Thus, in order to define a presheaf, we have to give a 
topological space T, a category C and a functor F: 0(7)P --) C. 
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4 
David Murphy 
An Algebraic Entelechy-, 
Interval Process Algebra 
In actionfaithful, and in honour clear; 
Who broke no promise, serv'd no private end, 
Who gain'd no title, and lost nofriend, 
Ennoble by himsey'. by all approv'd, 
And prais'd. unenvy'd by the muse he lov'd. 
Pope 
This chapter is devoted to presenting a more concrete application for interval event struc- 
tures than we have hitherto indulged in. A timed process algebra is presented: terms in this 
algebra can be naturally implemented as interval event structures. The laws obeyed by the 
algebra are examined, together with an operational semantics, an axiomatic semantics and a 
denotational semantics. The fiill abstraction problem is investigated for the algebra with 
respect to a notion, of behavioural equivalence; we show that those terms that are 
behaviourally equivalent under the denotational are just the terms that can be shown to be 
equivalent using the laws of the axiomatic semantics. The problem is treated without consid- 
ering recursion. We also discuss, en passent, the interpretation of process-algebraic con- 
structs in Pdtri nets. 
The main references to the material of this chapter are [Hennessey 1988], from which 
some material is taken, [Kiviatkoivska 1989] and [Bednarczyk 1988]. Our process algebra is 
derived from both CCS [Milner 1989], timed CSP [Reed 1988], and standard (theoretical) 
CSP [Brookes et al. 1984]; its semantics draws heavily on the material of chapters one and 
two, since the meaning of a term in our algebra will be an interval event structure. We begin 
by defining our process algebra. 
4.0 IPA -A timed process algebra 
Interval Event Structures are quite detailed and implementa ' 
tional models of concurrency. 
It seems natural, therefore, to provide a slightly more abstract and structured framework for 
the description and implementation of real-timed systems. Process algebras have been popu- 
lar as-tools for reasoning about and implementing atomic-eyent concurrency; formalisms such 
as CSP (op cit. ), COSY [Lauer & Shields 1983], CCS [Milner 1989] & SCCS Wilner 1983] 
have achieved some success. However, there has been comparatively little work on timed 
process algebras (as distinct from real-time languages); the only mature approach we know 
of in this direction is timed CSP (referred to in Oxford as TCSP, a term used for Theoretical 
CSP elsewhere). 
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Our process algebra, which will be referred to as interval process algebra, while notation- 
ally similar to both timed CSP and CCS, is rather different semantically from either of those 
formalisms, because we intend it to have a natural model in the world of interval event struc- 
tures. It maintains the distinction between nondeterminism and parallelism that is the central 
tenet of the non-interleaving school mentioned in the introduction. There are many ways of 
building a process algebra 'on top of' event structures: this model falls midway between the 
poset approach 6TIBoudol & Castellani 1987] & [Pratt et al. 1989] and the interleaving alge- 
bras modelled in [Winskel 19841. 
The intention in creating this process algebra is to provide a framework for constructing an 
interval event structure using the usual techniques associated with process algebras (such 
as the use of refinement calculi based on algebraically formulated notions of equivalence). 
This approach should also provide a 'bridge' between the world of the last three chapters 
and the world of process algebra. 
A process can be thought of as a means of constraining the set of all interval events struc- 
tures, leaving just those that display some required behaviour. A process, then, is a means 
of characterising behaviour. Hence constructive activity with processes is complementary to 
constraining activity with specifications. Our aim in, for instance, writing the bar specification 
of chapter one, is to define precisely which interval event structures (and, hence, at a higher 
level of abstraction, processes) are valid implementations of our intuitions. We will now 
develop a. theory of processes which will enable us to impose our intuitions on interval event 
structures via the processes that they represent. 
DEFINITION 4.0 - IPA, an interval process algebra 
We shall adopt a syntaxt similar to that of timed CSP. Suppose that we have a set of 
events E, with typical element e. For the purposes of the process algebra we will assume 
that the set is given, and finite; we will not inquire into the structure of its elements. There is 
also the special set of events whose elements are wait t for all te R+, the positive reals; 
this set of waits is discussed below. We shall use a BNF-like syntax writing 
Action :: = eI wait t 
to indicate that an action is either some event e 4=- E or a wait. The event wait t does 
nothing but occupies time t. We shall also introduce the abbreviations skip and stop for 
the additional cases skip -=drfwait 0 and stop =da wait -. The use of these terms will be 
discussed later, they are not actions, since 0 and - are not elements of R*, but they do have 
a technical use. Note that although Action is uncountable in general, for any given IPA 
process it will only contain a countable number of wait ts, and hence will be countable 
provided E is. 
t- The particular intuitions behind this notation will be explained later in this section; the confident reader 
may safely skip from the end of this definition to section 4.1. 
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Processes can be formed from events in the usual way. A process is either a single action, 
or the nondeterministic composition of two processes, or the parallel composition of two pro- 
cesses (with a given synchronisation set S= (P $ Q)), or the sequential composition of two 
processes, or a variable process, x, which is used in the definition of recursion, where the 
recursion operator It-. - 
binds x in px. - 
Proc:: = Actidh I Proc + Proc I Proc S11 Proc I Proc; Proc IxI px. Proc 
410, 
The motivations for the various operators and their practical uses will now be discussed. 
4.1 An introduction to Interval Process Algebra 
We begin with the notion of an event or action. These have observable occurrences, - we 
can see events happening and observe their effects. We shall collect the names of all the 
events that we are interested in into a set, E. For technical reasons we shall demand that 
this set is finite. Each element of the set, each event, has a duration associated with it. This 
duration will be used to build up timed structures of events. 
i 
The occurrence of nothing, of a pause, will carry the name wait t, where t is the duration 
of the pause in some suitable prespecified units. These occurrences are interesting, too, so 
we shall f6rm a sýt Action =Eu (waitt It ER+). (Cf. [Hennessy 1983]). 
We shall assume that all events have a fixed, finite non-zero duration: no event can take 
no time, or infinite time. We shall also assume that there is a function A: Action -) Time 
which returns this time. (Times are reals, but we prefer to write Time rather than R' in order 
to make our intention clear. ) Our aim in making the proviso on durations is to ensure that 
only a finite computation can take place in a finite time on afinite machine (it can be argued 
that infinite machines incorporating unbounded angelic nondeterminism or unbounded paral- 
lelism are capable of infinite computation in a finite time). The requirement that only finite 
computation is possible in finite time is seen as basic to the well-foundedness of timed mod- 
els in [Joseph & Goswami 1985]; we agree with this analysis. 
Notice that the requirement that the duration of all events and waits is greater than zero 
and less than infinity means that skip and stop are not strictly part of the syntax of IPA. 
The wait skip will fulfil a technical r6le like that of V in CSP; it is not strictly a valid pro- 
cess. The problem is that it lasts no time, (and hence is unphysical). This durationlessness 
can lead to livelock if carelessly used. We will return to this point latter. 
The wait stop, on the other hand, is less dangerous and we will allow it to be used as an 
ordinary process, breaking the rule about durations being finite. So, the user can write a pro- 
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cess involving stop, but will not be allowed to use skip. The aim of writing a process alge- 
bra expression is, naYvely, to provide a description of some set of events that captures 
certain salient features about their order of occurrence. Further structure is given which indi- 
cates how certain sets of events may be thought of as interacting in certain ways. This 
structure gives us some idea of how a machine which could perform the desired actions in the 
desired order might. be built. We can think of a process as a specification for a machine, - it 
comprises a set . of events constrained to happen in a certain order, together with a name for 
this specification. Process are combined using process combinators which correspond to 
ways of building larger machines from smaller ones, that is, to ways of adding more structure 
to the sets of events in each process. The various combinators, 11, +, and ; add different order- 
ings of events to the orderings already present in the processes they combine. 
The simplest useful process is something that engages in one event and then stops. Sup- 
pose we have given the name drink to the event of taking a drink. (Of course, we could 
have given the event any name we liked, but dog, say, or WhoWasWittgensteinAnyway 
are not very helpful signifiers, especially as we shall soon (in postmodernist vein) blur the 
distinction betweeq processes and their names. ) A prescription for a machine, named 
Drinker say, which can engage in just one event named drink and then stop would be 
Drinker =dd drink; stop 
its The =df symbol defines the process name on its left to be the name of the definition on 
right. The definition is one of a process that can engage in one event, drink, and then 
(indicated by the sequential conibinator _; _) stop. 
A definition like a; b indicates that the 
event a happens then b does. We can construct a more accurate model of a drinker, called 
Drinker2, using further sequential combinations. (Where necessary for clarity we use 
placeholders with operator symbols, so -; - 
indicates that ; is an infix operator that takes two 
arguments on either side of it. ) 
The process 
Drinker2 =dd tuss le ; serve ; drink ; wait 5 
is a drinker which can engage in the event tussle, and then can engage in the event serve, 
and then can engage in the event drink, and then will wait five units of time before terminat- 
ing. Notice that the previous drinker never terminated, as the event stop, once started, 
lasts forever. 
So far we can just enforce one thing beginning after another has ended. This is not quite 
enough. We need to introduce something that will enable us to describe more than one event 
happening at once. The solution we adopt is to introduce the concurrency operator, _11- which defines the parallel composition of two processes. 
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The process, P, defined by 
P =df a 11 b 
can be thought of as a process which engages in the event a and the event b simultaneously; 
it continues engaging in the events a and b until both have finished. Thus if we had a pro- 
cess, Eater, say-, 'which represents tussling at the bar, being served a packet of quail- 
flavoured crisps, eating them, and pausing afterwards to allow any colic to settle, 
Eater =df tussle; serve ; eat ; wait 10 
then we could represent a couple, one buying and consuming food and the other drink by 
Couple =df (tussle; serve; eat ; wait 10) 11 
(tussle'; serve'; drink; wait 5) 
This process starts engaging in the two strands at the same time and finishes when both 
have finished. 
We shall discuss interference between events in processes on either side of - 
11 
- 
later. 
Notice, though, that here the two tussle events and the two serve events are entirely sepa- 
rate and non-interfering. Each occurrence of the same event has the same name, but events 
that are genuinely different, like two different people tussling at a bar, must have different 
names; hence the decorating prime. 
The same- person tussling twice before being served and eating, would be represented by 
TusslesomeEater "": d, f tussle ; tussle ; serve; eat ; wait 10 
More realistically, a group of three eaters and drinkers, with one person buying all the 
crisps and one all the drinks might be represented by the process 
Grpup =df ((tussle; serve) 11 (tussle'; serve') 11 (wait t)); 
((drinkl; wait 5) 11 (drink2; wait 5) 11 (drink3; wait 5)); 
((eat 1; wait 10) 11 (eat2; wait 10) 11 (eat3; wait 10)) 
Suppose 
1) = def 
(tussle; serve) 11 (tussle'; serve') 
Then the value of t which just fills the time available is 
t= end(P) - beRin(P) 
i. e. 
t=max[A(tussle; serve), A(tussle'; serve')) 
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so that the person who neither gets the drinks nor the food must wait merely until both have 
been procured before he can consume them. Notice that here all the drinking must be over 
before any eating starts. We can visualise the process Group informally as a process tree, 
showing the evolution of the system (see figure 4.1 overleaf). 
(Theoretical aside: the diagram suggests to the naYve that an IPA expression may be rep- 
resented by a Peffý n*et - the form of concurrency we discuss is very similar to (and, ind . 
eed, 
was motivated by) that in Petri nets. It will indeed be the case that we can represent IPA 
terms as C/E nets; see section 4.5 for details. ) 
(Technical aside: here we have assumed the existence of a function A: IPA -) pTime 
generated from duration function A: IPA -4 Time. (Recall that A assigned a non-zero dura- 
tion to every event. ) Processes have sets of durations, due to nondeterminism; 
A(e) = (A(e)) where e is an Action 
A(P 11 Q) =U( max( t, t') ItE A(P), t'E A(Q) 
A(P ; Q) =(t+ t' ItE A(P), t' c A(Q) 
A(P + Q) = A(P) u*A(Q) 
Aoa. P) = A(P) 
where A(x) = A(P 
Px. P/X]) 
The A functioný allows us to make a well-formedness requirement for recursion; 
t 
min(A(px. P)) >0 
which ensures that recursions progress through time, and forbids processes like Px. skip ;x 
and px. (skip +e; x). Here the term P[ylxl stands for the term P with every occurrence of 
x substituted by y. ) 
The crucial insight to be had from the diagram concerns the locus of control. In an expres- 
sion like a; (b 11 c) ; d, we start with one locus of control as we execute a, then we have two 
as we go through b 11 c; these then join up to give. us a single locus again as we execute d. 
Our semantics for IPA must reflect this intuition. (This is the same idea as one we discussed 
in chapter one, - noninterleaving semantics boils down to the notion elucidated there that 
concurrency is not the same as nondeten-ninistic choice between interleavings: it is not the 
same because there is more than one locus of control in genuine concurrency. ) 
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With the syntax introduced so far (which we shall call that of little processes, or LProcs) 
LProc:: = eI wait tI LProc 11 LProc I LProc; LProc 
we have an adequate if sparse process algebra. The behaviour of LProc expressions can be 
characterised equationally. For instance, the order in which we combine processes using _11_ 
is unimportant. Combining a process in parallel with itself has no effect. We also want skip 
to be a zero of ;_ that is, sequentially combining a process with a wait of no time gives you 
just that process. A parallel combination of a process and a wait of less time than the pro- 
cess can possibly last just gives the process, while sequentially combining two waits just 
gives a suitably longer wait. (Notice that skip is not in the range of P as it is not a pro- 
cess. ) Hence, for any LProcs, P, Q and R say 
PlIQ Q11P W 
P 11 (Q 11 R) (P 11 Q) 11 RW 
p lip pW 
Pllwaitt wait tllP =p tsý min(A(P)) 
P; skip skip; P=P 
P; (Q; R) (P; Q); R 
wait t; wait t' = wait (t + t') 
Now and in future lowercase courier type will indicate names ranging over events, and 
uppercase, COURIER type will indicate names ranging over processes. (The rules (*) are not 
e true when we have synchronisations, as we shall see later. ) 
The r6le of skip is to act as a null process which does nothing and instantly terminates; 
the r6le of s top is to act as a deadlocked process: it does nothing but never terminates. 
We shall now investigate the world beyond little processes. Parallel combination entails the 
possibility of synchronisation. Sometimes we may want two autonomous concurrent 
processes to do some action together. One may need the co-operation of the. other for some 
reason: to provide it with a resource, or to pass information for instance. In order to facilitate 
this, we need to be able to let two processes synchronise upon an event so that the loci of 
control meet. This means that they engage in the event together. But what does 'engage in 
the event together' mean in the timed framework ? We have two independently evolving 
processes which must engage in a composite event formed from the synchronisation of two 
events, one from each process. But which events can synchronise ? 
In chapter two we decided that two events can synchronise if their times overlap. Our 
paradigm, therefore, is this: in P 11 Q both P and Q evolve independently. Together with P and 
Q we are provided with a synchronisation set; this set (first described in chapter two) con- 
tains pairs of events, one member of the pair being from P and one from Q. Suppose (a, b) is 
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an element of the synchronisation set of P and Q (written (a, b) e (P $ Q)), then if the times 
of a and b overlap as P 11 Q executes, we will allow them to synchronise. 
The set P$Q cannot contain waits, as we do not allow synchronisations on a wait; waits 
must occur asynchronously. * It is worth noting that (P 11 Q) always displays pairs of events 
to the outside world; a pair with one component a* indicates an asynchronous occurrence. 
Whenever a parallel composition is written, a synchronisation set must be provided as 
well, containing all the desired synchronisations; if the times of occurrences of each event in 
a pair in the set allow, then a synchronisation will occur. Where the synchronisation relation 
is nonempty, or cannot be inferred from context, it will be allowed to decorate a parallel com- 
position, so that if S=PTQ, we will write the parallel composition of P and Q as P S11 Q, read 
'T par Q with the synchronisations S desired. " We understand by P 11 Q the parallel compo- 
sition of P and Q with empty synchronisation set, i. e. P 011 Q. 
Let us return to the bar: an event upon which a synchronisation should happen is called 
shared. Consider the process Drinker =d, f tussle ; serve ; drink ; wait 5. 
Obviously it is ex*pected that the Drinker process will be served by someone. Perhaps a 
simple barman process might be 
Barman =, If pour_drink; skip 
with the pour drink event in the barman synchronising with (or matching) a serve 
event in the drinker. The barman in combination with a drinker might be a Bar process 
-1 
Bar=ddDrinkersIlBarman 
and we would have S= Drinker ý, " Barman = [(serve, pour_drink)). 
Remember that asynchronous occurrences become decorated in a parallel composition 
(because they are modelled as synchronisations with the other processes' silent event), so 
that we can_keep track of what is what in constructions like Bar 11 Bar. 
The synchronisation discipline outlined above is in sharp contrast to that of CCS or CSP; 
both of these languages allow us to require a synchronisation to happen. Here, we cannot - 
it will only happen if the times of the matching events allow.. This does not alter the useful- 
ness of IPA, as we can always prefix one event of a matching pair with a wait t for some 
unspecified t, which we fix when we know the value it must take to enforce a synchronisa- 
tion. (This point will be returned to -in chapter five. ) 
*- In fact, the synchronisation relation of chapter two contained pairs of labc1led events; this distinction is 
useful if we want different synchronisation behaviour from different occurrences of the same event, but it 
leads to considerable technical complication, so we shall assume that the synchronisation relation holds 
between events in future. 
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As the reader will have noticed, the material of chapter two will keep on intruding on our 
considerations here. We have decided to model our process algebra with I. E. S. s, so the com- 
binators in the algebra must be similar to those available in the world of I. E. S. s. Therefore, 
our notion of parallelism is very close to that elucidated in chapter two, and our notion of non-. 
determinism will be designed so that the coproduct constructions of chapter two are an 
appropriate model for it. It may prove helpful to reread chapter two in parallel with this sec- 
tion. Remember-that an I. E. S. can always evolve without reference to its environment, - it 
just gets on and does its events with their specified timings, resolving its own nondeten-nin- 
ism. IPA processes must be capable of this degree of autonomy. Further, recall that we were 
led in chapter two to consider two closely associated I. E. S. s representing the synchronisa- 
tion behaviour of a system and the duration of the occurrences of its events (the union and 
intersection I. E. S. s); here too we shall end up with two I. E. S. s representing every process. 
(Aside: in IPA we never force a process to wait without an explicit wait; it can always 
evolve without reference to its environment (although one part of a process, such as one 
component of a parallel composition must sometimes wait for the other components, so that 
two loci of control can merge back to one). (The surroundings of a process, what it is put in 
parallel with, are known as its environment. ) This not only simplifies the real-time seman- 
tics, it is also an accurate reflection of the behaviour of autonomous systems; unless we ask 
them to interact with their environment, they don't (that's why they are autonomous). It 
seems unnecessary to build such interactions in as primitives; without them the user is 
allowed to specify whatever process/environment interactions he or she desires. ) 
Clearly we would like to be able to specify a barman who can serve an unbounded number 
of drinks (and a customer who can drink them). We do this using recursion. The process 
InfiniteBarman =da px. pour_drink; x 
will do for the barman, and 
ThirstyMan =d, 
,f 
px. serve; drink; x 
for the drinker. Notice that there is no pause required here between finishing the n- Ph drink 
and starting to be served the nth. 
The barman process is read "The, process InfiniteBarman is defined to be 
(InfiniteBarman =,,, .)"... 
the least process x which (ýLx. can perform a 
pour_drink action and then ... " (pour_drink ;)"... behave like x. " 
The behaviour of the Inf initeBarman process is, then, to do a pour drink event and 
then to behave like itself. Behaving like itself involves doing a pour 
- 
drink action and then 
behaving like itself, which involves doing a pour 
- 
drink action and then behaving like itself, 
... So we obtain an unbounded number of pour drink actions. The operator tix. - takes a 
process containing a variable x (P say) and produces the least process obtained by replacing 
every occurrence of x by P. 
Page 160 Chapter Four - An algebraic entelechY 
Time, causality, and concurrency David Murphy 
Returning to the bar, then, we n-flght chose a more realistic model with several drinkers; 
TuesdayNightBar=d, fDrinkerlS, 11(Drinker2 S211 (Drinker3 S3 11 
(Drinker4 S411 InfiniteBarman))) 
Notice that the bracketing is necessary to ensure that each synchronisation set is used 
properly. Even if we had Si --: S2 : -- S3 : -- S4 (modulo asynchronous pairing) then the results of 
chapter two will not ensure that we can write TuesdayNightBar without brackets. 
This point is worth a little expansion. Consider P SIII (Q S211 R); we would like to state that 
P S, R) -IR 
for some suitable S3 and S4, but which ? Clearly (a, (b, c)) 11 (Q S211 ý (P S311 Q) S41 
can occur in the LHS just when (a, (b, C)) ESi, (b, c) c- S2, SO 
((a, b), C)) E S4 & (a, b) E S3 <* (a, (b, c)) E Si & (b, c) E S2 
Similarly, 
((a, b), c) iý S4 & (a, b) e S3 ýt* (a, (b, *)) e Si & (b, c) e 
S2 
c) r= S4 & (a, b) o S3 4* (a, (*, c)) E= Si & (b, c) E= S2 
b, ) c) r= S4 & (a, b) e S3C=-> (a, (b, c)) tý Si & (b, c) e S2 
If S1, S2, S3 and S4 satisfy these conditions then we say that S3 and S4 are the Conjugate of 
Si and S2 and write (SI, S2) (-4 (S3, S4). Notice in particular that if we have no synchronisa- 
tions, P 11 (Q 11 R) (P 11 Q) 11 R. Similarly, P S11 Q -= Q S-pil P where (b, a) 
E S'P <. * (a, b) (= S. 
Previously it was clear what synchronised with what. But, in the TuesdayNightBar 
process we have four separate serve-like events, servel through serve4. Which of 
these synchronises with which pour_drink event ? 
We can obviously construct an unfair barman by only allowing pour 
- 
drink events to 
synchronise with, say, servel events, (Si = (servel, (*, (*, (*, pour 
- 
drink)))), all oth- 
er synchronisation sets empty) but this will not do. Or we could make a wholly synchronous 
bar by m'aking pour 
- 
drink events synchronise in turn with servel events, serve2 
events, serve3 events, and serve4 events (this would require four different pour drink 
events, with, for instance, S2 = [serve2, (*, (*, pour drink2)))). This would, however, 
make the bar somewhat inefficient, as the barman is constrained to serve at the speed of the 
slowest drinker. The most efficient approach would be to let a pour 
- 
drink event synchro- 
hise with a serve event whenever one is available. Then we would have 
Si = (servel, (*, (*, (*, pour drink)))) 
S2 = (serve2, (*, (*, pour drink))) 
S3 =( serve3, (*, pour drink)) 
S4 =( serve4, pour_drink) 
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which ensures that no pour 
- 
drink event is wasted. Because we have not enforced any 
particular synchronisation discipline any of these approaches is possible; it is up to the user 
to specify which events synchronise with which by giving an appropriate synchronisation set. 
Notice that the order of parallel composition is important here - if Drinker4 always 
demands a drink whenever the barman is ready to give him one, then no other drinker will 
ever be served; it is only if Drinker4 allows a pour_drink action to occur asynchronously 
that another drink-er can synchronise with it. Hence our form of parallel composition is local. in 
the sense that the ordering of application of sil is important. 
This strategy also allows us to wash our hands of the vexing problem of fairness; that of 
making sure that if two drinkers are waiting to be served they are served fairly. This issue 
will be discussed in the next aside. 
The final operator we shall discuss is the nondeterministic choice operator -+- . 
Suppose 
we have two alternative processes P and Q, and we want one of them to be chosen and 
executed. This choice can be achieved in two ways; either we can let the process do it, 
washing our hands of all responsibility for (and knowledge of) how the choice is taken, or we 
can'allow the environment of the process to have some affect on what is chosen. CFhe former 
is often known as deterministic or external choice, and the latter as nondeternzinistic or 
internal choice; the use of the term 'external nondeten-ninism' for the former is very confusing 
(as no nondeterminism is involved) and should be avoided: we will not entertain that usage 
here). 
ASIDE - On nondeterminism 
There are a least four ideas that are referred to as 'nondeten-ninism' in popular concurren- 
cy theories. These are: 
(i) Delayed implementation decisions. [Hoare 19851 suggest that nondetermin- 
ism is useful as a way of modelling an implementation decision that has not 
yet been taken; 
(ii) Determinism by some unmodelled feature. Here it is assumed that the 
behaviour of the system is determined, but the object doing the determining is 
not accessible to us (this is the sort of nondeten-ninism that results from 
hiding, as in the CSP process 
=dd ((a --4 P0b --4 Q) \f 
This can give rise to nondetenninism in CSP: R=P [I b ---) Q. Incidentally, 
notice that it needn't: - 
pUb -) Q)\fc)) 11 (a -4 S) =a -4 ((P\(c)) 11 
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(iii) Genuine physical nondeterininism. Here the behaviour of the system is really 
unknowable. This is similar to (ii), but philosophically distinct from it. 
(iv) Identical external choices. If a CSP process offers the environment the choice 
T =df a -4 Paa --) 
then, as thv as are identical it is not determined whether an a action from the 
environment results in P or Q. The process T is equivalent to a -) (P F1 Q). 
David Murphy 
It is often unclear which of these alternatives is meant when the term 'nondeterminism' is 
used in the literature. In particular, as [de Nicola & Hennessy 1987] point out, the correct 
philosophical position of the CCS + operator is uncertain; it can act either as an external 
choice or (if, for instance, a -r is involved) as type-(iii) nondeten-ninism. 
We intend the choice operator -+_ 
in IPA to represent purely nondeterministic choice 
roughly with flavour of (iii) (or (ii)) above (i. e. roughly CSP n). This means, of course, that 
processes do not have to wait for the environment to do any choosing, and their behaviour is 
independent of the -. environment. This has the advantage that we can assign meaning to a 
process without reference to its environment. (Deterministic choice could be introduced into 
the model by the strategy of allowing the environment to choose the P or Q in P+Q by offer- 
ing one of the first events of one process for synchronisation but not one of the first events of 
the other. This will overcomplicate things here, so we shall not attempt it. The key point to 
notice is that anyýdeterministic choice must allow the process to proceed, so that if the envi- 
ronment doesn't do the choosing the process must make the choice itself (presumably 
nondeterministically) so that it can get on. The interlude at the end of this chapter contains 
further thoughts on this matter. ) 
At this point fairness again rears its ugly head. The classical fairness problem is this: sup- 
pose infinitely often in the history of a process two events are possible, like the two drinkers 
waiting to be served above. A process is said to be (unconditionally event) fair (with 
respect to this pair of events) if both of these events are executed infinitely often. This 
means that one event can be chosen in preference to the other only finitely many times. The 
subject of fairness is a complex and engaging one (see, for instance, [Kiviatkowska 1989) for 
further discussion and references). For us, fairness is a multifaceted issue; there is the prob- 
lem of the fairness of internal choice (whether in any infinite set of executions of A+B, it is 
possible for A to be chosen exclusively), and the problem of the fairness of synchronisation 
(whether it is possibly for one synchronisation of two available to be always preferred). 
We shall deal explicitly with neither issue. Our stance on the former is that the whole 
point about nondeterminism is that nothing can be assumed about it, that no finite observa- 
tion can distinguish a fair from an unfair process, and that the fairness of choice is an 
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implementational matter anyway, so we unashamedly refuse to allow the user to require that 
internal choice is fair. 
The fairness of synchronisation will be even more blatantly ignored; parallel composition 
is clearly not fair, since if two synchronisations are possible the most tightly bound one will 
be preferred; priority of synchronisation of A over B can be achieved by using (P 11 A) 11 B 
rather than (P 11 B) It A. The user must provide a synchronisation set which encodes informa- 
tion about which event synchronises with which. If fair scheduling is required, the user must 
explicitly state how it is to be implemented. (In practise more stringent requirements than 
fairness are usual (such as requiring not only that no process is always prefer-red to another, 
but also that no process is often preferred to another, for some suitable notion on 'often'), so 
the user will often have to provide their own scheduler anyway. ) This seems reasonable 
since it is hard to see how to implement completely fair syricbronisation - our local form of 
parallel composition reflects the notion that multiple synchronisations can only be built from 
binary ones. [Lamport 19851 has an interesting perspective here. 
A typical external. choice we might need in the bar is 
dd serve_crisps ;E+ serve_beer ;D 
Here the process can execute one of the two events serve 
- 
crisps and serve_beer. 
If it chooses serve_crisps then E will execute, whilst if it chooses serve_beer then D 
I will be executed. This choice is made purely nondeterministically, by the. process itself. 
The topic of recursion will now be revisited. A process which engages in an unbounded 
number of rounds might be 
Group =df gx. ((tussle; serve) 11 (tussle'; serve') 11 (wait t)); 
((drinkl; wait 5) 11 (drink2; wait 5) 11 (drink3; wait 5)); 
((eatl ; wait 10) 11 (eat2; wait 10) 11 (eat3; wait 10)); x 
while a process which may or may not have another drink is 
UndecidedDrinker=d, f px. 
(tussle; serve; x+go-home) 
The environment, of course, may 'want' one decision from the UndecidedDrinker; if 
IrritatedSignif icant0ther =,, wait 5; argue; sleep 
and S=f (argue, go-home)), then, assuming for simplicity that 
A(wait 5; argue) =A(go_home) <A(tussle; serve) 
that is, that the synchronisation can happen before any drinks are consumed. 
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We then have 
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UndecidedDrinkersIlIrritatedSignificant0ther= 
(go 
- 
home s1l wait 5; argue; sleep) + 
(tussle; serve; px. (tussle; serve; x + go-home)) s1l wait 5; argue; sleep 
with the synchronisation (argue, go-home) occurring in the first clause and not in the 
second. (So the UndecidedDrinker either goes home and has the argument or stays and 
has another round. If he has another round, the IrritatedSignificant0ther must 
have the argument alone (as the UndecidedDrinker has taken so long drinking that he or 
she is too late to synchronise with the argument) and then go to sleep; the 
UndecidedDrinker may return after some (unbounded) further number of rounds. ) This 
argument depends of the durations of the events being as stated, and on both components in 
the parallel composition starting at the same time. 
The choice -+- 
is purely nondetenninistic; our UndecidedDrinker could go on tussling 
and being served for ever. An appropriate process tree for this process is shown below. 
tussle XX go-home 
serve 
tussle go home 
Figure 4.2 -A process graph 
for the UndecidedDrinker 
serve process, not showing possible 
synchronisations. 
An attempt to provide some laws for nondeterminism should be made. These laws are 
very similar to those for parallel composition; 
P+Q = Q+p 
P+P =p 
P+(Q+R)= (P+Q)+R 
(P + Q); R= (P; R) + (Q; R) 
. 
(P+Q)SIIR= (PSIIR)+(QSIIR) 
The last two laws are the only interesting cases; 
(P + Q) ;R= (P ; R) + (Q ; R) is interesting principally because the obvious 
compliment to it 
R; (P + Q) = (R; P)+ (R; 
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is not true. In (P + Q) ;R we are committing ourselves to making an irrevocable 
decision between P and Q; there is no state following P+Q which does not have 
its ancestry unambiguously in either P or Q. 
On the other hand, if we had the axiom 
R; (P + Q) = (R; P) + (R; 
then we w6dld be able to bring forward the point at which a decision is made, - 
this is tantamount to introducing time travel into the model. The arguments for 
why this law should not hold have been rehearsed often; the point is that after 
the R on the LHS both P and Q are possible, whereas only one of them is on the 
RHS. Hence allowing the above means allowing a transformation which 
introduces ambiguity; before it, everything was clear, but after it the same 
observable sequence of actions leads to different states. This is undesirable, so 
we shall not allow R; (P + Q) = (R; P) + (R; Q) to be true in general. 
(ii) The last law, (P + Q) S11 R= (P S11 R) ý+ 
(Q S11 R) states that parallel composition 
distributes through nondeten-ninism. The intuition is that in the LHS R cannot 
influence the choice, so one might as well let it run with each alternative and 
make the choibe between the parallel compositions. Notice in particular if Sc (xP 
r-) aQ does not hold, then we have a synchronisation set not in the product of the 
alphabets of the processes it relates to. This is not, in itself, a problem, as there 
is not way to offer R in (P sII R) events from Q, but the extra events must be 
removed in the translation to a chapter 2 style synchronisation set. 
We can also formulate an axiom for the behaviour of a recursive term using substitution. 
The process px. P behaves like P, but with every occurrence of x replaced by J. Ix. P. (This 
accords with our clumsy characterisation above of px. P behaving like P until we hit an x, and 
then behaving like itself again. ) 
PX. P=p 
Ilix. P/Xl 
This completes our description of the process algebra IPA. The meaning of IPA expres- 
sions will occupy us for the rest of the chapter.. No attempt will be made to provide a 
specification calculus for IPA; this deficiency should be rectified in the future. 
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4.2 The axiomatic semantics of interval process algebra 
The laws of IPA discovered by informal arguments in the last section will now be gathered 
up and stated together. Recall that we had for LProc u( skip) the laws 
P; skip=skip; P= P 
wait. t; wait t'= wait (t + t') 
P; (Q; R) (P; Q); R 
P Sil QQS. P11 P 
P 
(Xp2ll 
P : -- P 
PsIl wait t=wait tsllP= P where t: ý min(A(P)) 
P S, 11 (Q S21 I R) = (P S311 Q) S411 R where (Si, S2) (-) (S3, S4) 
The Axioms for LProc uf skip) 
here P, Q and R range over LP ro c. The alphabet of a process, aP being defined overleaf. 
From now on, we will assume a universe of discourse, that all are arguments are made in. 
This simply involves stating a fixed, nonempty finite set of events, E, and a fixed, countably 
infinite set of labels, L, and never considering an occurrence of an event that cannot be repre- 
sented by a unique member of LxE. Hence the laws above are supposed to refer to 
processes constructed using events from E. 
It is al§o instructive to contemplate some of the laws that are not true. For instance, some 
j laws which are in'generalfalse in this semantics for IPA are 
a; (b 11 c) = (a; b) 11 (a; c) 
(a; b) 11 (c; d) = (a 11 c); (b 11 d) 
The first law follows from the second for a; (b 11 c) = (a 11 a) ; (b 11 c) which is not the 
same as (a ; b) 11 (a ; c). Consider 
C 
a c 
b 
Figure 4.3 - The difference between(a 11 c) ; (b 11 d) and (a ; b) 11 (c ; 
The reason we want these laws to be false is that in (a 11 c) ; (b 11 d) both a and c must 
be over before b or d start (furthermore b and d start at the same time). Neither of these 
properties hold in (a ; b) 11 (c ; d) = (a 11 c) ; (b 11 d). Notice finally that the CSP-style. law 
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P 11 stop = stop does not hold here, again due to our stance on the nature of concurrency. 
The second law is proposed in [Meseguer & Montanari 1988] as "capturing a rather basic 
fact about concurrency"; this intuition does not extend to our framework. The essential differ- 
ence is that P= (a ; b) 11 (c ; d) is one process with one locus of control, whereas for 
Meseguer & Montanari (a ; b) and (c ; d) are two processes that are wholly independent - 
they may just happen to be executing at the same time. Compare our Petri net interpretation 
of parallelism in secti6n 4.5 to those of [Olderog 19891 for a clear idea of the distinction. 
Next the axioms for choice and nondeterminism are stated. 
P+Q = Q+P 
P+P =p 
P+(Q+R) (P+Q)+R 
(P + Q); R (P; R) + (Q; R) 
(P + Q) SH R (P S11 R) + (Q sil R) 
PX. PP Ax- 
t. ý 
I P/Xl 
The axioms for nondeterminism 
and recursion 
All of laws can be used to reason about IPA expressions; in section 4.6 we will fon-nalise 
a proof system based on them. The main idea is that the laws tell us which terms behave the 
same way, and hence can be thought of as equivalent. 
It may be helpful to define the alphabet of an IPA process P, written (xP, as this concept 
has been used informally several times; 
cce = [e, 
a(wait t) = 
CO; Q) C(P U aQ 
(X(P + Q) CCP U (XQ 
oc(P sil Q) (e, *') Iee aP Iu ((*, e) I e' ra aQ Iu( (e, e') I (e, e) r= S 
a(gx. P) = C(P - (x) 
The omnipresent * indicates that, in addition to 'doing' events, eEE, the process must 
start and stop, - the 'on light' * must behave sensibly. (The claim that (e, *) is observably 
different from e, and hence the veracity of the definition of cc(P sil Q), rests on allowing the 
o bservation of causality. ) 
We shall require in future that if P sil Q is written, S c; up x aQ. This is a commonsense 
requirement, allowing us to ignore pathological synchronisation sets. 
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4.3 The denotational semantics of interval process algebra 
DaVid Murphy 
We shall give a denotational semantics to our process algebra. The task of such a seman- 
tics will be to determine what I. E. S. s are, in some sense, valid representations of an IPA 
expression. This will determine which IPA expressions are equivalent (they are equivalent 
when they have equivalent denotations). The proof rules for IPA can then be compared to 
this semantics; t&e congruence induced by them and that induced by the semantics will be 
shown to be the same. 
In fact, an IPA expression has an associated set of I. E. S. s that (intuitively) satisfy it: the 
denotational semantics associates one member of the set of satisfying structures with a giv- 
en tenn; this is the maximally live structure in that set (that is, it gets on with things as 
soon as possiblet). 
Two IPA expressions can be thought of as equivalent if they behave the same way. 
Hence, rather than demand equality of meanings (that is equality of maximally live represent- 
ing I. E. S. s) as a criterion for equivalence, we shall demand equality of behaviour (in the 
I sense of the last chapter). This is because equality of meanings is too weak; we want to 
identify structures that 'we cannot tell are different. ' The extra structure may, though, be 
useful when we come to consider implementing process algebra expressions as interval 
event structures; the denotational semantics can be thought of as suggesting some structure 
-an implementation might have, while the laws merely tell us how the implementations 
behave. The denotational semantics, then, is our link with the world of implementations. 
(A point we shall not tackle, but which is of some interest, is whether we can recover the 
equivalence induced by the axiomatic semantics by considering isonlorphism (in the categon- 
cal sense) rather than equality. The category in which this is recovered could then be claimed 
to have the operationally 'natural' notion of behaviour. ) 
A Scott-Strachey-style semantics will be given as advocated in [Scott & Strachey 1971]. 
Here two descriptions are considered equivalent if they map to the same object in the domain 
of meanings. However, we shall use categories rather than domains; for us, the set of mean- 
ings will in fact be objects of the category UES. (Objects in this category are members of the 
class of all interval event structures, IES. We shall only be'concerned with I. E. S. s as (re-) 
defined in chapter two. ) The meaning function will be structure-oriented so that the meaning 
of a complex process is deten-nined by the composition of the meanings of its constituents. 
t- Notice that nowhere have we said that wrifing a; b implies a adl b; we have merely supposed that 
C. nd(a): 5. bggm(b). Now we will impose a semantics where a Ldj b- things happen as soon as they can. 
It would be fairly trivial to modify this to fit the timed CSP paradigm where end(a) = begin(b) + 5, for 
some (possibly variable) 5. Then the law wait 1; wait I'= wait (I + 1) would need modification. 
Chapter Four - An algebraic entelechy Page 169 
David Murphy Time, causality, and concurrency i 
We will assume for the moment that all structures start at t=0; our task is to determine 
what I. E. S. will result if a given IPA term starts to execute at that time. So, then, we want to 
define a function 
C:: Proc -> IES 
which, given an IPA term s will produce a I. E. S., C (s). However, we will have to deal with 
I. E. S. s that displry more than one maximal Con-set, thus possibly ending at more than one 
time. Hence, really, we will need a function which given a set of starting times, returns an 
I. E. S. and a set of possible finishing times 
D:: Proc --4 joTime --) (IES x pTime) 
then we just define the denotation of a structure as the result if we start at just time 0; 
C(s) = fst(D (s) (0» 
The main meaning function D is defined by cases over the structure of terms. It decomposes 
an IPA-composition of terms into a UES-composition of meanings using the UES- 
operators defined in. chapter two. For convenience we shall define auxiliary functions 
E: Proc -) pTime -) IES, 
E (s) t= fist(D (s) t) 
F: Proc --> pTime -4 pTime 
F(s) t= snd(D (s) 1) 
where fst(x, y) =x and snd(x, y) = y. 
Primitive actions are converted into one element I. E. S., while waits become empty struc- 
tures (or, rather, structures with just silent events in them). The clause for wait t' works for 
stop as well, with the definition stop =df wait .. The definition of D that we shall adopt in 
the base cases, then, is 
D(e) I =df (I EIIM(e) t, 
(t + A(e) It. E 1)) 
D (wait t') I =dd (t 
I M(wait tý t, [t + t'l tE for. t'> 0 Et 
so that events and waits just happen whenever they can. (M is defined overleaf. ) For the 
more complicated, structured cases, we have 
D (P sll Q) t =df (F, t') 
whereT =E (P) I "T E (Q) I and 
I' = 
ýý ( MaX(tl, t2) I tl e F(P) (t), t2 EF(Q) W) I C= t 
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Here the I. E. S. synchronisation set T over labelled events is derived from the IPA one, S, 
over events by T= (((n, a), (n', b)) I (a, b) E S, n, n' c N, aE ce, bE (xQ). (The integers are 
used as labels. ) 
(Remember that we indicated two approaches to dealing with timed synchronisations; 
conventionally (i. e. in process algebras like CSP), we insert waits before events so that all 
the synchronisationS- 'demanded' actually happen, or the process deadlocks. Alternatively, 
(and this is the course adopted above, ) we only allow a synchronisation to happen if the two 
synchronising event overlap in time. ) 
D (P + Q) t =dd (T, t') where T=E (P) I+E (Q) t and t'= F(P) Iu F(Q) t 
D(P; Q) t =d, where T=E (P) t (D E (Q) (F(P) t) and 
t'= ýjt(F(Q)(lj)ItjEF(Q)[t)) 
IEt 
In the definition above, certain combinators (11 and +) have been overloaded; they are 
defined both on IPA terrns and on I. E. S. s. To decrease confusion slightly, the I. E. S. versions 
are shown in bigger, bolder type. 
The function M produces an interval event structure containing just one labelled event 
(and a silent event). It also deals with the production of I. E. S. s containing just silent events. 
(We will show the output of Min the form (labelled events, maximal Con-set, ordering). We 
will also show the (real) timing of *. ) 
In the case of an event we have; 
M: Action -4 Time -4 IES 
M(e) t (it, e), ((it, e), ((t, t+ A(e)))) e: p, -, wait t' 
where [t, t+ A(e)] and it = next(e) 
(The function next is assumed to keep track of which labels have been issued to a given 
event, and to always provide a new one. ) In the case of a wait 
M(e) t= (f * 1, f (- 1), ((t, t+ t'))) 
The two flavours of I. E. S., 5- and S, are dealt with in the obvious way; 
(M(e) t)- = (M(e) I)- = M(e) t 
(E (s op s') t)- = (E (s op s') t)- 
for Op E (+,; ) while 
(s S11 s') I)- = (E (s) 1 
IIT E (s) I)- =E (s) t i-L E (sý t 
e= wait t' 
where * =- [t, t+ tj) 
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(s sli s) t)- = (E (s) 1 
IIT E (s) I)- =E (s) t TT E (s) I 
as defined in chapter two. 
Several points deserve clarification. First note that the primitive I. E. S. constructor M 
always produces a, computational structure, and that finite application of the I. E. S. -combina- 
tors preserves computational ity, so all the structures that are-denotations of IPA terms are 
computational. 
Note too that the set of finishing times F that we pass around in the denotational seman- 
tics has a function very similar to the set of durations A we use in the laws; we have the law 
P S11 wait t= wait tsII P=P where t: 5 min(A(P)) 
which is closely related to the denotation 
D(PSIIQ)I=, I, f (E(P)t"TE(Q)t, t') 
where t' =uI max(ti, t2) IAEF (P) [ t), t2 EF (Q) f t) le t 
I 
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4.4 The operational semantics of interval process algebra 
This section introduces a timed operational semantics for IPA. The framework used for 
this semantics, that of asynchronous timed labelled transition systems, is new; an introduc- 
tion to timed labelled transition systems forms the first subsection of this section, while 
asynchronicity is introduced in the second. The formalism is then applied, giving an opera- 
tional semantics for interval process algebra. 
The operational semantics of IPA will be in the structured operational semantics tradition 
of [Plotkin 1981). There every expression, s, is associated with a transition system (S, Ev, 
---)) where S is the set of subterms of s, Ev is the set of events that s can be observed to 
engage in (also called the alphabet of s, written as), and -) is the transition relation, a rela- 
tion in Sx Ev x S. In conventional transition system semantics [Milner 1989], [Keller 1976], 
something like 
s S) S, 
would be written to indicate that the term s could perform an e action and hence be 
transformed into the term s' We, though, must have timing: - 
4AJ Timed labelled transition systems 
A timed labelled transition system semantics is much like an untimed one; we shall adopt 
almost the same course, writing 
st (1, e)@t -)S, t, 
to indicate that the term s, beginning at time t c- R can be transformed into the term s' which 
is incapable of any action until time t: (It seems more natural to use tER instead of r C= R 
here, even though it is not uniform notation. ) This transformation is accompanied by an occur- 
rence of the event e at time K, and this occurrence 'carnes the label 1. As before we assume 
that the duration of events is predefined, and that some function from events E to time, 
Time, A: E --) Time exists to give these durations of events. Since all events must occupy 
some finite interval of time, we shall require that 
t :5 t-< (t- + A(e)) :5 t' 
(This proviso is the weakest one that makes sense. For other languages much more 
restricting inequalities might hold; if we were dealing with timed CSP, for instance, we would 
have t t-- t'- 5, where 5 is the timed CSP system delay constant. ) 
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DEFINITION 4.1 - Timed labelled transition systems 
A timed labelled transition system is a triple (S, LEv, --)) where 
Time, causality, and concurrency ' 
(i) S is a set of states, 
(ii) LEv is a set of labelled events with durations, and 
(iii) -) is a. relation over (S x Time) x (LEv x Time) x (S X Time) 
41. 
This form of transition system will be used to give an operational semantics to IPA. Note, 
however, that it is not limited to this application. TLTSs (and the ATLTSs introduced below) 
are suitable for use in giving operational semantics to a wide variety of timed concurrency 
theories, particularly timed process algebras such as timed CSP or timed CCS. Another use 
would be to use the extends predicate of the last chapter to construct a timed labelled transi- 
tion system; the states would be observations, and LEv would be the observer's set of 
labelled events. 
The relation . 'holds between an IPA term s, a starting time t, (known also as a 
terinItinze pair) a labelled event a, a time t- and another ternVtime pair s' t' just when s 
starting at time t can be transformed into s' which must remain inactive until t' The labelled 
event a is observed to accompany this transition; it begins at time t- The labelled event a 
and its starting time t- can, therefore, be seen as a label of the transition as they are always 
observed to accompany it. When necessary, we shall refer to the starting state as so. 
How is the set LEv related to the alphabet of the process it represents ? In general all 
that we shall require for a timed labelled transition system or one of its derivatives is that 
each occurrence of an event carries a label which disambiguates it from any other occurrence 
of any other event (or any other occurrence of the same event). In the case of the timed 
labelled transition system of an IPA expression, s, however, we will find a little more struc- 
ture on the set LEv useful; we now proceed to explain how this structure is generated from 
the events that s can do (its alphabet); the material concerning synchronisation in chapter 
two is assumed in this discussion. 
Given an underlying set of events of s, E say, the set of labelled events LEv is built up in 
quite a complex way. Firstly assume that we have some set of labels of events, L. (For sim- 
plicity we require that LnE0. ) Then LxE will certainly be contained in LEv. However, 
we also have to cope with the relabelling of events that happens. when we enter a parallel 
composition. Consider the silent event * and remember that * is not a member of E or of L. 
Then labelled events resulting from asynchronous occurrences will be of the form ((I, *), 
(e, or the form ((*, 1), (*, e)) for I r= L, ecE, while synchronisations will take the form 
((I, (e, e')). 
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So, any candidate for LEv would have events with structure Eu ((E u [*)) x (E u (*))) 
and labels with structure L tj ((L u [*)) x (L u [*))). There are waits in s as well as "real" 
events; these will be represented by *, and associated transitions will carry the label r. We 
shall not allow waits to syncbronise, (as its technically unpleasant to allow it, and not clear 
what it means), so for binary synchronisations 
LEv, pA= (E G-[, r 
fu ((E u (*) u (, c)) x (E u (*) u f-r)))) x (L u ((L u(* 1) x (L u( *)))) 
(We assume that L is capable of labelling waits as well as events. ) 
However, we have to cope with multiple parallel compositions like (P 11 Q) 11 R as well as 
binary ones like P 11 Q so 
LEvjpA = 
(E 
u (, c) . 
rl (E u (*) u [, c))) x (L u 
11 (L u [*))) i E-= (0 iE (0 
(The product is only potentially infinite since we demand that only a finite number of 
processes can be placed in parallel. ) 
Note that most of this complexity is due to the fact that the underlying set of events that a 
process can perform, which we have notated E, is related to the alphabet of a process s, (XS, 
(the set of events that it may be seen to engage in) in quite a complex way; 
as =Eu 
11 (E u (*» i r= (0 
which is in turn due to our treatment of parallel composition. 
411- 
The timed labelled transition system formalism is suitable for giving a semantics to some 
timed systems. We want to define the particular operational semantic function for IPA. The 
machinery to accomplish this is developed in the next section, where the timed labelled tran- 
sition system formalism is extended to allow a better treatment of parallelism. This leads us 
to asynchronous timed labelled transition systems or ATLTSs. 
4.4.2 Asychronous Timed Labelled Transition Systems' 
Given an EPA term s and a starting time t, (a term/time pair) we shall want to associate 
with sa timed labelled transition system. In the last section we saw that a timed labelled 
transition system was a structure (S, LEv, -4). For us the set S will be the set of subterms 
of s (including s itself), LEv will be a set of transition labels derived from the alphabet of s, 
(but with r built in to deal with waits), LEvjpA, as outlined in the previous subsection, and 
the relation ---) will indicate how one term can evolve into another. 
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This structure is not quite enough to allow us to describe non-interleaving concurrency, so 
another transition relation, , will be introduced. 
(There have been several attempts at producing a non-interleaving (or truly concurrent) 
operational semantics for CCS-like languages; see, for instance [Boadol & Castellani 1989], 
[Degano et al. 19881, [Olderog 1987], [Goltz 1988]. Also of some relevance are the asyn- 
chronous transitioh systems of [Bednarczyk 1987], [Kwiatkowska 1988] and [Shields 1990] 
and other variants on transition systems due to [Stark 1989] and [Gaifiman 1989]. We shall 
adopt the idea due to LDegano et al. 1987] of decomposing a parallel composition into a set of 
subprocesses, known there as grapes. ) 
The purpose of the transition relation is to allow a pair of term/time pairs to evolve 
independently of one another. A parallel composition P 11 Q will give rise to a pair of derived 
terms each of which will proceed independently (unless they synchronise). 
Once both of them have finished, this pair of terms can be reduced back into a single term. 
This accords with the intuition that in the process P 11 Q the subprocesses P and Q proceed 
independently (except for synchronisations), and the composite is over once both P and Q 
have terminated. A suitable transition relation will be, therefore 
g (S x Time)2 X (LEvipA x Time) x (S x Time)2 
In general, for any parallel composition operator H: Sn _ý S (rather than just the conven- 
tional compositiohi 11 : S2 -> S we have had thus far) we will need a transition relation 
x-> c: (S xT ime)' x (LEvpA xT ime) x (S xT ime)n 
where, if P 11 Q#Q 11 P the order of tupling is important. 
Parallel composition can then be modelled using x-> transitions between tuples of 
term/time pairs. A labelled transition system endowed with x-> will be called an asyn- 
chronous timed labelled transition system. 
DEFINITION 4.2 - Asynchronous timed labelled transition systems 
An asynchronous timed labelled transition system (or ATLTS) is a triple (S, LEv, x-4) 
with 
(i) S *is a (countable) set of states, with a distinguished starting state so, 
(ii) LEv is a (countable) set of labelled events, including the reserved symbolr, and 
(iii) x--) is a relation on SO(S x Time) x (LEv x Time) x p(S x Time) 
This relation holds between a set of term/time pairs, a labelled event/time pair and a set of 
term/time pairs. 
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(We assume also the existence of the duration function A: LEV -4 Time and label oracle as 
outlined above. ) Transitions labelled r will often perform technical functions as well as repre- 
senting waits. 
The transition relation must respect timing; 
'<<(SI tl)j (S2 t2)j ... 
(Sn tn))ý' <((fl-l' t1o)i W t0t ... 
(Sn' lnl))ý' 
3i. tj:! ý t- & Vi. ti: 5 t-+A(f) & Vi. t-:! ý ti& 3i. t-+A(f): 5 tj 
410 
We can now go on to describe the operational semantics of IPA in terms of our asynchronous 
timed labelled transition systems. In this section the set S will always be finite. Recall that ele- 
ments of S will consist of IPA terms, and that a transition will hold between one term and 
another just when the first can perform the event in the label of the transition and be trans- 
formed into the second. 
In order to give the semantics of IPA we shall only need two special cases of the transition 
relation x--), the cases 
): x Time) x (LEvjpA x Time) x (S x Time) 
: (S x Time)2 X (LEvjpA x Time) x (S x Time)2 
discussed above. 
4.4.3 The asynchronous timed labelled transition system of IPA 
The transitions for the base level terms e and wait t are straightforward (although we have 
to be careful that skip has no transitions in order to forbid meaningless livelock); 
(l, e)@I, et, (skip) (t+A(e)) (wait t') t (11'*12t; (skip) (t+ tý 
The label I is assumed to be generated from the event by some oracular means; we pass the 
oracle the event and it passes back a unique label for it - it is up to the oracle to keep track of 
what has happened so that it can ensure that it is issuing unique labels. 
The interpretation of stop as a deadlocked process is usually reflected by the lack of a 
transition coming out of it. However, consider skip; a moment's reflection will indicate that 
skip cannot have any transitions, as the only sensible one would be skip t (1,92', skip t, 
which gives us the possibility of livelock. Hence, to differentiate stop from skip we must 
introduce the rule 
stop t 
(11,0@1) 
stop (t + tý for any t' >c 
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This, if you like, indicates that the 'on' light of stop is always on, but the condition t, >C for- 
bids us from making an infinite number of observations of this fact in a finite time, and hence of 
introducing a form of livelock. (Think of E as the time it takes to make an observation. ) Transi- 
tion labels involving -r are only carried by waits, or transitions that fulfil a technical rather than a 
computational function. The symbol * will be reserved for parallel compositions. The Occurrence 
of a T-labelled transition can be thought* Of indicating that the 'on' light of the process is still 
shining. 
In the following description f (and derived variables like fi) will be assumed to range over 
transition labels, i. e. over the set LEv1pA defined in subsection 4.4.1. 
The most straightforward operator is sequential combination; here two transition rules suf- 
fice, one to deal with the first process in the combination, and one to eliminate skip; 
fj@l j, 
S2 t 
f2@1: ý 
Sý tý Sl ti ) SI, ti, .2 
(SI ; SO A 
f1@1 f, 
4 (Sl' ; SO tlo (skip ; s2) t2 
f2CTlf 
ý sý tý 
Choice can be dealt with using the usual operational technique; two mutually exclusive tran- 
sition rules are enabled by s, + S2, one for the choice of s, and one for the choice Of S2. Our 
paradigm of P+Q meaning choose between P and Q nondeternzinistically is dealt with thus; 
S, t fl@ I i, si- ti- 
(sl + So t fi@,! ', Sý ti- 
and thus 
Sý t fl@li- si- ti- 
(S'. + so t fl@,: ý) ti- 
This choice of rule for -+- automatically ensures that skip 
is a zero of choice. (In order to have 
an operational treatment that was identical to the denotational. one, then, we would have to 
deal with choice differently, since the denotational semantics does not give P+ skip = P. ) 
Parallel composition gives rise to the most complicated set- of transition rules of all. As men- 
tioned above, we shall decompose a parallel composition into a set of terms that will be 
allowed to proceed independently, via the' transition relation. 
This set will be written with continental quotes, (< and )), rather than f and ), since the order 
of elements in it is (superficially) important: remember that asynchronous events are represent- 
ed as synchronisations with the silent event of the other partner in _11_, so we need the order to 
ensure that we get the right partner. This order does not lead to any observable difference 
Page 178 Chapter Four - An algebraic entelechYl 
Time, causality, and concurrency David Murphy 
between the processes P 11 Q and Q If P, though, so it is merely technical. Where necessary 
we carry the synchronisation relation S around, writings<<- >>. 
We have, then, a transition to get us into the grapes; 
(s, 
Sil S2) t 
(1, T)@l 
4 S<<(SI I)i 
(S2 t))O' 
Notice that this rule, (and the one eliminating << >>, together) automatically 'ensure that skip 
is a zero of -11-. 
Now we introduce genuine parallel execution. There are three separate things that can 
happen as a parallel composition evolves; either an asynchronous event from one component 
occurs, or an asynchronous event from the other, or a synchronisation. 
The first two cases can be dealt with so: 
S. t fl@l 
i') 
si- tý 
Sý((Sl t)y 
(S2 t)ý)(fl' SO(Sý tl'), 
(S2 t)ýý 
and so: 
S, t fl@, i, ) Sý 11 
S(((S2 t)? 
(SI 
S(((S2 t)i 
(Sl' tl')ýý 
Synchronisation relies on the times being right and both events being in the synchronisa- 
tion set: 
_S 
It 
fl(ý 
)SI & S2 I' 
f2@1: ý) 
Sý 6& [ti' ti + A(fl)] n ItZ t: ý+ A(f2)1: t- 0& (fl, f2) 
t), (S2 t))ý 
(fl'f2)@l 
S<<(Sl' tl), 
(Sý 6)>> 
where t--- min(ti-, 6) 
So, we decompose a parallel composition into a set of terms that will be allowed to evolve 
independently. Our definition of a transition involving a synchronisation is slightly different 
from the usual one due to the nature of synchronisation in IPA (see above); we can observe 
the composite (fl, f2) resulting from the synchronisation of the events fi and f2 if their times 
overlap (the clause [ti- + A(fl)] n [t: r + Q2)] * 0) and if they are . 'meant' to synchronise, 
that is, the event (fjji) is in the synchronisation set (the clause(fi, f2) E S)). 
The duration of a compound event is the union of their durations. Without loss of generali- 
tY, suppose ti'< t:; r. Then A(fjji) = max (ti' + A((, ), tj + A(f2)) - 
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When both components of the composition have terminated, we return to a single locus of 
control: 
So(skip ti), (skip t2)>> 
(11'921-4 
skip t- where t' = max(ti, t2) 
The order in which. we are allowed to fire events in a parallel composition respects the 
branching order <b (and, hence, causality), not the linear order <, so sometimes we can allow 
one parallel stream of execution to evolve first and then deal with another. 
The choice we are allowed to make in deciding which transition to fire corresponds precisely 
to the different interleavings possible under an interleaving semantics. 
Notice that our operational semantics, in the atomic rules, has assumed an implicit 
quantification over time. It does not have to be that way; if we had an event fastidious that 
could only happen at certain times, say during some set allowed(fastidious) Cz R, its 
introduction rule would be different; 
re allowed(f astidious). 
(l, fastidi us)(214(skip)(t+A(e)) et 
By this means we can reason about events with limited firing times, or events whose times are 
otherwise constrained. 
It should be mentioned that a main topic we shall not tackle is observational equivalence. 
While there does not seem to be any obvious problem in using our transition system to define 
an observational equivalence (in the style of bisimulation equivalence say), it seems more natu- 
ral to concentrate on equivalences of implementational structures, as considered in chapter 
three. 
For convenience the transition rules are now gathered up and stated together. Here we shall 
adopt the overloaded x--), which stands for both the conventional 
): (S x Time) x (LEViPA x Time) x (S x Time) 
and the gape 
: (S x Time)2 X (LEvIPA x Time) x (S >ý T ime)2 
This has the merit of allowing us to write x) in some premises, which matches all suitable 
transitions, not just ones involving ), as was the case above. 
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Atomic actions 
(s kip) (t + A(e)) 
stop stop (t + 
Sequential Composition 
st ti ý4 f1@1 f, 4 SI, ti, 
(wait t') twY, *@'4 (skip) (t+ t') 
for any t'> c 
David Murphy 
1 12, S2 t2 )(I Sý 
(SI ; S2) A, I 
f2@ t i' 
, 4L@tý' ýW; S2) tl' 
(skip ; S2) t2 Xý Sý 
Choice 
- 
S. t )(fl@lf') Sý tý ý.. (SI + SO tX fj@l j, ý Sý tý 
S, t fl@, 
ý) 
S. - ti- 
f1@1j, (S2 + SO fX, ) Sý tý 
Parallelism 
Introduction of parallelism 
(s, 
Sil S2) t )4 
(1, T)@ I 
SCý(Sl 
Op (S2 0ýý 
Asynchrony 
sý t)(fl@IF) sý tý 
S«(SI t)i 
(S2 t> 
A *)@liA 
S«W tl)t 
(S2 t3» 
DEFINITION 4.3 - The 
Operational Semantics 
of IPA 
Si tx fl@, 
f') 
si ti 
S'(ý(S2 t'), 
(SI t))ý SO(S2 t'), 
(Sl' tl'))ý 
Synchronisation 
SI tX SI tý & S2 t' X-f2@1f) Sý 6& [I]-, tC+ A(fl)) r) ft: ý, tý'+ Q2)] 0& (fIJ2) ES 
SO(Sl t), 
(S2 t)ýý X 
(fl, f2)@l 
S(<(SI tl')y 
W h)ý) where t-= min(ti', tj) 
Removal of parallelism 
so(skip ti), (skip t2))) skip max(ti, t2) where r= max(ti, t2) 
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4.5 Aside - Petri nets and Process Algebra 
The purpose of this aside is to discuss the net-theoretic interpretation of various process- 
algebraic constructs, including those found in IPA. 
Petri nets are very well known models of concurrency. An extensive bibliography concern- 
ing them can be found in [Best & Fernandez 19881; [Reisig 1985] is a good introduction. We 
shall concentrate on a subclass of Petri nets known as C/E nets, both because they are sim- 
pler than general Petri nets, and because they are more suited to our purpose of discussing 
asynchronous implementational or behavioural models. Section 4.4 in [Best & Fernandez 
1988] gives an extensive discussion of the special properties of C/E nets (referred to there 
as I-safe nets). 
DEFINITION 4.5 - Condition/event nets 
A (finite) Petri net N is a triple (S, T-, F) where 
(i) S is a (finite) set of places, 
(ii) Tis a (finite) set of transitions, such that S r) T= 0 and 
(iii) Fis aflowrelation, that is a relation over (Sx 7) u (Tx S). 
We write x- = F(x) for the presei of xeSuT and -x = F-1(x) for the postset of x. This 
notation generalises to sets of places or transitions; we write *X for ( -x I -x r= X) with X c; S 
orX c: T. I 
A net is called pure (or acyclic) if it does not contain any self-loops, that is pairs (s, t), 
with seS, teT such that (s, t) EF and (t, S) E F. It is advantageous to interpret the flow, 
relation F as a function F: (S u 7) x (T u S) -> [0,1) with F(x, y) =I just when F holds 
between x and 
The dynamic behaviour of a Petri net is explained by assuming a set of tokens. A marking 
is a function M: S ---> N that indicates how many tokens are on each place. The initial distribu- 
tion of tokens around the places of a net is called the. initial marking, Mo. A transition can fire 
if it has at least one token on its input places, which results in the token appearing at an out- 
put place of the transition, so the initial marking is graduýlly transformed. Formally, a 
transition t r= T is enabled in a marking M (written M enables t) iff Vs C: S. F(s, t) :5 M(s). If 
the transition t transforms a marking M to a marking M' then we write M[t>M'. 'Me mark- 
ing M'can be deduced from M and t by the following rule; 
Mft>M' 4=; > M enables t& Vs c- S. M'(s) = M(s) - F(s, t) + F(t, s) 
In future we shall specify nets together with the initial markings, writing E= (S, T; F, Mo) 
for the net (S, T; F) together with the initial marking Mo. A marking M is said to be accessi- 
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ble or reachable from Mo if there is some sequence of transitions to, ti, t2, ..., r. and markings MI, M2, 
..., M. such 
thatMO[tO>Ml[tl>M2[ 
... 
>Mn[tn>M- 
Two transitions tj and t2are concurrently enabledifVS ES . F(s, ti) + F(s, 
t2): 5 M(s). 
A condition/event net (or CIE net) is a pure Petri net 7, having at most one token per place 
in any reachable marking. (Often the set of places S is also referred to as a set of conditions 
(sometimes notated B, from the German Bedingung), while the set of transitions T is some- 
times called a set of events, notated E. ) In the case of C/E nets, markings can just be 
thought of as the set of conditions that have tokens on them. Such a subset'c C; S is known as 
a case. For e ci T, e is said to be c-enabled if -e c- c and e- nc=0, so c can allow e to occur, 
but any result of the firing of c does not interfere with e. In this case the transition rule can be 
simplified to 
c[t>c' <* c' = (c - -e) u e- 
where - denotes set-theoretic subtraction. 
The type of the flqNv relation is then - 
[->ý- : pB xEx j9B 
An occurrence net is a pure Petri net Y, where no state comes from or goes to more than 
one transition. That is, Vs c S. I -sl: 5 1& Is-1: 5 1. 
(We will not discuss here the timed nets of [Ramchandan 1974], nor connect full ATLTSs 
with nets. Eventually we hope to understand the connection between ATLTSs and timed net 
models, but such a connection will probably rely on the interpretation of nets as symmetric 
monoidal categories; discussing that here would take us too far out of our way. ) 
Nets can be represented diagrammatically by showing places as boxes, transitions as cir- 
cles and the flow relation as an arrow connecting the relevant circles and boxes. Tokens-are 
represented by solid smaller circles at the appropriate place. ne first example (overleaf) 
should make the definitions clearer. Note that this net is not an occurrence net. 
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EXAMPLE -A simple C/E net 
The following C/E net should make the definitions clearer; 
Figure 4.5 -A C/E net 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
Here we have S=(1,2,3,4,5), E =" I a, b, c, d), F=( (1, a), (2, a), (a, 3), (a, 4), (3, c), 
(4, c), (4, d), (d, 2), (d, 5), (c, 5), (5, b), (b, 1)). The event a is ( 1,2 )-enabled, while d 
is not thus enabled, but it is 4 )-enabled. The initial marking is ( 1,2) and the following pre- f 
and post-sets can be seen; *b 5), b* 1), 4* = (c, d), *c3,4) etc. 
(Here and in future Courier-Oblique will be used for places and Courier for transi- 
tions. ) 
From the initial marking only [a) is enabled. Various markings can occur as a result of 
this transition; firing the transition a gives rise to the marking M(1) = M(2) = M(5) = 0, 
M(3) = M(4) = 1. After this, either c or d may fire, (giving rise to M(1) = M(2) = M(3) 
M(4) = 0, M(5) =I and M(l) = M(4) = 0, M(2) M(3) = M(5) =I respectively). In both 
cases we can fire b resulting in the marking M(2) M(3) = M(4) = M(5) = 0, M(1) =1 in 
the former case and M(4) = M(5) = 0, M(1) = M(2) = M(3) =I in the latter. The former 
marking is deadlocked, but the latter can then proceed to fire another a, demonstrating its 
non-C/E character. 
41 4, 
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EXAMPLE - The interpretation of process-algebraic operators in nets 
This example briefly discusses net representations of common constructions in process 
algebras. We will give a series of transitions involving fragments of IPA, in the style of the 
previous section, together with a net representation. The marking before and after the transi- 
tion will be shown. 
Transition Net before firing Net after firing 
e e 
ee4 skip e e 
skip skip 
Figure 4.5 - The net corresponding to some simple process-algebraic operators 
So the occurrence of the event e, transforming the process e into the process skip can be 
seen as analogous to the firing of a token from a place e to a place skip via a transition e. 
Transitions resulting from other rules can be similarly interpreted, giving an intuitive 
meaning to process-algebraic operators in terms of nets. (See overleaf. ) 
There is a fundamental difference between the parallelism evident in process algebras and 
in nets. In a process algebra we write P 11 Q for a single process consisting of the processes P 
and Q running in parallel - we think of a single entitY. which starts both P and Q off and which 
can be said to be over. In net terrns, parallelism means complete independence; unconnected 
nets bear no relationship whatsoever to each other. The differeqce may be a slight and philo- 
sophical one, but it affects how we choose to compile parallelism. ([Olderog 1989], which 
inspired this example, takes a. different course and ignores this difference. ) 
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Transition Net before firing Net after firing 
p+P, p p+p p+p p+ p+p 
or a b ab or ab 
fi 
p +p P, p p 0 pp 0 pp 
0 plip, PlIA p "' p 11 p plij j 
p P, P, P, 
pp p po p 
p 
(ý)p 
p 
(i)p 
<( P, P, >> q, p'>> f f 
q q 
p p p p 
<(P, p'>> <(q, q'>> f 
X 
f 
x 
qý q 0 cqrl 0 q 
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The examples on the previous page related to the introduction and evolution of parallelism 
and to choice. We now need to see how to eliminate parallelism and how to deal with sequential- 
ity: - 
Transition Net before firing Net after firing 
0 skip 0 skip skip skip 
<(skip, skip>> skip 
0p p 
a a 
Pq p p 
b b 
q 0q 
Figure 4.6 - The net corresponding to some simple process- algebraic operators 
For more examples of the use of Petri nets in modelling process algebras the reader is 
referred to [Degano et al. 19871, [Degano et al. 19881, [Goltz 19881, [Goltz & Mycroft 19841, 
[Goltz & Reisig 1983], [Olderog 1987], [Olderog 19891, [Shields 1987] and to [van Glabbeek & 
Vdandrager 1987]. A comprehensive survey, discussion and series of constructions is given in 
[Taubner 19891. We must press on to investigate the relationship between our denotational. and 
axiomatic semantics. 
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4.6 The relationship between the semantics of IPA 
In this section we will study the relationship between the semantics of IPA, that is, 
between the operator C and the laws (axiomatic semantics) given in section 4.2. Some 
results (from [Hennessy 1988]) will be of use in proving results about the equivalence of 
these semantics, and we will begin by providing a framework for this proof. Recursion will 
not be considered here- 
The syntax of finite IPA can be thought of as determined by a set of constants (functions 
of arity 0) and functions acting upon them and other funcfions. We shall refer to this set as 
IPA; it consists of the following functions 
of arity 0 e, wait t for e E= E, te R* 
of arity 2 _; _, -11, -+- 
Any expressions in IPA is a member of tile. ternz algebra of IPA, TPA. This is just the 
application-closed set of these functions. Thus, for instance, the expression 
b); (c 11 d) 
can be decomposed into the application of the function -11- onto a and 
b, and onto c and d, 
together with an application of the function _; _ onto 
(a 11 b) and (c 11 d) . 
We shall'use fk for a function f of arity k. 
DEFINITION 4.8 - The tenn algebra over a signature 
The term algebra, Tim over the set of functions (or, more properly, signature) IPA is thus, 
the least set of strings which satisfies 
(i) if f' E IPA then f' E TjpA, and 
(ii) if f' E IPA then V (si, ..., 
S,, ) E TpA, whenever sl, ..., s. E 
Tim, for it > 0. 
Thus by rule (i) a, b, c and d are in TjpA, and, hence, by rule (ii), the IPA ten-ns (a 11 b), 
(c 11 d) and (a 11 b) ; (c 11 d) are. 
Some authors call our signatures (i. e. sets of functions with explicit indication of domain 
and range) many-sorted algebras. The BNF for the syntax of IPA defines the functions of 
IPA and their types adequately. We shall use as little of the theory of many-sorted algebras 
as necessary; see JADJ 19781 for details. 
'III- 
The set of terms Ty should be thought of as a language; its semantics is an algebra over 
that language. 
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One answer is a signature algebra, or Y, -algebra. This comprises a signature, and a mean- 
ing set, A, of all possible meanings of terms generated from E, and is usually written <A, Y, >. 
Variables that range over Y, -algebras will take the names of the underlying meaning sets and 
underscores, so we shall write A= <A, Z>. 
Any semantics for IPA can be thought of as an IPA-algebra, <A, IPA> for some set of 
meanings A. The set A is also referred to as the carrier. 
Notice that the term algebra, TIpA, is also an IPA-algebra; it is <IPA*, IPA>, the set A 
being just the set of all terms. This corresponds to the semantics which assigns the same 
meaning to terms if and only if they are syntactically identical, and this meaning is just the 
term itself. 
DEFINITION 4.9 - Homoniorphisms of signature algebras 
Two signature algebras, say A= <A, Y_> and B= <B, Y_> can be related by giving a func- 
tion from one carrying set to the other which preserves the structure induced by the 
signature. Such a function is called a signature algebra homomorphism or just a Y, -homomor- 
phism. If h: A -> B then h is a E-homomorphism if 
Vfk E E. h (f'(a 1, ..., 
ak)) = fk (h (a, ), ..., 
h(ak)) 
that is, if it preserves the structure of the meanings induced by the functions. This definition 
of morphism give's a category of Y--algebras over a given- signature E; [Bednarczyk 1987] has 
the details. 
-01, 
Notice that the denotational semantics C associates an I. E. S. with a termAime pair and 
the axiomatic semantics defines a relation between terms, so we have, denoting by A the. 
axiomatic semantics: 
C: Proc --ý IES 
A: Proc x Proc 
Our aim in this section is to solve the fidl abstraction problem, that is, to show that all the 
semantics are equivalent. We shall do this by showing that the-, if two tem-vtime pairs can be 
proved to be equal within the laws of the axiomatic semantics, then they will be assigned 
behaviourally identical I. E. S. s as their denotations. 
The full abstraction problem, then, presupposes a concept of behavioural equivalence, and 
a notion of how to discuss terms that "can be shown to be the same using the axiomatic 
semantics. " Usually this notion is merely equality (of meanings), but for us it will be one of 
the equivalences of chapter three. (The reasons for this decision are discussed below. ) 
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We have seen that we can encapsulate a semantics algebraically as a Y'algebra; our 
denotational. semantics, for instance, is a particular Yalgebra over <IES, E>. This insight 
enables us to relate semantics; we could, for instance, if we had some event structure 
semantics for IPA, <ES, Z>, relate this to the one given by the denotational. semantics, 
<IES, Z>, by giving a E-homomorphism h: IES --> ES. 
The two semantics*'would then be isomorphic (in the algebraic sense) if we could provide 
two Fhomomorphisms h: IES --> ES and i: ES -4 TES; we would then have (using semantic 
brackets like II to extract meaning) 
ISI 
IES ýI S' 
I 
MS <-* 
0SI 
ES =I S' 
I 
ES 
(It should be mentioned en passant that we are very unlikely to be able to do this because 
it is hard to imagine how two equivalent event structures could always give rise to two 
equivalent I. E. S. (as there is considerable freedorn in generating the timing information). ) 
DEFINITION 4.10 - Initiality in classes of Z-algebras 
For any class of !. -algebras, C, an algebra I ca C is initial in C if for all IEC there is a 
unique E-lioniomorphism from I to J. 
. I. 
The concept of initiality, like that of an initialobject in category theory, is something like 
that of a canonical object. An object, 1, is the canonical or natural object to represent a class 
if it is in the class and it has the least structure necessary to be there. Since morphisms pre- 
serve structure, and since the object with the least structure is the one which shares its 
structure with everything else, the object with the least structure will have morphism going 
from it to every other object, and thus will be initial. (Obviously if there are two or more ini- 
tial objects it does not matter which one you pick as there are homomorphisms from one to 
the other and back; initial objects are unique up to isomorphism. To see this note that if I and 
J are initial then there are maps f: I -) J and g: J -> I and hence, by composition, maps f. g: 
I -) I and g. f: J -) J. But idl is a map, and since I is initial it must be the unique one from I 
to itself. Hence gj= idl and similarlyf. g= idj. Thus] and J are isomorphic. ) 
THEOREM - Initiality 
The ten-n algebra, Tj:, is initial in the class of all E-algebras. Proof - [Hennessy 1988). 
418. 
Our aim is to compare the denotational and axiomatic semantics of IPA, to show that they 
are compatible. First we shall have to prove that 
Page 190 Chapter Four - An algebraic entelechy 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
(i) the denotational semantics agees 
equality induced by the axiomatic semant 
semantics, and 
David Murphy 
with the axiomatic semantics, that is, any 
cs must be respected by the denotational 
(ii) the axiomatic semantics agrees with the denotational semantics, that is, 
expressions equal under interpretation in IES must be provably equal under the 
axiomatic semantics. This means that of all the possible respectful denotational seman- 
tics, ours is a 'natural' one; it makes only as many identifications as it must. This. 
notion will now be made more precise. 
DEFINITION 4.11 -A deductive system for IPA 
Let E be the set of equations 
P sil Q=QS. P11 P 
Slil (Q S21 I R) = (P S311 Q) S41 I 
P sll wait t= wait t sil P=P 
P; skip... = skip; P=P 
P; (Q; R)'= (P; Q); R 
+Q=+ 
P+P =p 
P+(Q+R) (P+Q)+R 
(P + Q);,, R (P; R) + (Q; R) 
(P + Q) S11 R (P S11 R) + (Q sil R) 
wait t; wait t' wait (t + t') 
where (b, a) E S'P c: * (a, b) ES (4.1) 
where (SI, 
S2) (-4 (S3, S4) (4.2) 
where t:! ý min(A(P)) (4.3) 
(4.4). 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
(4.10) 
(4.11) 
together with the deduction rules§ 
s=s 
s= S', S, = S, 
s=S, 
s S, 
S, s 
sl sh ---ý Sk Sk' 
fk(SI, ýk) = fk(S ... 
') I Sk 
This set of equations will be referred to as the deductive systetfi for E or DED(E). We write 
s =Es' if it is possible to deduce s= s' in DED(E). The class of all IPA-algebras which sat- 
isfy E will be written C(E). Thus (i) above reduces to proving that <IES, IPA> is in C(E), 
and (ii) to showing that it is initial in this class. 
I- We should really have dealt with substitution here as well, to ensure that we can make deductions about 
expressions containing variables, but this is all standard material, and it would cloud the results. 
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(The law P (Xp211 P=P, which we previously allowed, only 
holds is (e, e) is taken to be 
observationally equivalent to e, which is not, in general, so. ) 
A deductive system DED(E) is said to be sound with respect to a relation R if s ý--E s' ý-* 
(s, s') ER, and complete with respect to R if (s, s') c- 
R! 
-> S -Es' A denotational semantics 
A can be thought of as giving a relation over terms, with (s, s) ER <* Is JA =I S' IA* Thus A 
is sound if it is in C(. ]E)-and complete if it is initial in C(E). 
THEOREM - Soundness and completeness of DED(E) 
The proof system DED(E) is SOUnd and complete with respect to =c. 
Proof - [Hennessy 19881. 
The proof of (i) thus has the satisfying bonus of providing a sound and complete proof sys- 
tem for IPA, DED(E), as a by-product. (We keep writing DED(E) rather than just DED 
to indicate that our results hold for the deductive system based on any set of equations like 
not just on the partiCular ones given. ) 
DEFINITION 4.12 - E-congnience 
A relation, R, is a Z-congmence over A= <A, Z> if 
(i) R is an equivalence relation over A, and 
(ii) R respects the structure induced by F,: Vfl e E. (at, al), ..., (ak, 
ak') eR 
(fk(a 
i, ..., 
ak), fk(a, ...... ak')) (= R. 
LEMNIA - The congruence =E is a E-congruence. Proof - (Hennessy 1988]. 
DEFINITION 4.13 - Factored algebras 
Suppose that we have a E-algebra A= <A, E> and a E-congruence, R, over it. Let AIR 
be the set of equivalence classes of A induced by R. The equivalence class of a single ele- 
ment, as we saw in chapter three, is [a]R =[a' I (a, a') E R), so AIR = f[a]R Ia ez A). 
Define functions over equivalence classes thus fIA/R (fa, ]R, ..., fak], ý) = ffl: (ai, ..., 
ak)]R. 
THEOREM - The factored Z-algebra Ty is initial in C(E). Proof - [Hennessy 1988]. 
This theorem provides an example of the denotational semantics that satisfies any 
axiomatic semantics R and is 'natural. ' It is the term algebra with the equivalence induced 
by the laws factored out. Unfortunately this is not a particularly useful form to have it in. It 
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would be nice to find a IPA-algebra which was initial in C(E) (and hence a natural choice) 
but which was a little more informative. We see that 
The requirement (ii) amounts to proving that the denotational semantics 
<IES, IPA> is initial in C(E). 
We have an algebraic characterisation of the axiomatic semantics A; it is the 
factored IPN--algebra TIPA/=I: - 
HYPOTHESIS - The denotational satisfies the axiomatic semantics. 
The denotational semantics is in the class of Z-algebra that satisfy the axiomatic seman- 
tics, that is <IES, IPA> (= C(E) or 
S =E S' =ý C(S) = C(S') 
Unfortunately this is not true; the denotational semantics has too much structure. The 
obvious counter example to our desired soundness result is a+a,, because a+a -`E a but, of 
course, C(a + a):;, -L C(a). The position we are in is this 
Operational semantics Axiomatic Denotational semantics 
semantics c (I. E. S. ) 
or 
t 
I 
But all is not lost. We merely want the two meanings of s and s' to behave the same way 
if s =E s, not to be the same. Hence, if we have some sort of notion of behavioural 
equivalence, -a congruence on IES that holds when two I. E. S. have identical behaviours, - 
say, - where 
-: IES x IES 
then the soundness result we really want is 
s =E S, =* C(s) - C(s) 
That means that the denotational semantics <IES, IPA> will be in C(E) if we are allowed 
to forget structure that - doesn't notice in constructing our Z-homomorphisms. This 
amounts to showing that <IES/-, IPA> is in C(E). (We should also prove that - is a congru- 
ence of the IPA structure. ) 
(The observant reader will have noticed that C(skip) is undefined, and so, as + is strict, 
C(s + skip) is also undefined. This shows why we cannot let skip be a proper process: - 
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At the moment we are safe, as skip is not an Proc, and we only want C and =: E 
to agree on Procs, not necessarily on Procs u (skip). 
However, making skip a process would force us to give it a denotation, which 
we do not want to do, as we wish to avoid infinitesimal ly-timed interval event 
structures. A theory of I. E. S. involving infinitesimal structures is beyond the 
scope of this Mork. Of course, there is an obvious denotation for skip; it is the 
I. E. S. 0, but we do not want to make this identification yet. ) 
DEFINITION 4.14 - The observational equivalence - 
Which congruence, of all those presented in chapter three, should be chosen here ? The 
idea is that - is the most detailed behavioural equivalence. This means that we should not 
chose an equivalence that cannot be justified as a testing equivalence; we should be able to 
tell if C(s) - C(s') merely by observation. 
The strongest testing equivalence that we can (philosophically) justify is -r, the strict 
timed observational equivalence. We shall choose this as the congruence as -, and write - 
to mean -, y., in future. 
THEOREM -C is sound with respect to /'I "modulo" the observational equivalence 
That is, we have, to prove Vs, s' c TjpA . 
C(s) - C(s') => s =r, s'. 
L 
Proof - By structural indLICtion. As a base case consider the atomic actions e and wait t 
for t>0. Clearly e e' unless e=e, and wait t #iz wait t' unless t= t' and furthen-nore 
for no e and for no t do we have wa it t =,: e so for atomic terms a; 
a =:,. a'=:: > C(a) - C(a') 
since this only happens if a= a', and certainly C(a) - C(a). 
Now we must perform the indUCtiVe step. There are cases corresponding to each of equa- 
tion 4.1-1 It 
(i) p sli Q=Q sil p. We have C(P sll Q) - QQ sll P) by construction, so this case is 
immediate. 
(ii) P Sill (Q S211 R) = (P S311 Q) S411 R, where (SI, S2) <--) (S3, S4). This holds by 
construction of ". 
I 
(iii) P s1l wait t=p. Suppose C(P s1l skip) =3 "T 3'. Here SWY is empty and STTS' -p 
3, so this case is immediate provided V5 A(P). 
(iv) P; skip = skip ;P=P. This is true, if tedious to verify, by construction. 
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(V) P; (Q; R) = (P; Q); R. Ditto. 
(vi) P+Q=Q+P. This is immediate since C(P + Q) - QQ + P) by construction. 
(vii) P+P=P. This follows from chapter three, where we noticed C(P + P) - C(P). 
(Viii) P+ (Q + R) = (P + Q) + R. Again, by construction. 
(ix) (P + Q) ;R ==ý. (P ; R) + (Q ; R). This follows from the definition of E(P + Q) t as the 
union of E(i? ) t and E(Q) 1. It is worth seeing in some detail: 
((P + Q) ; R) = f. st(D ((P + Q) ; R) (0)) 
= fst(E (P + Q) (0) (D E (R) (F(P + Q» (0», (F(R) (ti) 1 tie F(P + Q) (0») 
=E (P + Q) (0) (D (E (R) (F (P + Q» 10») 
= (E (P) (0) +E (Q) 10 1) (B (E (R) (F (P +0 (0 ») 
Take p=E (P) (0), q=E (Q) (0) for convenience. Then, the above 
= (p + q) (D (E (R) (F (P +C1 (»» 
= (p + q) (D (E (R) (F (P) (t) uF (Q) UM) 
- (p @ (R) F (P) (0» + (q (D E (R) (t) F (Q) (0» 
(E (P) (0) (D E (R) F(P) (0» + (E (Q) (t) 0E (R) (tl F(Q) (0» 
= (E (P ; R) (0» + (E (Q; R) 10» 
fst(D «P ; R) + (Q *, R» (0 1) 
C«P ; R) + (Q; R» 
as required. 
(X) (P + Q) S11 R= (P S11 R) + (Q S11 R). Again, a tedious expansion of the defintions 
gives C ((P + Q) s1l R) -C ((P S11 R) + (Q S11 R)). The only point to note is the way the 
clauses aE (xP, bE (xQ in the definition of the I. E. S. synchronisafion set T= [((n, a), (n', b)) 
I (a, b) E S, n, n' E N, aE aP, bE (xQ) ensures the same synchronisation behaviour of the 
LHS and RNS of the law. 
(xi) wait t; wait t' = wait (t + 0. Straightforward; both C(wait t) and C(wait tý 
are empty with durations t and t' respectively; C(wait t; wait tý is thus also empty with 
duration t+ t'. 
*11, 
There are two ways of proving that a semantics A is initial amoungst all those that satisfy 
a class of equations. One can either construct a homomorphism. h from A to any member of 
the class, and prove it unique, or one can show that, for all terms s and s' 
IS IA -I SAA => S =r S' 
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THEOREM - Completeness of the denotational semantics. 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
The denotational semantics is initial in the class of Z-algebra that satisfy the axiomatic 
semantics, that is <IES, IPA> c C(E). 
C(S) - C(s I) => s =r, SI 
Proof: We adopt ihe second of the two methods given above. For convenience, the sub- 
script y- is dropped from ~ from now on. 
Clearly C(e) -/ Qe') unless e=e, and C(wait ti) / C(wait ti) unless tj = ti and fur- 
then-nore C(e) -1 C(wait ti) ever, so we have the base case. 
Next note that for an action a, C(a) -/ C(sj + s2) unless s, ý S2 = a. Furthermore, we know 
that C(a) -1 C(s, 11 S2) unless a= si and S2 = wait t for t :5 min(A(a)). Finally C(a) -/ C(SI 
S2) unless s, = skip orS2 = skip ora = wait t- &s, = wait I& si = wait t'& t- = t+ t'. 
') ý: * (S] 0 S2) ýE (S] ý Now we have to show that 
C(SI 0 S2) - C(Si 0' S2 s) 
for 
pp c- 111, a straightforward double structural induction. 
Consider first C(SI + S2). From the definition of C(s, + s2) as a coproduct of the meanings 
of s, and S2 we know that C(s, + s2) -/ C(sj + sý) unless the sets [C(SA C(s2)) and [C(si), 
C(Q) are equal or unless s2= Q+R, Si = Sj +Q& sý = R. Next note C(s, + s2) -1 
C(s 
i; s ý) 
unless s, ='skip and sý = s, + hor sý = skip & s, =SI +S2ors, =S2=Sl ; sý or Si =P+Q 
& SI =P; Sý & S2 =Q; sj. The last case for + 
is C(SI + S2) 'IC(si 11 Q. This holds unless s, 
=P 11 Sý, S2 =Q 11 Sý & Sý =P+Q or s, = S2 = SI (I sý or one of the siý is a wait t and the other 
ISSI +S2- 
Next consider C(si ; S2). This is even easier as C(s, ; s2) -/ C(s! ; sý) unless something is 
a skip or s, -.:: SI & Si : -- S2. Furthermore C(s, ; s2) -1 C(si 11 sý) unless one of si is skip or 
one of siý is a wa it t and the other is s, ; s2. 
Finally consider C(SI 11 S2). Again, C(s, II S2) :; 6EC(s! 
11 
sý) unless one of the Cs is wait t 
or the sets 
(C(SO, QS2)) and (C(si), Qsý)) are equal. The only other case is the multiple 
composition P S111 (Q S211 R) = (P S311 Q) S411 R (where the conjugation (SI, S2) (S3, S4) 
holds), this follows by construction so the theorem holds. 
. $I,, 
This completes the treatment of IPA proper. In the interlude we briefly examine a tech- 
nique for including external choice in IPA and for treating recursion, before returning to 
I. E. S. s, and in particular to their specification and refinement, in the next chapter. 
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Interlude - External choice and Recursion 
In this interlude some suggestions are given for a treatment of external choice and recur- 
sion in IPA. A category of embeddings is discovered, and its use in giving a sheaf-theoretic 
model of timing is investigated. 
A4.0 External Choice 
The intuition behind CSP external choice H is very simple: in 
P =, jf (a -) Q) U (b -> 
the process P offers the environment the choice of doing a or b. If the environment 'wants' a 
then it does an a too, resulting in a synchronisation and P doing Q next; 
S) =a --> (Q 11 S) 
and similarlY for b; 
P 11 (b -4 T)=b -) (RII T) 
The natural way to include this fonn of choice into IPA is to introduce a new choice opera- 
tor, written _LL, with the 
intention that 
Q) [F] (b; R) 
means the environment is offered a or b to synchronise with. If it synchronises with a, then Q 
happens next, while if it synchronises with b, R happens next. However, if no 
synchronisation takes place F occurs. This alternative is necessary since our view of a 
process is as an independent entity, so its progress should not be interrupted by the failure 
of the environment to do something. (Notice that both synchronisations cannot occur, since 11 
is a binary operator; we are looking for a or b from the environment, not (*, a) or (b, *). ) Thus 
we have: 
EC =df a; Q [F] b; R 
EC Sil a; S= (a; Q) 11 (a; S) 
EC sli b; T= (b; R) 11 (b; T) 
EC Sll c; U=F Sil c; U 
EC S11 (a 11 b) =F S11 (a 11 b) 
Here S= ((a, a), (b, b)). The synchronisation must be available as soon as the choice 
starts to execute; the environment must already be doing a matching action, or staft one as 
soon as the choice process starts. 
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If A(b) = t, then 
EC S11 (wait t; a; S) =F S11 (wait t; a; S) 
Time, causality, and concurrency 
(wait 1/2; EC) S11 (b; T) = (wait 1/2; b; R) 11 (b; T) 
(wait t; EC) S11 (b; T) = (wait t; b; R) 11 (b; T) 
(wait 3t/2; EC)Sll (b; T)= (wait 3t/2; F) 11 (b; T) 
The operational semantics of this new form of choice are clear; if 
(SI t Sl tý & S2 t' 
f2@ 1: ý3, 
Sý 6&t:! ý t' & 
[ti-) tr+ A(fl)] (-I W') t: ý+ AVA #: 0& (flif2) E S) 
then 
(S'*((SI 0, (S2[S3]S4 t'))> 
(fl, f2)@ 
S(<(si 
0, W ti)>> 
and 
(f], f2)@ I 
Sýý(Sl t), 
(S4[S3]S2 t')ýý SO(Sl' 
6), (S2 
else, 
(if S3 t h2l& s; t; then 
SO(SI 1), 
(S4[S3]S2 t')ýý 
f3@tS' 
S<<(SI t), 
(S; t; )>>). 
where t--- min(tC, t: ý) 
where t'-- min(ti-, t: ý)) 
(In the above we have used if ... then ... else to make the reading of the transition rules 
clearer. In general one should read something like: 
sl t fi@tf, ) Si ti 
S<<(SI t)p 
(S2 t)ýý 
(fl 
' *)(ý- 
t ý' 
S << 
(S I' tl')) 
(S2 t) ý> 
as 'if s, starting at time t can evolve via a transition f, seen starting at time ti" into sý which 
is incapable of further action until t, then so(si t); (S2 t>ý can evolve via the transition 
seen starting at time t, " into so(si, 
tlýt (S2 
The correct denotational characterisation of external choice is unclear. A tentative 
axiomatic characterisation of external choice might be, given (a, aýeS, and (a, c) e S: 
Q) [F] (b; R) = (b; R) [F] 
Q) [F] (b; R)) S11 a'; S= (a; Q) Sll (a; S) 
Q) [F] (b; R) S11 C; U=F Sll C; U 
I 
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A4.1 The categorical semantics of IPA with recursion 
Here, and in the next few section, we give some thoughts on how recursion might be treat- 
ed in a categorical setting, roughly following [Bednarczyk 1987]. 
In this subsection all times are measured relative to t=0, the assumed start of all things. 
We will only treat singly-nested guarded recursion. Consider some recursively-defined pro- 
cess gx. P and sdihe candidate I. E. S. meaning for it (LE-, Con', <b). Clearly, for every 
n the process 
/ 
X] 
n [stop 
pn=p P 
is finite. (Where the large square brackets denote substitution as usual. ) 
For convenience define PO = stop. Between each unwinding and the next there is some 
time, t,, ER such that the n1h unwinding has just finished and (iz+l)th has just started. 
Further, each unwinding, being finite, has a well-defined meaning, Sn say: 
Vn cN. _I n =e,. f 
C(p n) 0 
We have to show that the lim ý3n is well-defined. The crux of this is the t. s. First note 
n -4 
that t,, = end(Sn-1) and that 30 = 1. 
Clearly the meaning, S" say, truncated at t,, must match the intended meaning; t 
Vit r= N. 3n= S-. -ti 
so that S- approximates P at every stage. We conjecture that there is a morphism, from Sn to 
! 3n+l in UES for all it and that this is an embedding [Coquand 1988]. 
This leads us to conjecture that the category of embeddings HES whose objects are com- 
putational interval event structures, and where there is an arrow from S to S'just when 
3tcR. S= T-t't 
might be appropriate for dealing with recursion. The treatment should proceed much as indi- 
cated by [Smyth & Plotkin 1982]. 
A4.2 The operational semantics of IPA Nvith recursion 
Recall that the axiomatic semantics of recursion was 
PX. P=pI IIX. 
P/Xl 
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This suggests the operational treatment that if an unwound process can do something, so 
can the wound version. 
P [PX- P/x] t -J, @"" s' 
t' 
(lix. P) t s- t- 
We should mention here related work on various forms of transition system; the reader 
may find [Boudol & Castellani 1989], [Kiviatkoivska 1989], [Lodaya et al. 1989] and 
[Shields 19881 or interest. 
A4.3 Aside, for readers of the last interlude, on HES-based sheaves 
Consider the category HES and the nonnegative reals with the Alexandroff topology, so 
that the opens are the sets [0, r] for rcR, and call this topological space R". For a given 
I. E. S. -9, associate with an open U= [0, r] the I. E. S. F(U) = 3#. r. F lifts to a functor F 
O(R. )OP -) HES in the obvious way, and we have a presheaf of I. E. S. s on R.. 
This is, in fact, a sheaf, since given an open U of R., and an open cover for U, ( [0, rj] ), with 
U= U. j, z j Uj, and a family of sections of F, 19j, j r= J, the required properties hold: 
e Consider two opens, Ui, Uj. We have arrows F(Ui) -> F(Ui r) Uj) and F(Uj) -) F(Ui n UD 
in HES and moreover, the restriction of F(Ui) to domain Ui r) Uj and of F(Uj) to Ui r) Uj gives 
! 3.. r us the same object, namely , where Ui n Uj = [0, r]. The object of rIES such that F 
restricted to Uj isSj is just S. Hence we have a sheaf. 
fKwiatkoivska 1989] shows that progress properties correspond to Alexandroff-open 
sets (in her space of behaviours) and finitary safety properties to Scott-closed sets. It is 
rather suggestive that our category of progress properties forms a sheaf over R with the 
Alexandroff topology. Could it be that one can view timed properties as sheaves over the 
space of time ? One might envisage pick a model of time (N, Q, R, Minkowski spaces, what- 
ever), endowing with the appropriate topology (e. g. Alexandroff if one is interested in 
progress properties) and erecting a sheaf over that topology. - The sections of the sheaf will 
be observable proper-ties (in HES we are dealing with properties deducible from strict-timed 
causal bets), and the order on these sections (for us the arrows of HES) will correspond to 
the order in which those properties can be observed. Thus we have r. nodel with two dimen- 
sions of variation; keeping the same category of properties and changing the underlying 
space (but not the topology) allows to deal with the same behavioural properties in different 
models of time, while changing the category and the topology, but keeping the same points in 
the underlying space allows us to deal with different classes of properties uniformly. 
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The case of R with the Alexandroff topology with the category of progress properties 
HES as a sheaf over it is, I conjecture, only one example of this phenomena. It may be that 
this property-oriented approach to connecting time and behaviour will be more fruitful than 
concentrating on primitive notions like the connection between causality and timing. 
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Manipulating Structures: 
Abstraction and Refinement 
Want is a bitter and a hateful good, 
Because its virtues are not understood; 
Yet many things, impossible to thought, 
Have been by needs tofull perfection brought. 
Dryden 
This chapter is concerned with the specification and refinement of interval event struc- 
tures. There are two orthogonal ways to refine interval event structures; event refinement 
andfunctional refinement. The latter is the more usual form of refinement; it involves chang- 
ing the functionality of a structure while preserving some desired behavioural invariant. It 
will not be treated here. 
We will just tackle- the problem of event refinement, giving definitions which allow a 
labelled event to be replaced by a whole I. E. S. The issue of event refinement, following the 
ground-breaking work of [Shields 1979], is becoming more important in concurrency theory; 
witness the recent controversy in the EATCS bulletin (exemplified by [Reisig 1988]; see 
also [Reisig 1987A and the work of [Aceto & Hennessy 19871, [Nielsen et al. 19881, and 
[Vogler 1989]. Our own approach is modelled on [Gischer 1989]. 
The dual of event refinement is substructure abstraction, - replacing a whole substructure 
by a single event. This too is defined, and the duality between these concepts, under certain 
restrictions, is demonstrated. 
The postlude at the end of the chapter concludes the main body of the thesis. Our conclu- 
sions are presented, and further work is suggested. A fairly expansive bibliography 
concludes the document. 
5.0 Event refinement 
Here we deal with the problem of compound events. At some levels of abstraction we may 
wish to treat something as a single labelled event, and as some structure of labelled events 
at another, lower, level. This process is known as event refinement. In this section, we shall 
allude to some circumstances when it is possible to do this while preserving 'some of the 
properties of the original structure. 
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DEFINITION 5.0 - Refining structures 
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Suppose a =- [(r,, a., ), (rr, af)] r= LE is a labelled event in some interval event structure 
= (LE, Con, <b), and S. = (LE', Con, <b) is another I. E. S. with silent event can refine 
a, written! 3. refines a, iff 
lies exactly inside a; r. = begýin(S. ) & rf = end(S. ). 
(ii) S. is consistent with S. This is easiest and cleanest to achieve if we enforce the 
requirement LE'n LE = 0. 
'and one causally the same as *ff: S. has a transition causally the same as *, 
LE'. IbLeegin(ai) =b beg"in(*') & end(a') =b end(*) 2 
The transitions must also have the same Con behaviour as *' 
c'E M(S'). (af, a2'1 E C' 
The requirement (iii) that there is an occurrence of the start of an event necessarily 
simultaneous with the start of S., and an occurrence of the finish of an event necessarily 
simultaneous with end of S., is enforced to ensure that there is a transition to 'inherit' the 
causality of *' in the refined structure. (There will be no *' in the refined structure, only a 
timed with the same time as 
4t. 01 
We can think Qf an event as defining a bracket, - its hegLn and end times, - within which 
any refinement of it must terminate. Thus a bounded I. E. S. is a valid refinement of an event if 
it can do its work within the time available and does not interfere with anything. 
(We can shift a structure around, (as we did in the definition of prefixing in chapter twoj 
by adding a constant to every time in the structure, in order to propitiate refinements. This 
enables us to refine. the same event by the same structure each time it occurs. ) 
The structure obtained by performing a refinement is simple to describe; we just replace 
the labelled event we are going to refine by the structure that is doing the refining: - 
DEFINITION 5.1 -Event refinement 
The I. E. S. S with a refined by S., written ! 3[! 3-/al, is defined if S. refines a, when it is the 
I. E. S. (LE-, Con', <; ) where 
(i) L E- =df (LE - [a)) u (LE'- (*')) 
(ii) Define the *'-less Con-sets of S., Con I= (c'- (*') I c' E Con'). 
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Now, in the refined structure there will be Con-sets that didn't mention a from the 
old structure, plus, instead of any Kjon-set that mentioned a, that Con-set without 
a but with all the *'-less Con-sets ofS.: 
Con' =d,, (c Ic ECon, ae c) u f(c- (a)) u cl c r= Con, aE C, CEConl) 
(iii) For the -pari of < given by S we need to rewrite a, tags by a, (, )' ones and af tags by 
af(2)'ones. Suppose g a, = a, [a-, m'1a, j[af(2)'1af]. Then <b'will certainly have in it 
( ((r, (, ), g a, (. )), (r, (b), g a, (b))) I ((r, (. ), a, (. )), (ro), a, (b))) r= <b 
I 
It will also inherit < but with a, (, )' replacing *; and af(2), *J. We need to rewrite S)f 
some tags; define h at = at'[aw)'1*,, 1[af(2)'1*f,, 1. Then < will have in it 
( ((r, (. ), h a, (, )'), 
(ri(b), h a, (b))) I ((r, (. ), a, (, )), (r, (b), a, (b))) E <b) 
< is defined to be the smallest transitive relation containing both of these sets. 
A similar fechnique. is used for 
This last definition has the advantage of ensuring that the beginning and ending points of a 
are used in a sensible manner; anything that was previously branching less-than the begin- 
ning of a'will now be less than every labelled event in the refining structure, and anything 
that was greater than the end of a will now be greater than every labelled event in the refin- 
ing structure. 
If we had not required the existence of the transitions a., (,; and af(2)' we would be saddled 
with a very complex definition; we would have to work out what to do with the causality of 
the transitions of a, but we wouldn't have points with the right timing to acquire it. Hence 
refinement could disconnect branches, which would be rather undesirable; we have already 
seen this kind of problem in section 2.3. 
A labelled event, then, can be seen as specifying an-interval within which the silent event 
of a refining structure must fit exactly. Once the refinement is made, the causality that previ- 
ously applied to a will now affect every labelled event in the refining structure. 
It remains to check that refinement is a congruence'of betting equivalence: if we have two 
structures equivalent under a form of bet, 5 -zS' then we must show that! 3[52/al 
This will be postponed until after an example event refinement. 
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EXAMPLE 
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Consider one of the examples from chapter three, 52, rewritten as (LE, Con, <b, =b): - 
32 
T--ý 
-12 ---: 
((a 
=- [(0, aj, (2, af)], b =- [(l, b, ), (4, bf)], 
* ý-[(O, *J, (4, *f)]) 
((*, a, b) ), ab 
(((0, aj, (1, bj), ((2, af), (4, bf)) 
The labelled event b can be refined by the structure Sb == (LE', Con', <, =b); 
Sb (c [(2, c, ), (4, cf)], d [(I, d, ), (2, df)], e as [(2, e, ), (4, ef)], *; ), (4, *f)]), s 
d, c), d, e) ((2, df), (2, cj), ((2, df), (2, ef)) 
(Again we adopt the conventiorf of not showing trivial relations like as <b' af & *s' <b' at, and of 
requiring a transitive . closure to obtain the true <9 and 4. ) For clarity, we do, however, show b 
the silent event. ) The refinement leaves us with 32[ý3b/bl, as shown below. 
-92 
! 32['9b/bl (a p [(0, aj, (2, af)], c =- [(2, cj, (4, cf)], 
d =- [(l, d, ), (2, df)], e =- [(2, e, ), (4, ef)], * =- [(0, *0, (4, *01) 
((*, a, d, c), ( *, a, d, e) 1, a 1 ((0, aj, (1, dj), ((2, af), (4, cf)), ((2, af), (4, ef))), d 
((2, df), (2, cj), ((2, df), (2, ef)))) 
e 
THEOREM - The observational equivalences are congruences W. R. T. event refinement 
The glib statement of this theorem, -9[! 
3-/a] -z! 3'[-3-/aj, is not quite right. Suppose that in 
3, a= (1, e) a. ), (rf(,, ), af)] is a labelled event. Then if s -z S' and if evety occurrence 
of e with real timing [r, (,, ), rf(,, )] is replaced by% in! 3 and 91, the results will ~z each other. 
- Suppose a= (1, e) M [(r, (. ), a, ), (rf(. ), af)] is in ! 3: we will write -9 with every occurrence of e 
with real timing [r, (,, ), rf(. )] replaced by! 3. as .5 
15.1al. 
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Proof. First notice that we merely have to show that 31-94a] -p 5154al as -7. is strict- 
ly the most discriminating equivalence, and so if event refinement is a congruence of it, it will 
be a congruence of all the -zs. 
To begin with, we have to show that if S. refines a in S then there will be a labelled event 
with the same event part and timing as a for it to refine in 5'. This is clearly the case, since if 
S has an a= (1, aj, (rf(,, ), af)] then ST will have an a' = (I', e) aj, (rf(a), af)] 
since otherwise we can bet on the transitions of a and obtain -, (S -y. S'). 
Thus 31S. /al and 345-1a] are well-defined and behave as intended. 
Next notice that if LE cLxEu [*) then LE' c 1: xEu [*') and there is a bijection, f 
say, between L and 1: such that a= (1, e) E LE <--> a= (E(I), e) ELE', so, up to bijection of 
labels, we need only consider E as a universe of bets. 
Consider the syntax of bets, b :: = Win I Lose I (a, )ys bI bi v b2 I b, Ab2 I Vb I 3b and sup- 
pose to the contrary of the theorem that there is a bet, bd say, such that 
S(31 alal,. £, bd)vtS(2'13-Ial, Lbd). 
4. 
Clearly, if this bet bd is of the form bi v b2 or b, A b2 then there are more primitive bets 
that will distinguish the structures, so we can discard these forms. Similarly, if Vb or 3b dis- 
tinguish t4e. structures then b will, so we are left with the assumption that 313.1all can 
display a transition that ST34all even though! 3 -y, T. 
Suppose this offending transition is a L(d) Irt(d), aqd)]. Clearly begin(S. ) !5 rt(d) :5 end(! 3, ) 
since otherwise -, (! 3 -p ! Y). Suppose this transition at(d) is in some run fýd). This run must 
have been derived from one of -9 which displayed a since otherwise (! 3 -'Y. ' 3'). But, for 
every run of S which displays an a there will be a run of ! 5' which is the same. up to bijection 
of labels, since otherwise -, (! 3 -, ys! 3'). 
In., 91S. /al every run of S which displayed a will be replaced by a set of runs which together 
have all of the transitions of 3,, and similarly for ý'[%Iaj. Hence our transition al(d) can't be 
one of the transitions of 19., since these are present in both 91-94a] and TIS. /al. But it can't 
be one that isn't fromS. either, since then -, (! 3 -y, T). 
Hence we have a contradiction and the theOrem is proved. 
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5.1 Substructure Abstraction 
The dual concept of refinement is abstraction. Instead of the conventional notion of hiding, 
we will allow substructure abstraction; giving more than one labelled event a (new) name and 
only mentioning that name in future. There are considerable complications in knowing what an 
event abstraction might mean in general, so, here, we just give a definition that is the dual of 
the event refinement definition. 
DEFINITION 5.2 - Substructure 
Consider two I. E. S. s, 3= (LE, Con, <b), and Sb = (LE', Con', <bf). Sb is a abstractable sub- 
structure ofS iff 
V a' = (1, e) E LE', a' ; -, *'. 3a= (1, e) E LE, a : P-- *. a =- [t,, td =- a'. That 
is. 
-Sb 
has a 
subset of the labelled events of S with the same timings. This means that we can 
use the same name for a labelled event in LE as we use for it in LE'. 
ýLo_n , ý_-dd ((cn LEý u (*') IcE Con). That is, the Con-sets Of Sb are just those of s 
which refer to the labelled events in LE'. 
a, . a2 E LE'. V a' c: LE', aE LE - LE'. 
(a, <b at) (a, <b aý(, )':! ýb at') A 
(a, <b at) (at ý5b af(2)' <b a, ) A 
(at =b a't) => (a, ýb a, (, )' =b at) v 
(a, =b af(2)' =b a, ) 
Further,,, 
Val, a2'E LE'. ((a, <b' a2') <-* (a, <ba2')) A((al =b' a2') <=ý. (a, =ba2') 
) 
(iv) If af [(r, (,;, a, (,; , (rf(,;, af(j))] & al'SE [(r, ( ), a, (2; , (rf( ;, af( ; )] then 2) 
2) 2) 
[(rs(l)'7 *s')i (rf(2)', *01- 
The first two conditions just ensure that Sb is actually contained in -9. The third ensures 
that -9b 
is Only connected to 3 via its end points, and agrees with it on causality, so that we 
have 
19 3 
rather than 
Figure 5.1 - Abstractable, and nonabstractable substructures 
where dashed lines, as usual, show causality. 
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The final condition (iv) ensures thatSbhas the right silent event. 
4. 
David Murphy 
The notion of substructure is the key to an abstraction principle that is the dual of refine- 
ment. It means that only some structures are amenable to refinement, but that is not 
necessarily a bad thing. 
DEFINITION 5.3 - Abstraction 
Consider an I. E. S., 3= (LE, Con, <b), and a new labelled event, b C- LE. Suppose that 3 
has a refinable substructure, Sb -` (LE', Con', <). Then, we can define .3 with 3b abstracted 
by b, written 301-9b], as the I. E. S. (LE-, Kjoq, <) where 
(i) LE- =df LE - (LE'- f *')) u (b) 
(ii) Define ka=b if aELE' 
=a other-wise. Then 
Con' =,,, f (k(c) Icc Con) 
(iii) Define i (rt, 'a, ) = (ri, a, ) if ae LE' 
= (r, (b), b., ) otherwise 
and j (ri, a, ) = (r,, a, ) if ao LE' 
= (rf(b), bf) othenvise 
Then 
<b' (i(r, (. ), a, (. )), i(ri(b), a, (b))) I ((r, (, ), aq. )), (r, (b), ao))) E <b) 
And similarly for 4. 
The new labelled event b carries the timing of *'. 
4. 
It follows immediately that abstraction is the dual of refinement: - 
THEOREM - Relating abstraction and refinement 
SupposeS is an I. E. S. and Sb is a refinable substructure of it. Then 
0 lb/-9 b] blbl=g and (%%/al)[ý/5.1=3 
Proof. For the first part, (S1b1SbD1'Ib1b1 =! 3, consider the three components separately. 
(i) R. T. P. LE = ((LE - (LE'- (b)) -(b (LE'- 
= (LE - (LE- (LE'- 
= LE 
(ii) R. T. P. Con =(CIC ECon2, bz c) u f(c- (b)) u c'l CE Con2, bcc, c'r= Conl] 
where Con I= fc'- [*')I c'E ýýon) and Con2= (k(c) I cE Con). 
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Rewrite Con2 as Con3 u Con4 where Con3 = (c Ice Con, -, 3a' c. LE'. a'c= c) and 
Con4 = (cn (LE-LEý u (b) Ic c= Con, 3a'E LE'. a'rz c). Then R. T. P. 
Con = (c Ic cz Con3) u f(c - (b)) u cl c (=- Con4, c'c= Conl) 
= Con3 u f(c r-% (LE-LEý) u cl ce Con, c'c Conl). But, 
ýQgn'= ( (cr-) LE') u (*') Icc Con3) since3b is a refinable substructure, so 
we have Conl (cn LE'l ce Con3) anditjust remains to show that 
Con Con3 u (c n (LE - LE )) u (c r) LE) Ice Con, --, 3 a' c. LE'. a' r= c) 
(cIcE Con, -, 3a'E LE'. a'E c) u (c Ic (=- Con, -, 3a'c= LE'. a'r= c) 
Con. 
(iii) R. T. P. <b = <ba u <bb where 
<ba =[ ((r, (. ), g a, (, )), (ri(b), g a, (b))) ((rt(, ), a, (, )), 
(ri(b), at(b))) E 
')) ((r, (. ), a, (. )'), (r, (b), at(b)')) E <b), and where <bb = (((r, (. ), h a, (. )'), 
(r, (b), h a, (b) 
<b2 = ((j(r, (. ), aq. )), i(r, (b), a, (b))) I ((r, (. ), aqý)), (r, (b), a, (b))) (z 
<bl with g, h, i and j are 
as before. 
Notice that, since Sb is a refinable substructure, we can write <b (modulo a 
transitive closure or two) as the union of orders not involving any tags in 5b, things 
related to a, (, )', things related to af(2), and the orders in Sb itself, <b' (but without 
those relating to the fictional *'): 
<b = <b3U <b4a u <Ab u <bb 
where <0 = ((r, (, ), a, (, )), 
(rt(2), a, (2))) ((r, (, ), a, (, )), (r, (2), a, (2))) E <b, a,, a2 0 LE'), I 
<b4a = ((r, (, ), a, (, )), (r, (,;, a, (,; )) ((r, (, ), a, (, )), (r, (,;, a., (, 
ý)) E <b, a, o LE'), 
I <b4b ((rf(2), af(2); ) . (rt(2), a, (2))) ((rf(2), af(2)), (rt(2), a(2))) C <b, a2 o LE'). 
Clearly, nothing g, h, i orj do will affect <b3, so our task reduces to proving that 
<b4a u <b4b =( ((r, (. ), g a, (a-)), (ro), g a, (b))) 
I ((rq. ), a, (, )), (ro), a, (b))) c (<b4a u <b4b)) 
But, <b4a and <b4b have nothing in them that g can effect, by construction. Thus the 
case of <b 
follows. 
Hence the first part of the theorem follows. 
The other case, (3 [! 3. /aj)[a/%j= ! 3, follows similarly. 
41W 
. There are other notions of refinement from the one we have outlined; it is possible, for 
instance, to define a structure as capable of refining a labelled event a if it fits inside-the time 
interval available, rather than fitting exactly. This definition places limitations on the causali- 
ty that the transitions of a can have, and makes it harder to find a dual definition of 
abstraction, but it may be useful on occasion. 
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Postlude - Conclusions and Further Work 
David Murphy 
The final section of the thesis, this one, deals with further work needed and conclusions 
resulting from this work. The latter first: - 
The principal conclusion is that it is possible to construct an implementational real-timed 
concurrency theory iWth intervals of the reals associated with occurrences of events. Such a 
theory givesfresh insights into concurrency and nondeterminism. 
The detailed conclusions can be subdivided into two sections, one dealing with the techni- 
cal content of the thesis, the other with more philosophical matters; there is some overlap of 
material between the sections. 
Technical conclusions 
Our primary technical conclusion is that some of the considerable work to be done in 
understanding the relationships between various notions of time, causality, and concurrency 
can be done using the interval event structure framework and categorical techniques. As the 
further work section (below) indicates, much of this thesis needs reworking to incorporate a 
more categorical treatment and make such comparisons easier. We have discovered four 
kinds of categories: - 
(i) Categories of simulations. In these categories, objects are I. E. S. s and arrows 
indicate when one structure can simulate another. A proper refinement calculus for 
I. E. S. s should be built using these categories. The common notions of the most 
sequential, or most nondeterministic, or most concurrent I. E. S. that simulates 
given one live here. 
(ii) Categories of behaviours. These are the 'conventional' categories of concurrency 
theory; objects are either labelled events or their transitions, and arrows represent 
causality. Associated with each such causal category is a linear order. Thus, for us, 
a 'behaviour' is a poset viewed as a category, a linear order viewed as a category, 
and a functor assigning times to happenings, that is, objects in the latter category 
to objects in the former. 
(iii) Categories of embeddings. Here, objects are I. E. S. s and there is an arrow from S to 
S' just when 3 is S' truncated at some Point. A category of embeddings is a wide 
subcategory of a category of simulations, since any notion of simulation naturally 
leads to a notion of embedding. These may be the right categories for establishing 
fixed-point results. 
(iv) Certain notions of behavioural difference seem to lead naturally to metric spaces. 
We have shown how to treat the logic of such equivalences categorically, by 
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defining a category whose objects are (a subclass of) LE. S. s and whose arrows 
represent the betting distance between structures. This approach should be of 
some use in a more general search for the logic of concurrent behaviours. 
It is our contention that a lot of interesting concurrency theory can be done using these 
four kinds of categories and by relating various instances of them. (Categories derived from 
asynchronous operational models like ATLTSs are also important and should turn out to be 
what we have called 'categories of behaviours. ) 
In the preceeding chapters various constructions were invented and, as often as not, 
claimed to be natural. Here we summarise some of the more important conclusions about 
what constructions make sense in the timed framework. 
Causality is represented as a poset and timing by the reals with their usual 
linear order. The connection between these two structures can be described 
sheaf-theoretically. 
It is sensible to associate occurrences of events with intervals of time. This 
leads to clean notions of event refinement and substructure abstraction which 
are duals of rach other. 
It also leads to a notion of concurrency which only permits synchronisation 
when intervals overlap. This form of concurrency is properly described by two 
structures, one recording information about the intersection of events' inter- 
vals, and. one recording information about the union of events' intervals. These 
structures stand in a simple relationship to one another. 
There is a semantic paradigm based entirely on single observations of execu- 
tions that allows us to discover all the information about a structure that is 
finitely obtainable. It can be seen as a natural extension of testing equivalence. 
There is a major difference between the assumptions made about the nature of 
concurrency in traditional non-interleaving frameworks such as the Petri net 
model, and those made in the world of process algebras. A new timed process 
algebra can be constructed which takes a, different position from either major 
camp; it uses Petri net-style nondeterminism, mixes it with the idea (from pro- 
cess algebra) that there is a single (non-distributed) state before P 11 Q starts 
and after it finishes, and adds a semantics based in the 'true concurrency' tra- 
dition. These notions seem to live together quite happily. 
It is possible to have a continuous model and yet not to have to abandon 
handy induction principles. Models of computational systems will usually only 
do a countable number of things in uncountable time, and by concentrating on 
them, it is possible to have the richness of real-timing without losing the 
chance to be able to do structural inductions. 
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Philosophical conclusions 
We have tried to explore a rather different point in the concurrency theory design space. 
The decision that I. E. S. s should be capable of evolving without reference to their environ- 
ment leads to: 
the notion -of synchronisations only happening when they are desired, and 
when timing allows. This is a much more primitive notion of sYnchronisation 
than usual, and a rather better description of the mechanisms available in 
physically concurrent systems. 
a semantics based entirely on observation. It is important to notice that con- 
currency and choice interact in subtle ways: having changed our notion of 
concurrency from the conventional one in process algebra, we must see what 
notion of choice makes sense. For us, external choice at the I. E. S. -level turns 
out not to be natural, and so the testing paradigm (which assumes participa- 
tory concurrency and makes most sense when external choice is present) is no 
longer appropriate. Hence we have to formulate a semantics based on obser- 
vation ratýer than participation. It turns out to be possible to do this while 
keeping some of the features of the testing paradigm intact, highlighting the 
fact that bisimulation isn't the only sensible notion of observational equiva- 
lence. 
It is worth emphasizing that we have shown that an implementational concurrency theory 
can make different assumptions about what kind of an entity a distributed system is and still 
be coherent, (- we assumed it could evolve without reference to the environment, and that 
we could see everything the system does). One just has to consider what the natural techni- 
cal notions of 'concurrencY' and 'nondeterminism' are, once the philosophical position of the 
theory is decided upon. 
Turning to IPA, perhaps unsurprisingly, we see the same pattern at a higher level. It is 
possible to build a process algebra with the same philosophical stance as the more imple- 
mentational I. E. S. model; again, we have tirning, 'non-participatory concurrency (and, 
-thus, 
a 
yery raw notion of liveness), and choice as nondeterminism. 
While our stance on the nature of concurrency may seem tadical, the introduction of real- 
time is equally so. 'Fhe importance of timing is that it gives us another structure to test our 
. constructions in; R has a strict total order <, and all constructions that we make must 
respect both causality and this order. We have succeeded in defining various constructions 
that fulfil this criteria, but the impact of timing is greater than just to validate our particular 
constructions; a valid consideration for any concurrency theory is whether it is, in principle, 
timeable, or not: for those that are not, it should be possible to justify the veracity of their 
constructions on other grounds. 
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One of our stated aims was to produce a behaviourally-rich concurrency theory. The I. E. S. 
model is certainly rich enough to makes some interesting distinctions: - 
we can distinguish between concurrency and nondetern-iinistic interleaving; hence 
this is a 'true concurrency' model. 
we can, --distinguish 
between occurrences of events whose intervals are entirely 
simultaneous, overlap each other, and are entirely disjoint. 
we can also distinguish between concurrency, simultaneity, and overlap. Concur- 
rent occurrences need not overlap in time, and overlapping occurrences need not be 
concurrent. A clear distinction between timing and causality is maintained, enabling 
descriptions of concurrent systems to distinguish between happenings in the same 
place (which are possibly simultaneous, but never concurrent), and distributed hap- 
penings (which are possibly simultaneous and possibly concurrent). 
In short, we can talk about the where and the when of concurrency theory as well as the, 
usual what. 
Our notion of concurrency, - that two things are concurrent if the are not completely 
dependent on each other, - is, I claim, a useful one. This notion of concurrency can be 
interpreted allowing two things to happen in different places if they are concurrent. The fact 
that our decision on which things are concurrent derives from the fundamental causality of the 
situation, not frorb any particular observations, means that it can be seen as a rather deeper 
one. than, for instance, notions of concurrency which rely on the possibility of an observer 
seeing two different interleavings. ([Reisig 1987] calls our sort of notion 'strong 
concurrency. ') 
Further work 
This will be discussed chapter by chapter: - 
Chapter 0. It would be interesting to try to develop more formal criteria for comparing mod- 
els. It is vital to have certain 'fixed-points' to facilitate this process, - notions that should 
have a definite well-understood meaning in every model. Pari of the problem with trying to 
compare concurrency theories, at the moment, is that it is hard to extract the essence of a 
given theories' notion of, for instance, concurrency, while abandoning the formalism used to 
define it. 
it 
would be particularly interesting to try to develop an untimed concurrency theory which 
held to the precepts of our philosophical section, 0.3, in order to see what notions of 
behavioural equivalence they lead to. 
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In the long term, physical concurrency should become of increasing interest to concurrency 
theorists, - the search for a suitable formalism is only just beginning. We hope that some of 
the ideas presented here will be of use in the development of theories of physical concurrency. 
Chapter 1. A sensible basis for a timed model, in retrospect, would probably be the cate- 
gories POSet of poýets and UnSet of linearly ordered sets. All the work of chapter one can 
be seen as pro-viding a structure built over both these categories; it would be better 
rephrased as such. 'Me work of Thomason, discussed in the interlude preceding chapter 
three, indicates that there might, under certain conditions, be an adjunction between QOSet 
(the category built from POSet by formally associating transitions with occurrences of 
events) and UnSet; this hypothesis ought to be explored, and, if possible, extended to the 
non-free construction of timing from posets (i. e. the free construction of timing in the pres- 
ence of temporal as well as causal constraints). The implications of instability should be 
further investigated, and class of functions computable by I. E. S. s (under suitable constraints, 
such as finite density and finite causes) should be elucidated. 
Chapter 2. Much more needs to be discovered about categories for timed models before 
the right choice is clear; categories like UES seem a sound choice, but it is hard to tell with- 
out defining more operators in them (such as CSP III or CCS relabelling) and discovering 
more about their properties. Hiding should be dealt with categorically; unfortunately, the 
proper treatment of causality in this case, as with sequential composition, is less clear. 
It would be výry technically convenient to have a category of timed simulations that had 
all small limits and colimits. There seems to be no obvious modification that can be made to 
the definition of morphism in UES that would give it these properties; perhaps different cate- 
gory of simulations might be more appropriate. 
The insight stated above, that the real test of the veracity of operations is that they make 
sense both temporally and causally, should be exploited, once the correct forum for comparing 
the temporal and the causal is known: the two categories QOSet and UnSet, together with 
an adjunction between them, (if one exists, ) would have sufficient structure for such a com- 
parison. 
The relationship between UES and other categories used in describing concurrency 
theories should also be investigated. This would enable us to'relate I. E. S. s formally to event 
structures, Petri nets etc. Such a categorical -comparison might enable us to import other 
notions of equivalence into the I. E. S. model, which could broaden our understanding of it. 
My real discovery in writing this chapter was that I didn't know enough category theory. 
It ývould be interesting to rewrite the chapter using a much more general notion of behaviour. 
The work of [Pratt et al. 19891 again provides the clue; we should specify operations uniform- 
ly over a category of behavioural categories. In our case, elements of this large category 
Postlude - Conclusions and Further Work Page 218 
David Murphy 'rime, causality, and concurrency 
would be categories each incorporating a notion of the behaviour of an I. E. S. Such an 
approach, although technically difficult, would provide the perfect forum for comparing notions 
of timed (and untimed) behaviour. 
Chapter 3. The categories of bets should be investigated in much more detail. The relation- 
ship between traditional testing equivalence and betting equivalence is fairly unclear, and 
should be elucidated. Furthermore, we should investigate the relationship between the oper- 
ations of chapter two and the equivalences of chapter three in more detail and, in particular, 
the extent to which the betting equivalences are congruences of the various operations of 
chapter two. It would be interesting to know if there was an appropriate subcategory of UES 
in which the various betting equivalences could be recovered as isomorphisms. 
The worth of a new semantic technique is only really obvious when it is applied in numer- 
ous situations. Therefore, betting equivalence might profitably be applied in other models, 
leading to a nonparticipatory semantics for them, and a better understanding of betting and of 
what it is applied to. 
Practically nothiývg was discovered about the various spaces of bets. It would be 
interesting to investigate the topological properties of these spaces, (such as compactness), 
and attempt to discover whether there is anything interesting to be learnt from these 
properties. Could one, for instance, rely on any space constructed from bets having certain 
properties, 
' 
independent of the system being bet upon ? One obviously desirable property in 
all our spaces isIthat finite structures should be dense in the infinite ones; this would bear 
investigation. 
Furthermore, it might be informative to investigate different metrics; one could easily for- 
mulate a metric based on the integral over all time of the intervals that two structures were 
not betting-equivalent, for instance. This would take a much more even-handed view of fail- 
ure than we do now: it would allow transgressions in the past to be mitigated by future good 
behaviour, rather than penalising the first failure of simulation, however small. 
The hint in the interlude succeeding chapter three about describing real-timed systems by 
sheaves would probably bear further investigatio 
, 
n. It would be interesting to reformulate the 
whole theory of causality and timing, concentrating on the sheaf nature of the 'evaluation 
functor, ' the functor that tells us what has happened thus far. The interlude preceding the 
chapter can be seen as hinting at an adjunction between appropriate categories of timing and 
causality when causality is treated at the labelled event level (i. e. via the j-morphisms). The 
section about sheaves in the next. interlude, in contrast, deals with the relationship between 
timing and causality at the lower level of transitions and the causal order. The fact that the 
sheaf of sets of posets generated by an I. E. S. over the reals has nice global as well as local 
properties might be exploitable, possibly leading to a better understanding of the relationship 
between timing and causality at the transition level. 
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It might be easier to work with executions directly rather than I. E. S. s. The Hausdorff met- 
ric for subsets (discussed in the appendix to chapter three) could be used to build spaces 
from structures (via their set of executions); these might be interesting to work with, espe- 
cially since it should be possible to derive the usual more-nondeten-ninisfic-than ordering in 
this setting (- essentially one process would be more nondeterministic than another iff they 
had the same always-lose behaviour, but the latter process always won more often than the 
former). 
All bets can be seen as &-timed bets. Yet we have concentrated on untimed and strict- 
timed bets, two special cases. Our semantics would be neater if we had a uniform treatment 
of 5-timed difference, as a metric space for instance, to match the pleasantly clean treatment 
of sameness that betting equivalence gives us. In order to deal with timewise refinement 
properly, the connection between the strict-timed and the untimed spaces needs to be fully 
worked out: perhaps a sensible (categorical ?) treatment of 5-timed bets would provide a uni- 
fying framework. 
Chapter 4. The',, ATLTS technique is not restricted to IPA; it should be used to give an 
operational semantic .s to other calculi, perhaps timed CSP. ATLTSs could be given a categor- 
ical treatment much as Bednarczyk treated ATSs; this treatment should prove most 
informative, and will propitiate the establishment of the relationship of our timed operational 
semantics to other operational models. We should discuss the precise relationship of the 
operational semantics of IPA to the other two semantics; perhaps a categorical treatment of 
ATLTSs would propitiate this, too. It seems likely that the untimed part of ATLTSs have the 
same expressive power as C/E nets or asynchronous transition systems; this topic should 
be investigated, as it should give some perspective on how to add time to these models. 
In IPA itself we should deal with recursion properly. We should be able to use Banach's 
contraction mapping theorem and metric spaces of bets to deal with recursion, rather than the 
Smyth & Plotkin result and categories of simulations suggested in the interlude; a compari- 
son of the two approaches would be useful. It is rather suggestive that one obvious category 
used to erect a sheaf of executions of I. E. S. s overthe reals, HES, seems promising as a can- 
didate for one needed to give a meaning to recursive terms in IPA. The suggestion that 
various topological notions of closure correspond to various classes of properties, and that 
one of these notions is the appropriate one to impose on a model of time in order to erect a 
sheaf of the matching class of properties upon it should be investigated further: it offers the 
hope of a comprehensive theory of observation. 
Various other connections remain to be investigated. How does the work on models of 
Petri nets as monoidal categories, or the work from Imperial on quantale-theoretic models 
relate to ours ? Our sheaf-theoretic viewpoint needs much work, and may eventually be 
related to these models. 
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We can only specify a small class of I. E. S. s with IPA so far, we cannot, for instance, spec- 
ify local simultaneity. It would be interesting to extend the syntax of IPA so that the 
semantics included more of cIES or even IES. IPA also needs a refinement methodology, 
and much larger examples written in it, before its worth as a process algebra, rather than a 
curiosity, is established. Our full abstraction result should be extended to IPA with mutual 
recursion. A biding operator would be useful in IPA, and its introduction, without making 
great changes tolthe semantics, should be investigated. Timed process algebras don't seem 
very algebraic; there are few laws that they satisfy. It would be interesting to investigate a 
hierarchy of less and less discriminating behavioural equivalences, to see at which stage of 
abstraction various laws are recovered; such an approach might lead to the goal, suggested 
under chapter 0, of discovering an untimed concurrency theory which held to our philosophical 
position, but with rather more behavioural laws. 
It would be interesting to know the class of nets we have 'compiled' IPA into; it would be 
interesting to discover, for instance, that all our expression correspond to confusion-free nets. 
It should be possible to build ATLTSs directly from I. E. S. s using the notion of extends giv- 
en in chapter three. This would extend the ATLTS framework to deal with I. E. S. s explicitly. 
Chapter 5. The issues of specification and refinement, the former particularly, have been 
only very lightly touched upon. A proper treatment would rely on logic of specifications. It 
might be fruitful to investigate whether any of the real-time temporal logics known thus far 
are suitable for specifying I. E. S. s; the philosophical literature is so rich (e. g. [Allen 1985], 
[Goldblau 1987], 1[van Benthem 1986]) that some progress should be possible. 
The insight that various maximal I. E. S. s (the most sequential, or most nondeterministic, 
or most concurrent I. E. S. that simulates a given one) live in UES, mentioned at the startlof 
the posflude, should be exploited to give a refinement calculus for I. E. S. s with notions of both 
timewise and functional refinement. The problem of timing a given causality, subject to given 
timing constraints, is rather poorly understood, but should be accessible to attack from the 
I. E. S. model. This might lead to a useful calculus not only for describing, but also for design- 
ing timed distributed systems. 
FIN - 
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